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Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to a user's account or bypasses authentication mechanisms entirely.
Mattermost Contribution:mattermost-server implements its own user management, authentication (including password handling, session management, and optional MFA), and authorization logic. It handles direct integrations with external authentication providers (LDAP, SAML, GitLab, etc.) within the server code.
Example: A vulnerability in the SAML integration code within mattermost-server allows an attacker to forge a SAML assertion and bypass authentication. A flaw in the password reset logic implemented in mattermost-server allows account takeover.
Impact: Complete compromise of user accounts, access to private messages and files, potential for impersonation, and lateral movement within the system.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
Developers: Implement robust input validation and sanitization on all authentication-related endpoints within the server. Use secure password hashing algorithms. Implement secure session management with proper expiration and invalidation within the server's logic. Thoroughly test and audit all authentication flows, including integrations with external providers, focusing on the server-side handling. Implement rate limiting and account lockout mechanisms. Follow secure coding practices for handling secrets.
Description: An attacker injects malicious JavaScript, but the vulnerability lies in how mattermost-server processes and delivers content.
Mattermost Contribution:mattermost-server is responsible for processing and rendering user-generated content (messages, channel names, etc.) before sending it to the client. If the server-side sanitization is flawed, XSS is possible. This includes handling Markdown parsing and any server-side transformations.
Example:mattermost-server fails to properly escape user input before storing it in the database or before sending it to other clients. A vulnerable Markdown parsing library used by the server allows XSS.
Impact: Session hijacking, theft of sensitive information, defacement (though primarily client-side, the root cause is server-side).
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
Developers: Implement strict output encoding and context-aware escaping of all user-generated content on the server-side before storing it or sending it to clients. Sanitize input on the server-side, regardless of any client-side sanitization. Regularly update and audit any libraries used for Markdown parsing or HTML rendering that are part of the server.
Description: An attacker injects malicious SQL code into database queries executed by mattermost-server.
Mattermost Contribution:mattermost-server directly interacts with the database (PostgreSQL or MySQL) to store and retrieve all data. All database interactions are handled by the server code.
Example: A crafted search query or username, processed by mattermost-server, contains SQL code that bypasses authentication or extracts data.
Impact: Complete database compromise, data breaches, data modification, denial of service, and potential for remote code execution on the database server.
Risk Severity: Critical
Mitigation Strategies:
Developers: Use parameterized queries (prepared statements) for all database interactions within the server code. Never construct SQL queries by concatenating user input directly within the server. Implement strict input validation and sanitization on all data used in database queries handled by the server.
Description: An attacker tricks mattermost-server into making requests to unintended destinations.
Mattermost Contribution:mattermost-server handles integrations with external services (webhooks, slash commands, OAuth) and may fetch resources based on user input. The server makes these requests.
Example: A webhook configuration, processed by mattermost-server, is manipulated to point to an internal service, exposing sensitive data.
Impact: Access to internal network resources, data exfiltration, denial of service, and potential for remote code execution.
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
Developers: Implement strict input validation and sanitization on all URLs and data used to make external requests within the server code. Use a whitelist of allowed domains. Avoid making requests to internal resources based on user input processed by the server.
Description: An attacker uploads a malicious file that exploits vulnerabilities in the server's handling of the file.
Mattermost Contribution:mattermost-server is responsible for receiving, validating, storing, and potentially serving uploaded files. The vulnerability lies in how the server handles these operations.
Example:mattermost-server fails to properly validate the file type (based on content, not extension) and allows a PHP file to be uploaded and executed. The server's file storage logic has a path traversal vulnerability.
Impact: Remote code execution, denial of service, data breaches.
Risk Severity: High
Mitigation Strategies:
Developers:
Strict File Type Validation (Server-Side): Validate file types based on content, not extensions, within the server code.
File Name Sanitization (Server-Side): Sanitize file names to prevent path traversal on the server.
Storage Location (Server Configuration): Store files outside the web root, a configuration managed by the server.
Execution Prevention (Server Configuration): Configure the web server (often in conjunction with mattermost-server deployment) to prevent execution.
Description: A malicious or vulnerable plugin introduces security risks, and mattermost-server fails to mitigate them.
Mattermost Contribution:mattermost-server provides the plugin architecture and is responsible for loading, executing, and managing plugins. The server must enforce security restrictions on plugins.
Example: A plugin bypasses the server's intended permission model and accesses sensitive data or APIs. The server fails to properly sandbox a plugin, allowing it to execute arbitrary code.
Impact: Varies, but can include data breaches, denial of service, or complete system compromise due to the server's failure to control the plugin.
Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical)
Mitigation Strategies:
Developers:
Plugin Sandboxing (Server-Side): Implement robust sandboxing within the server to isolate plugins.
Permission Model (Server-Side): Enforce a strict permission model on the server to limit plugin access.
Code Signing (Server-Side Verification): Require and verify digital signatures on plugins on the server.