attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for labstack/echo

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Access/Disrupt Service via Echo

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      [Attacker's Goal: Gain Unauthorized Access/Disrupt Service via Echo]
                                                      |
                                     -------------------------------------------------
                                     |                                               |
                      {Exploit Middleware Vulnerabilities}          [Exploit Core Framework Features/Misconfigurations]
                                     |                                               |
                -------------------------------------                ------------------------
                |                   |               |                |                      |
        {(Bypass Auth Middleware)} {Tamper JWT} {(CSRF via CORS)} (Path Traversal)  [Exploit Binder]
                |                   |               |                                     |
        ----------          ----------      ----------                            ----------
        |                    |               |                                     |
{(Weak Secret)}             -               {(No Origin)}                         {Type Juggling}
      (JWT)                                 (Wildcard)                            [Injection]

Attack Tree Path: {Exploit Middleware Vulnerabilities} -> {(Bypass Auth Middleware)} -> {(Weak Secret) (JWT)}

• Attack Vector: Weak JWT Secret
• Description: The application uses Echo's JWT middleware for authentication, but the secret key used to sign and verify JWTs is weak (e.g., easily guessable, short, a default value, or publicly known).
• How it Works:
  • The attacker attempts to guess the secret key through brute-force or dictionary attacks.
  • Alternatively, the attacker may find the secret key exposed in source code, configuration files, or environment variables that are improperly secured.
  • Once the attacker knows the secret key, they can craft a JWT with arbitrary claims (e.g., setting the user_id to an administrator's ID) and sign it with the weak secret.
  • The application's JWT middleware will accept this forged token as valid, granting the attacker unauthorized access.
• Likelihood: Medium
• Impact: High (Full account compromise, potential for complete system takeover)
• Effort: Low (Brute-force or dictionary attack, or finding exposed secrets)
• Skill Level: Low
• Detection Difficulty: Medium (Unusual JWTs, failed login attempts if brute-forcing)

Attack Tree Path: {Exploit Middleware Vulnerabilities} -> {Tamper JWT}

• Attack Vector: JWT Tampering (Consequence of other JWT vulnerabilities)
• Description: This is not a primary vulnerability but the result of exploiting a weakness like a weak secret (described above) or a vulnerability in the JWT validation logic. The attacker modifies an existing JWT or crafts a new one to gain unauthorized access.
• How it Works:
  • This relies on a pre-existing vulnerability, such as a weak secret key (as described above).
  • The attacker intercepts a legitimate JWT (e.g., from their own session or by sniffing network traffic).
  • They modify the claims within the JWT (e.g., changing the user_id, role, or permissions).
  • If the signature validation is weak or bypassed (due to the pre-existing vulnerability), the modified token is accepted by the application.
• Likelihood: Medium (Dependent on the presence of other JWT vulnerabilities)
• Impact: High (Unauthorized access, privilege escalation)
• Effort: Low (If a primary JWT vulnerability exists)
• Skill Level: Low to Medium (Depends on the underlying vulnerability)
• Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires careful auditing of JWT usage and validation)

Attack Tree Path: {Exploit Middleware Vulnerabilities} -> {(CSRF via CORS)} -> {(No Origin/Wildcard)}

• Attack Vector: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) due to Misconfigured CORS
• Description: The application uses Echo's CORS middleware, but it's misconfigured to allow requests from any origin (*) or doesn't properly validate the Origin header. This allows an attacker to perform actions on behalf of a logged-in user without their knowledge.
• How it Works:
  • The attacker creates a malicious website that contains a hidden form or JavaScript code.
  • When a logged-in user visits the malicious website, the hidden form or JavaScript code automatically sends a request to the vulnerable Echo application.
  • Because the CORS middleware is misconfigured, the request is allowed, even though it originated from a different domain.
  • The request is processed by the Echo application as if it came from the legitimate user, potentially performing actions like changing the user's password, transferring funds, or posting data.
• Likelihood: Medium (Common misconfiguration)
• Impact: High (Can perform actions on behalf of the user, potentially leading to data breaches or account compromise)
• Effort: Low (Craft a malicious website)
• Skill Level: Low
• Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires monitoring for unusual cross-origin requests and analyzing referer headers)

Attack Tree Path: (Path Traversal)

• Attack Vector: Path Traversal
• Description: The application uses user-supplied input to construct file paths or route parameters without proper sanitization or validation. This allows an attacker to access files outside the intended directory, potentially including sensitive data or system files.
• How it Works:
  • The attacker crafts a malicious URL or request parameter that includes special characters like ../ (parent directory) or absolute paths (e.g., /etc/passwd).
  • The application uses this input directly to construct a file path or route.
  • The operating system interprets the special characters, allowing the attacker to traverse the file system and access files outside the intended web root or application directory.
• Likelihood: Medium (If user input is used unsafely in routing or file access)
• Impact: High (Read arbitrary files, potentially including sensitive data, configuration files, or even execute code)
• Effort: Low (Craft a malicious URL)
• Skill Level: Low
• Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires monitoring for unusual file access patterns and analyzing request parameters)

Attack Tree Path: [Exploit Binder] -> {Type Juggling/Injection}

• Attack Vector: Type Juggling/Injection via Binder
• Description: The application uses Echo's binder to bind request data to Go structs, but it doesn't properly validate the types or values of the bound data. This allows an attacker to inject unexpected data, potentially leading to unexpected behavior, vulnerabilities, or even code execution.
• How it Works:
  • The attacker crafts a malicious request payload that contains data of unexpected types or values. For example, they might send a string where an integer is expected, or an array where a single value is expected.
  • The Echo binder attempts to bind this data to the corresponding fields in a Go struct.
  • If the application doesn't properly validate the bound data, the unexpected types or values can lead to:
    • Type Juggling: Exploiting loose type comparisons in Go (e.g., comparing a string to an integer).
    • Injection: Injecting data that is later used in SQL queries, shell commands, or other sensitive operations, leading to SQL injection, command injection, or other vulnerabilities.
    • Unexpected Behavior: Causing the application to behave in unintended ways, potentially leading to crashes or data corruption.
• Likelihood: Medium (If input validation is weak or absent)
• Impact: Medium to High (Depends on how the bound data is used; can range from minor data corruption to code execution)
• Effort: Low (Craft a malicious request payload)
• Skill Level: Low to Medium (Depends on the specific vulnerability being exploited)
• Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires monitoring for unexpected data types or values and analyzing application logs)