Objective: Compromise CA to Issue Unauthorized Certificates
Compromise CA to Issue Unauthorized Certificates **[ROOT GOAL - CRITICAL NODE]**
├── OR
│ ├── Exploit Software Vulnerabilities in Boulder **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│ │ ├── OR
│ │ │ ├── Code Injection Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│ │ │ ├── Logic/Design Flaws in Boulder's ACME Implementation **[HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]**
│ │ │ │ ├── OR
│ │ │ │ │ ├── Validation Bypass **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│ │ │ │ │ ├── Authorization Bypass **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│ │ │ ├── Dependency Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│ │ │ ├── Denial of Service (DoS) Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│ ├── Compromise Boulder Infrastructure **[HIGH RISK PATH]**
│ │ ├── OR
│ │ │ ├── Compromise Boulder Servers **[HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]**
│ │ │ ├── Compromise Database Server **[HIGH RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE]**
│ │ │ ├── Compromise HSM/Key Storage **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│ ├── Compromise Boulder's Build/Release Pipeline **[CRITICAL NODE]**
│ ├── Compromise Dependency Supply Chain **[CRITICAL NODE]**
Attack Tree Path: * High-Risk Path: Exploit Software Vulnerabilities in Boulder
* This path focuses on exploiting vulnerabilities within the Boulder software itself. Successful exploitation can lead to unauthorized control over the CA's functions.
* **Critical Node: Logic/Design Flaws in Boulder's ACME Implementation**
* This is a particularly critical area as flaws in the core logic of ACME processing, validation, and authorization can directly lead to unauthorized certificate issuance.
* **Attack Vector Details:**
* **Validation Bypass:** Attackers aim to circumvent the domain validation process. This could involve exploiting weaknesses in how Boulder implements DNS, HTTP, or TLS-ALPN validation methods. For example, logic errors in checking DNS records, vulnerabilities in handling HTTP redirects during validation, or flaws in TLS-ALPN negotiation. Successful bypass allows certificate issuance for domains the attacker does not control.
* **Authorization Bypass:** Attackers attempt to bypass authorization checks within Boulder. This could involve exploiting flaws in how Boulder manages accounts, permissions, or session handling. For example, incorrect permission checks allowing unauthorized actions, session fixation vulnerabilities, or flaws in account ownership verification. Successful bypass allows attackers to perform actions they shouldn't, including issuing certificates for unauthorized domains.
* **Critical Node: Code Injection Vulnerabilities**
* Boulder processes external data (ACME requests, domain names, etc.) and interacts with databases and potentially external systems. Input validation flaws can lead to code injection.
* **Attack Vector Details:**
* Attackers identify points where Boulder processes external input without proper sanitization or validation. This could be in ACME request parsing, database query construction, or command execution during validation processes (e.g., DNS lookups).
* Attackers craft malicious input payloads designed to inject code. Examples include SQL injection payloads in ACME requests targeting database interactions, or command injection payloads if Boulder executes external commands based on user-controlled input.
* Successful injection allows attackers to execute arbitrary code within the context of the Boulder application, potentially gaining control over Boulder components, accessing sensitive data, or escalating privileges.
* **Critical Node: Dependency Vulnerabilities**
* Boulder relies on external Go libraries and potentially other dependencies. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies can be exploited to compromise Boulder.
* **Attack Vector Details:**
* Attackers identify outdated or vulnerable dependencies used by Boulder. This can be done through publicly available vulnerability databases or by analyzing Boulder's dependency manifest.
* Attackers leverage known exploits for these vulnerabilities. Many dependency vulnerabilities have publicly available exploits.
* Exploiting dependency vulnerabilities can allow attackers to gain code execution, bypass security controls, or cause denial of service within Boulder, depending on the nature of the vulnerability.
* **Critical Node: Denial of Service (DoS) Vulnerabilities**
* While not directly leading to unauthorized certificate issuance, DoS attacks can disrupt CA operations, impacting availability and potentially masking other malicious activities.
* **Attack Vector Details:**
* Attackers identify DoS vectors in Boulder. This could include resource exhaustion vulnerabilities (e.g., memory leaks, CPU-intensive operations), algorithmic complexity issues in request processing, or amplification attack vectors.
* Attackers craft malicious requests or traffic patterns designed to overwhelm Boulder's resources and cause a denial of service.
* Successful DoS attacks can disrupt certificate issuance, revocation, and other CA operations, impacting users relying on the CA.
Attack Tree Path: * High-Risk Path: Compromise Boulder Infrastructure
* This path focuses on directly compromising the infrastructure hosting Boulder, bypassing the application-level security.
Attack Tree Path: * High-Risk Path: Compromise Boulder Servers
* Directly compromising the servers running Boulder grants attackers control over the entire Boulder instance.
* **Critical Node: Compromise Boulder Servers**
* **Attack Vector Details:**
* Attackers identify vulnerabilities in the operating system, exposed services, or configurations of the servers hosting Boulder. This could include unpatched OS vulnerabilities, misconfigured firewalls, weak passwords, or exposed management interfaces.
* Attackers exploit these server vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access to the servers.
* Once servers are compromised, attackers can gain control of the Boulder instance, access configuration files, private keys (if stored on the server), and potentially manipulate CA operations directly.
Attack Tree Path: * High-Risk Path: Compromise Database Server
* Compromising the database server used by Boulder can expose sensitive CA data, including potentially private keys if improperly managed.
* **Critical Node: Compromise Database Server**
* **Attack Vector Details:**
* Attackers identify vulnerabilities in the database server itself or in Boulder's interactions with the database. This could include SQL injection vulnerabilities in Boulder's code, database server misconfigurations, weak database credentials, or unpatched database vulnerabilities.
* Attackers exploit these database vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access to the database.
* Once the database is compromised, attackers can access and potentially modify sensitive CA data, including account information, certificate metadata, and potentially private keys if they are stored in or accessible from the database.
Attack Tree Path: * Critical Node: Compromise HSM/Key Storage
* If Boulder uses a Hardware Security Module (HSM) or other secure key storage, compromising this component is a direct path to CA compromise.
* **Attack Vector Details:**
* Attackers identify weaknesses in the physical security, software vulnerabilities in the HSM interface, or weak access controls protecting the HSM or key storage system.
* Attackers exploit these weaknesses to gain unauthorized access to the HSM or key storage.
* Successful compromise of HSM/key storage allows attackers to directly access and potentially extract the CA's private keys, enabling them to issue unauthorized certificates without even needing to compromise the Boulder software itself.
Attack Tree Path: * Critical Node: Compromise Boulder's Build/Release Pipeline
* Attacking the build and release process of Boulder allows attackers to inject malicious code into the software before it is even deployed.
* **Attack Vector Details:**
* Attackers target the infrastructure used to build and release Boulder, such as GitHub accounts, build servers, or code signing key management systems.
* Attackers compromise this infrastructure to inject malicious code into the Boulder source code or build artifacts during the build process.
* The compromised build artifacts are then distributed to users, who unknowingly deploy a backdoored version of Boulder. This allows attackers to control CAs running this compromised version.
Attack Tree Path: * Critical Node: Compromise Dependency Supply Chain
* Similar to compromising Boulder's pipeline, but targeting the supply chain of Boulder's dependencies.
* **Attack Vector Details:**
* Attackers identify vulnerabilities in the supply chain of dependencies used by Boulder. This could involve compromising the repositories, build systems, or developer accounts of dependency projects.
* Attackers inject malicious code into a compromised dependency.
* When Boulder (and other projects using the dependency) builds and includes the compromised dependency, the malicious code is incorporated, indirectly compromising Boulder.
* This is the ultimate objective and represents the most severe security breach.
* **Attack Vector Details:**
* Successful achievement of any of the attack paths described above that lead to unauthorized certificate issuance results in this critical outcome.
* This allows attackers to impersonate any website, conduct man-in-the-middle attacks, and undermine the trust model of the internet. The impact is extremely high, potentially damaging the reputation and trustworthiness of the CA and any applications relying on it.