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Attack Tree Analysis for micro/go-micro

Objective: Compromise Application using go-micro

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application using go-micro **(Critical Node)**
└───[AND] **Exploit go-micro Specific Weaknesses (Critical Node)**
    ├───[OR] **Exploit Registry Vulnerabilities (Critical Node)**
    │   ├─── **Registry Poisoning (Critical Node)**
    │   │    └───[AND] Gain Access to Registry **(Critical Node)**
    │   │        └─── **Exploit Registry Authentication Weakness (if enabled) (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)**
    │   │             └─── Weak Credentials, Default Credentials, Credential Leakage **(High-Risk Path)**
    │   │                  [Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Low, Skill Level: Low, Detection Difficulty: Medium]
    │   │        └─── **Inject Malicious Service Information (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)**
    │   │             └─── Register Malicious Service with Attacker-Controlled Endpoint **(High-Risk Path)**
    │   │                  [Likelihood: High (if registry access gained), Impact: Critical, Effort: Low, Skill Level: Low, Detection Difficulty: Hard]
    ├───[OR] **Exploit Broker Vulnerabilities (Critical Node)**
    │   ├─── **Message Interception (Eavesdropping) (High-Risk Path)**
    │   │    └───[AND] Access Broker Network Traffic
    │   │        └─── **Network Sniffing (if unencrypted) (High-Risk Path)**
    │   │             └─── [Likelihood: Medium (if no TLS), Impact: Medium, Effort: Low, Skill Level: Low, Detection Difficulty: Hard] **(High-Risk Path)**
    │   │        └─── **Capture Sensitive Data in Transit (High-Risk Path)**
    │   │             └─── Application Data, Credentials, Internal Communications **(High-Risk Path)**
    │   │                  [Likelihood: High (if traffic intercepted), Impact: High, Effort: N/A, Skill Level: N/A, Detection Difficulty: Very Hard]
    │   ├─── **Message Injection/Spoofing (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)**
    │   │    └───[AND] Access Broker and Forge Messages **(Critical Node)**
    │   │        ├─── **Broker Authentication Bypass (if enabled) (High-Risk Path)**
    │   │        │    └─── Weak Credentials, Default Credentials, Credential Leakage **(High-Risk Path)**
    │   │        │         [Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Low, Skill Level: Low, Detection Difficulty: Medium]
    │   │        ├─── **Broker Authorization Bypass (if enabled) (High-Risk Path)**
    │   │        │    └─── Lack of Message Signing/Verification **(High-Risk Path)**
    │   │        │         [Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Medium, Skill Level: Medium, Detection Difficulty: Hard]
    │   │        └─── **Send Malicious Messages to Services (High-Risk Path)**
    │   │             └─── Trigger Service Logic Flaws, Cause Denial of Service, Data Manipulation **(High-Risk Path)**
    │   │                  [Likelihood: High (if message injection possible), Impact: Critical, Effort: Low, Skill Level: Low, Detection Difficulty: Hard]
    ├───[OR] **Exploit Transport Vulnerabilities (Critical Node)**
    │   ├─── **Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack (High-Risk Path)**
    │   │    └───[AND] Intercept Communication between Services
    │   │        └─── **Network Sniffing (if unencrypted transport) (High-Risk Path)**
    │   │             └─── [Likelihood: Medium (if no TLS), Impact: Medium, Effort: Low, Skill Level: Low, Detection Difficulty: Hard] **(High-Risk Path)**
    │   │        └─── **Intercept and Modify/Eavesdrop on Service Communication (High-Risk Path)**
    │   │             └─── Data Manipulation, Credential Theft, Service Impersonation **(High-Risk Path)**
    │   │                  [Likelihood: High (if MitM successful), Impact: Critical, Effort: N/A, Skill Level: N/A, Detection Difficulty: Very Hard]
    ├───[OR] Exploit API Gateway Vulnerabilities (if used with go-micro)
    │   ├─── **API Gateway Authentication/Authorization Bypass (High-Risk Path)**
    │   │    └───[AND] Exploit Weaknesses in Gateway Security
    │   │         └─── **Default Credentials, Weak Credentials (High-Risk Path)**
    │   │              └─── [Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Low, Skill Level: Low, Detection Difficulty: Medium] **(High-Risk Path)**
    │   │        └─── **Gain Unauthorized Access to Backend Services (High-Risk Path)**
    │   │             └─── Access Sensitive Data, Execute Unauthorized Actions **(High-Risk Path)**
    │   │                  [Likelihood: High (if bypass successful), Impact: Critical, Effort: N/A, Skill Level: N/A, Detection Difficulty: Hard]
    └───[OR] Exploit Service Implementation Vulnerabilities (Related to go-micro usage)
        └─── Misconfiguration of go-micro Features
            └───[AND] Identify and Exploit Misconfigurations
                └─── **Improperly Configured Authentication/Authorization (High-Risk Path)**
                    └─── Permissive Access Controls, Missing Authentication **(High-Risk Path)**
                         [Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Low, Skill Level: Low, Detection Difficulty: Medium]
        └─── Logic Flaws in Service Code Leveraging go-micro Features
            └───[AND] Identify and Exploit Logic Flaws
                └─── **Business Logic Flaws Exposed via RPC Calls (High-Risk Path)**
                    └─── Insecure Workflows, Privilege Escalation via RPC **(High-Risk Path)**
                         [Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Medium, Skill Level: Medium, Detection Difficulty: Hard]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit Registry Authentication Weakness (if enabled) (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)

  • Attack Vector:
    • Name: Registry Authentication Bypass via Weak Credentials
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Description: Attacker attempts to gain access to the service registry by exploiting weak, default, or leaked credentials. If the registry uses authentication, but it's poorly configured or uses easily guessable credentials, attackers can compromise it.
    • Mitigation:
      • Enforce strong password policies for registry access.
      • Avoid default credentials and change them immediately upon deployment.
      • Implement multi-factor authentication for registry access.
      • Regularly audit registry access logs for suspicious activity.
      • Consider certificate-based authentication for stronger security.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Inject Malicious Service Information (High-Risk Path, Critical Node)

  • Attack Vector:
    • Name: Registry Poisoning via Malicious Service Registration
    • Likelihood: High (if registry access gained)
    • Impact: Critical
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard
    • Description: Once the attacker gains access to the registry (e.g., through authentication bypass), they can register a malicious service with an endpoint they control. When legitimate services attempt to discover and communicate with the intended service, they might be redirected to the attacker's malicious service, leading to data theft, service disruption, or further compromise.
    • Mitigation:
      • Secure registry access as described above.
      • Implement service registration validation and authorization to prevent unauthorized service registration.
      • Monitor registry for unexpected or suspicious service registrations.
      • Use mutual TLS for service-to-registry communication to ensure authenticity.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Network Sniffing (if unencrypted) (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector:
    • Name: Broker/Transport Eavesdropping via Network Sniffing
    • Likelihood: Medium (if no TLS)
    • Impact: Medium (Broker), High (Transport - potential credential theft)
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard
    • Description: If communication between services and the broker, or between services directly (transport), is not encrypted using TLS/SSL, an attacker on the same network can use network sniffing tools to capture network traffic and eavesdrop on sensitive data being transmitted.
    • Mitigation:
      • Enforce TLS/SSL encryption for all broker connections.
      • Enforce TLS/SSL encryption for all inter-service communication (transport).
      • Implement network segmentation to limit the attacker's network access.
      • Use network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) to detect suspicious network activity.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Capture Sensitive Data in Transit (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector:
    • Name: Data Leakage via Intercepted Communication
    • Likelihood: High (if traffic intercepted)
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: N/A (Result of successful sniffing)
    • Skill Level: N/A
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
    • Description: This is the consequence of successful network sniffing. The attacker captures sensitive data from intercepted communication, which could include application data, user credentials, internal API keys, or other confidential information.
    • Mitigation:
      • Prevent network sniffing by enforcing TLS/SSL encryption (as mentioned above).
      • Minimize the transmission of sensitive data in messages if possible.
      • Consider end-to-end encryption of sensitive data within messages, even if transport is encrypted.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Broker Authentication Bypass (if enabled) (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector:
    • Name: Broker Authentication Bypass via Weak Credentials
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Description: Similar to registry authentication bypass, attackers can attempt to bypass broker authentication by using weak, default, or leaked credentials. Successful bypass allows unauthorized access to the message broker.
    • Mitigation:
      • Enforce strong password policies for broker access.
      • Avoid default credentials and change them immediately upon deployment.
      • Implement access control lists (ACLs) to restrict broker access.
      • Regularly audit broker access logs.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Broker Authorization Bypass (if enabled) (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector:
    • Name: Broker Authorization Bypass via Lack of Message Signing/Verification
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard
    • Description: Even if authentication is in place, if the broker or services do not implement proper message signing and verification, an attacker with access to the broker (or even network access) might be able to forge messages and send them as if they originated from a legitimate service.
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement message signing and verification mechanisms.
      • Use access control lists (ACLs) to restrict message publishing and subscription permissions.
      • Consider using broker features for message integrity and authenticity.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Send Malicious Messages to Services (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector:
    • Name: Message Injection/Spoofing leading to Service Compromise
    • Likelihood: High (if message injection possible)
    • Impact: Critical
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard
    • Description: If message injection or spoofing is successful, attackers can send malicious messages to services. These messages can be crafted to exploit service logic flaws, cause denial of service, manipulate data, or trigger other malicious actions within the services.
    • Mitigation:
      • Prevent message injection and spoofing by implementing strong authentication, authorization, and message signing (as mentioned above).
      • Implement robust input validation and sanitization in service handlers to prevent processing of malicious messages.
      • Design services to be resilient to unexpected or malicious input.

Attack Tree Path: 8. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector:
    • Name: Transport Layer Man-in-the-Middle Attack
    • Likelihood: Medium (if no TLS)
    • Impact: Critical
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard
    • Description: If inter-service communication (transport) is not encrypted with TLS/SSL, an attacker on the network can perform a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack. They can intercept communication, eavesdrop on data, and potentially modify messages in transit, leading to data manipulation, credential theft, or service impersonation.
    • Mitigation:
      • Enforce TLS/SSL encryption for all inter-service communication (transport).
      • Use mutual TLS for stronger authentication between services.
      • Implement network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) to detect suspicious network activity.

Attack Tree Path: 9. API Gateway Authentication/Authorization Bypass (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector:
    • Name: API Gateway Authentication Bypass via Weak Credentials
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Description: If an API Gateway is used, weak or default credentials for the gateway itself can allow attackers to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access to backend services protected by the gateway.
    • Mitigation:
      • Enforce strong password policies for API Gateway access.
      • Avoid default credentials and change them immediately upon deployment.
      • Implement robust authentication and authorization mechanisms in the API Gateway.
      • Regularly audit API Gateway access logs.

Attack Tree Path: 10. Improperly Configured Authentication/Authorization (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector:
    • Name: Service Authentication/Authorization Misconfiguration
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Low
    • Skill Level: Low
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium
    • Description: Services might be misconfigured with permissive access controls or missing authentication mechanisms. This allows attackers to bypass intended security measures and access sensitive functionalities or data without proper authorization.
    • Mitigation:
      • Implement proper authentication and authorization in all services.
      • Follow the principle of least privilege when configuring access controls.
      • Regularly review and audit service authentication and authorization configurations.
      • Use go-micro's built-in security features or plugins for authentication and authorization.

Attack Tree Path: 11. Business Logic Flaws Exposed via RPC Calls (High-Risk Path)

  • Attack Vector:
    • Name: Exploiting Business Logic Flaws via RPC
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High
    • Effort: Medium
    • Skill Level: Medium
    • Detection Difficulty: Hard
    • Description: Vulnerabilities in the business logic of services, especially when exposed through RPC calls, can be exploited by attackers. This could include insecure workflows, privilege escalation vulnerabilities, or other logic flaws that can be triggered via crafted RPC requests.
    • Mitigation:
      • Conduct thorough code reviews and security testing of service business logic.
      • Design secure workflows and access control mechanisms within services.
      • Implement robust input validation and sanitization in RPC handlers.
      • Perform penetration testing to identify and exploit business logic flaws.