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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for micro/go-micro

Attack Surface: Registry Poisoning

  • Description: Manipulation of the service registry, leading to redirection of service requests to malicious endpoints.

    • Go-Micro Contribution: go-micro relies on the registry for service discovery. A compromised registry directly impacts go-micro's ability to route requests securely.

    • Example: An attacker compromises the Consul registry and modifies the endpoint for the "authentication" service to point to a malicious server. When other go-micro services attempt to authenticate users, they are unknowingly sending credentials to the attacker's server.

    • Impact: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, Data Theft, Unauthorized Access, Service Disruption.

    • Risk Severity: High

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Secure Registry Access: Enforce strong authentication and authorization for registry access. Use ACLs or RBAC provided by the registry (e.g., Consul ACLs, Etcd RBAC).
      • Registry Encryption: Encrypt communication between go-micro services and the registry using TLS.
      • Regular Auditing: Monitor registry access logs for suspicious activity and regularly audit registry configurations.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant minimal necessary permissions to services interacting with the registry.

Attack Surface: Transport Protocol Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Exploitation of vulnerabilities within the transport protocols used by go-micro for inter-service communication (e.g., gRPC, HTTP).

    • Go-Micro Contribution: go-micro utilizes transport protocols. Vulnerabilities in these protocols directly affect the security of go-micro applications.

    • Example: A vulnerability in the gRPC library used by go-micro allows for a crafted request to trigger a buffer overflow, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the service.

    • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), Denial of Service (DoS), Information Disclosure, Service Compromise.

    • Risk Severity: High to Critical

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Use Secure and Updated Transports: Utilize well-maintained and secure transport protocol implementations.
      • Dependency Updates: Regularly update go-micro and its transport protocol dependencies (e.g., gRPC Go library) to patch known vulnerabilities.
      • Input Validation: Implement robust input validation within go-micro service handlers to mitigate potential protocol-level exploits.
      • Security Audits: Conduct security audits focusing on inter-service communication and transport protocol interactions.

Attack Surface: Deserialization Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities during the deserialization of data exchanged between go-micro services, potentially leading to code execution.

    • Go-Micro Contribution: go-micro relies on serialization/deserialization for message handling. Insecure deserialization practices within services can be exploited.

    • Example: A go-micro service deserializes data received from another service without proper validation. A vulnerability in the deserialization process allows an attacker to craft a malicious payload that, when deserialized, executes arbitrary code on the receiving service.

    • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), Service Compromise, Data Corruption.

    • Risk Severity: High to Critical

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Safe Deserialization Practices: Avoid deserializing untrusted data directly. If necessary, sanitize and validate data before deserialization.
      • Use Secure Serialization Formats: Prefer serialization formats less prone to vulnerabilities (e.g., Protocol Buffers with well-defined schemas) and use well-vetted libraries.
      • Input Validation: Implement strict input validation after deserialization within service handlers to catch and reject malicious data.
      • Security Audits: Review serialization and deserialization logic within go-micro services for potential vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Lack of Mutual TLS (mTLS) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) for Inter-Service Communication

  • Description: Unencrypted communication between go-micro services, allowing for eavesdropping and Man-in-the-Middle attacks.

    • Go-Micro Contribution: go-micro's default configuration might not enforce TLS/mTLS. Developers must explicitly configure secure communication.

    • Example: go-micro services communicate over unencrypted HTTP. An attacker on the network can intercept sensitive data like authentication tokens or business data exchanged between services.

    • Impact: Information Disclosure, Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, Data Breaches.

    • Risk Severity: High

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Enforce TLS/mTLS: Configure go-micro services to use TLS for all inter-service communication. Implement mTLS for stronger authentication and mutual verification.
      • Certificate Management: Implement secure certificate generation, storage, and rotation for TLS/mTLS.
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate microservices within secure network segments as an additional layer of defense.

Attack Surface: Insecure Service-to-Service Authentication and Authorization

  • Description: Weak or missing authentication and authorization mechanisms between go-micro services, allowing unauthorized access.

    • Go-Micro Contribution: While go-micro provides building blocks, secure service-to-service authentication and authorization are developer responsibilities within the go-micro framework.

    • Example: A go-micro order service directly calls a payment service without proper authentication. An attacker compromising the order service could then make unauthorized calls to the payment service, potentially manipulating transactions.

    • Impact: Privilege Escalation, Lateral Movement, Unauthorized Access to Sensitive Functionality and Data.

    • Risk Severity: High

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Implement Service-to-Service Authentication: Use robust authentication methods like JWTs, API keys, or mTLS client certificates to verify service identities.
      • Implement Authorization: Enforce authorization policies based on service identity and roles to control access to specific endpoints and actions.
      • Least Privilege Principle: Grant services only the necessary permissions to interact with other services.
      • Regular Security Reviews: Review and update authentication and authorization policies as services evolve.

Attack Surface: Insecure Default Configurations in Go-Micro and Plugins

  • Description: Using insecure default settings in go-micro core or its plugins that are not suitable for production environments.

    • Go-Micro Contribution: go-micro and its plugins might have default configurations that prioritize ease of initial setup over production security.

    • Example: A go-micro service exposes a debugging endpoint with sensitive information enabled by default, accessible without authentication.

    • Impact: Information Disclosure, Unauthorized Access, Potential System Compromise.

    • Risk Severity: High

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Review Default Configurations: Thoroughly review default configurations of go-micro and all used plugins.
      • Harden Configurations: Override insecure defaults with secure production-ready settings. Disable or secure unnecessary features and endpoints.
      • Security Hardening Guides: Consult security hardening guides and best practices specific to go-micro and its ecosystem.
      • Configuration Management: Use configuration management tools to enforce secure configurations consistently across environments.

Attack Surface: Dependency Vulnerabilities in Go-Micro Dependencies

  • Description: Vulnerabilities present in third-party libraries that go-micro directly or indirectly depends upon.

    • Go-Micro Contribution: go-micro relies on a set of Go libraries. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies can introduce security risks into go-micro applications.

    • Example: A critical vulnerability is discovered in a widely used logging library that go-micro depends on. Applications using vulnerable versions of go-micro become susceptible to exploitation.

    • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), Denial of Service (DoS), Information Disclosure, Data Breaches, Service Compromise.

    • Risk Severity: High to Critical

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Dependency Management: Utilize Go modules or similar dependency management tools to track and manage dependencies.
      • Regular Dependency Updates: Keep go-micro and its dependencies updated to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities.
      • Dependency Scanning: Implement automated dependency scanning tools in CI/CD pipelines to detect vulnerable dependencies.
      • Vulnerability Monitoring: Subscribe to security advisories and vulnerability databases to proactively monitor for new vulnerabilities affecting go-micro dependencies.