Threat Model Analysis for labstack/echo

Threat: Middleware Bypass via Ordering

Threat: Middleware Bypass via Ordering
- Description: An attacker crafts malicious requests that exploit incorrectly ordered middleware. They send requests designed to trigger functionality in a middleware component before an authentication or authorization middleware validates the request. For example, logging sensitive data before authentication allows logging of unauthorized requests.
- Impact: Unauthorized access, data leakage, bypass of security controls.
- Affected Echo Component: Use() function (middleware registration), overall middleware chain execution order.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
  - Strictly define and document middleware execution order.
  - Automated tests (unit/integration) to verify correct order and behavior.
  - "Fail-closed" principle: If order is uncertain, deny access.
  - Visual tool or linter to analyze middleware order.

Threat: Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) Misconfiguration
- Description: An attacker hosts a malicious website that makes cross-origin requests. If Echo's CORS middleware is overly permissive (AllowOrigins: ["*"], AllowCredentials: true), the attacker's site can read responses, exfiltrating data or performing actions on behalf of the user (if cookies are used).
- Impact: Data exfiltration, Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)-like attacks, unauthorized actions.
- Affected Echo Component: middleware.CORS(), middleware.CORSConfig
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
  - Explicitly define allowed origins (avoid "*"). Whitelist trusted domains.
  - Restrict allowed HTTP methods.
  - Avoid AllowCredentials: true unless necessary, and never with AllowOrigins: ["*"].
  - Regularly audit CORS configuration.

Threat: Debug Middleware Exposure in Production
- Description: An attacker discovers debug middleware (request logging, pprof) enabled in production. They send requests to trigger these, gaining access to sensitive information (request headers, bodies, internal state, performance data) to plan further attacks.
- Impact: Information disclosure, aiding in reconnaissance and further attacks.
- Affected Echo Component: Any debug middleware (middleware.Logger(), middleware.Recover(), middleware.RequestID(), custom debug middleware). e.Start() if misconfigured.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
  - Environment variables to control middleware activation (APP_ENV).
  - Build process to remove/disable debug middleware in production.
  - Regularly audit running configuration.

Threat: Route Parameter Injection (Path Traversal)
- Description: An attacker manipulates route parameters to inject malicious characters (../) to access files outside the intended scope. Example: /files/:filename exploited with /files/../../etc/passwd.
- Impact: Path traversal, unauthorized file access, potential code execution.
- Affected Echo Component: e.GET(), e.POST(), etc. (route definition), c.Param() (parameter retrieval).
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
  - Strictly validate route parameters (regex, whitelists).
  - Sanitize input to remove dangerous characters.
  - Avoid using route parameters directly in file system operations.
  - Least privilege: Application should have minimal file system permissions.

Threat: Route Parameter Injection (SQL Injection - via ORM)
- Description: While Echo doesn't directly interact with databases, if a route parameter is used in an ORM query without sanitization, an attacker can inject SQL. Example: /users/:id used directly in an ORM's Find() method, allowing /users/1;DROP TABLE users. Echo's parameter handling facilitates this.
- Impact: SQL injection, data modification/deletion/exfiltration.
- Affected Echo Component: e.GET(), e.POST(), etc. (route definition), c.Param() (parameter retrieval).
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
  - Parameterized queries or ORM's escaping mechanisms. Never concatenate user input into SQL.
  - Validate route parameters (data type).
  - Input validation/sanitization at multiple layers.

Threat: Sensitive Data Exposure in Context
- Description: An attacker triggers an error or exploits a vulnerability to leak the Echo Context. If sensitive data (API keys, credentials, tokens) is stored directly in the context, it's exposed.
- Impact: Information disclosure.
- Affected Echo Component: echo.Context, any middleware/handler storing sensitive data in the context.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
  - Avoid storing sensitive data directly in the context.
  - Encrypt/tokenize sensitive data before storing in context.
  - Robust error handling to prevent context leakage.
  - Review logging middleware to avoid logging the entire context.

Threat: Vulnerable Dependencies
- Description: An attacker exploits a known vulnerability in Echo itself or one of its direct dependencies.
- Impact: Varies; could range from denial of service to remote code execution.
- Affected Echo Component: The entire framework and its dependencies.
- Risk Severity: Critical (depending on the vulnerability)
- Mitigation Strategies:
  - Regularly update Echo and all dependencies.
  - Dependency vulnerability scanner (go list -m -u all, snyk, dependabot).
  - Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tool.

Threat: Unprotected Routes
- Description: An attacker directly accesses a route that should require authentication/authorization, but is left unprotected due to misconfiguration, missing middleware, or oversight.
- Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data or functionality.
- Affected Echo Component: e.GET(), e.POST(), etc. (route definition functions), middleware for authentication/authorization (middleware.JWT(), custom middleware).
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
  - "Deny-by-default": Require auth for all routes unless explicitly public.
  - Consistent naming/metadata for protected routes.
  - Regularly review route configurations.
  - Integration tests to verify protected routes.