Mitigation Strategy: Secure Go-Micro Client Interaction with Service Registry
- Mitigation Strategy: Implement Authentication and TLS Encryption for Go-Micro Service Registry Clients.
- Description:
- Configure Go-Micro Client Authentication: When initializing the
go-micro
client to connect to the service registry (e.g., Consul, Etcd), configure authentication credentials. This typically involves setting options within theregistry.NewRegistry()
function or through environment variables thatgo-micro
's registry client can utilize. Refer to your chosen service registry's documentation for specific authentication methods and how to configurego-micro
to use them. - Enable TLS for Go-Micro Registry Client: Configure the
go-micro
registry client to use TLS encryption when communicating with the service registry. This is usually done by providing TLS configuration options to theregistry.NewRegistry()
function. This might involve specifying certificate paths or using TLS configuration structs provided bygo-micro
or the underlying transport library. - Verify Client Configuration: Ensure that your
go-micro
services are correctly configured to use authentication and TLS when connecting to the service registry. Check logs and network traffic to confirm encrypted and authenticated connections.
- Configure Go-Micro Client Authentication: When initializing the
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Service Registration/Discovery by Go-Micro Clients (High Severity): If
go-micro
clients connect to the registry without authentication, malicious actors could potentially use roguego-micro
clients to register or discover services without authorization, leading to service disruption or information leakage. - Eavesdropping on Go-Micro Client-Registry Communication (High Severity): Without TLS, communication between
go-micro
clients and the service registry can be intercepted, exposing service metadata and potentially authentication credentials if not properly handled. - Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks on Go-Micro Client-Registry Communication (High Severity): Attackers could intercept and manipulate communication between
go-micro
clients and the registry, potentially redirecting service discovery or injecting false service information.
- Unauthorized Service Registration/Discovery by Go-Micro Clients (High Severity): If
- Impact:
- Unauthorized Service Registration/Discovery by Go-Micro Clients: High risk reduction. Prevents unauthorized actions from
go-micro
clients interacting with the registry. - Eavesdropping on Go-Micro Client-Registry Communication: High risk reduction. Protects sensitive data transmitted between
go-micro
clients and the registry. - Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks on Go-Micro Client-Registry Communication: High risk reduction. Ensures the integrity and authenticity of communication between
go-micro
clients and the registry.
- Unauthorized Service Registration/Discovery by Go-Micro Clients: High risk reduction. Prevents unauthorized actions from
- Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. TLS is enabled for
go-micro
registry clients in the staging environment. Authentication configuration forgo-micro
registry clients is basic and needs review. - Missing Implementation: Robust authentication needs to be configured for
go-micro
registry clients in all environments, especially production. TLS encryption needs to be enabled forgo-micro
registry clients in production. Specific configuration steps forgo-micro
client-side TLS and authentication based on the chosen registry (Consul) need to be fully implemented.
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Mutual TLS (mTLS) for Go-Micro Service Communication
- Mitigation Strategy: Enforce Mutual TLS (mTLS) for Inter-Service Communication within Go-Micro.
- Description:
- Configure Go-Micro Transports for mTLS: When initializing your
go-micro
services, configure the chosen transport (e.g., gRPC, HTTP) to use mTLS. This involves setting TLS options within theserver.NewServer()
andclient.NewClient()
functions ingo-micro
. You will need to provide paths to service certificates, private keys, and CA certificates for both server and client configurations. - Utilize Go-Micro Interceptors/Middleware for mTLS Enforcement: Implement
go-micro
interceptors (for gRPC) or middleware (for HTTP) to enforce mTLS. These interceptors/middleware should verify that incoming requests have valid client certificates and reject requests that do not meet the mTLS requirements. This ensures that only services with valid certificates can communicate with each other. - Certificate Management for Go-Micro Services: Establish a secure process for managing and distributing TLS certificates to your
go-micro
services. Consider using secrets management solutions or service mesh integrations to simplify certificate distribution and rotation within thego-micro
ecosystem. - Test and Verify mTLS in Go-Micro: Thoroughly test inter-service communication within your
go-micro
application to confirm that mTLS is correctly configured and enforced. Use network monitoring tools or service logs to verify that connections are encrypted and mutually authenticated.
- Configure Go-Micro Transports for mTLS: When initializing your
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Service Spoofing/Impersonation within Go-Micro (High Severity): Without mTLS in
go-micro
, a malicious service could potentially impersonate a legitimate service within thego-micro
ecosystem, leading to data breaches or unauthorized actions. - Unauthorized Service Access within Go-Micro (High Severity): Without mTLS, any service (even unauthorized or compromised ones) could potentially communicate with other
go-micro
services if network access is available, bypassing intended access controls. - Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks on Go-Micro Inter-Service Communication (High Severity): While basic TLS encrypts communication, mTLS within
go-micro
adds a crucial layer of identity verification for both communicating services, making MITM attacks significantly more difficult to execute successfully within thego-micro
environment.
- Service Spoofing/Impersonation within Go-Micro (High Severity): Without mTLS in
- Impact:
- Service Spoofing/Impersonation within Go-Micro: High risk reduction. Prevents malicious services from impersonating legitimate
go-micro
services. - Unauthorized Service Access within Go-Micro: High risk reduction. Enforces strict access control between
go-micro
services based on verified identities. - Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attacks on Go-Micro Inter-Service Communication: High risk reduction. Significantly strengthens protection against MITM attacks within the
go-micro
service mesh.
- Service Spoofing/Impersonation within Go-Micro: High risk reduction. Prevents malicious services from impersonating legitimate
- Currently Implemented: Not implemented. mTLS is not currently configured or enforced for inter-service communication in
go-micro
applications in any environment. - Missing Implementation: mTLS needs to be implemented for inter-service communication across all environments (development, staging, production). This requires configuring
go-micro
transports for mTLS, developing enforcement interceptors/middleware, and establishing a certificate management process forgo-micro
services.
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Rate Limiting using Go-Micro Middleware
- Mitigation Strategy: Utilize Go-Micro Middleware for Service-Level Rate Limiting.
- Description:
- Choose a Rate Limiting Strategy: Decide on a rate limiting strategy suitable for your
go-micro
services. This could be based on requests per second, minute, or hour, and might be applied globally to a service or per endpoint. - Develop Go-Micro Rate Limiting Middleware: Create custom middleware in
go-micro
to implement your chosen rate limiting strategy. This middleware will typically:- Track Request Counts: Maintain counters for requests received by each service or endpoint within a defined time window. This could be done in-memory (for simple cases) or using a distributed cache (e.g., Redis) for more robust and scalable rate limiting across service instances.
- Enforce Limits: Check if the request count for a given service or endpoint exceeds the defined rate limit.
- Reject Exceeding Requests: If the rate limit is exceeded, the middleware should reject the incoming request and return an appropriate error response (e.g., HTTP 429 Too Many Requests for HTTP transport, or a gRPC error code for gRPC transport).
- Apply Middleware to Go-Micro Services: Register the rate limiting middleware with your
go-micro
services when initializing them. This can be done usingserver.NewServer(server.WrapHandler(...))
orserver.NewServer(server.WrapSubscriber(...))
for handlers and subscribers respectively, or similar mechanisms depending on the transport. - Configure Rate Limits: Make rate limits configurable, ideally through environment variables or configuration files, so they can be adjusted without code changes.
- Monitoring and Tuning: Monitor the effectiveness of your rate limiting middleware. Track rate limit hits and adjust the limits as needed to balance security and service availability.
- Choose a Rate Limiting Strategy: Decide on a rate limiting strategy suitable for your
- List of Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks Targeting Go-Micro Services (High Severity):
go-micro
middleware-based rate limiting helps prevent DoS attacks by limiting the number of requests processed by a service, protecting it from being overwhelmed. - Resource Exhaustion in Go-Micro Services (Medium Severity): Rate limiting prevents excessive resource consumption in
go-micro
services due to unexpected traffic spikes or malicious request floods, ensuring service stability and availability. - Brute-Force Attacks Against Go-Micro Services (Medium Severity): Rate limiting can slow down brute-force attacks targeting
go-micro
services by limiting the rate at which attackers can make requests.
- Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks Targeting Go-Micro Services (High Severity):
- Impact:
- Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks Targeting Go-Micro Services: High risk reduction. Significantly reduces the impact of DoS attacks on individual
go-micro
services. - Resource Exhaustion in Go-Micro Services: Medium risk reduction. Improves the stability and resilience of
go-micro
services under heavy load. - Brute-Force Attacks Against Go-Micro Services: Medium risk reduction. Makes brute-force attacks less efficient and easier to detect.
- Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks Targeting Go-Micro Services: High risk reduction. Significantly reduces the impact of DoS attacks on individual
- Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Basic rate limiting middleware is used in the API Gateway component of the
go-micro
application for external requests. - Missing Implementation: Service-level rate limiting middleware is not implemented within individual backend
go-micro
services. Rate limiting needs to be extended to critical backend services usinggo-micro
middleware to provide more granular protection and prevent internal DoS scenarios and resource exhaustion within the microservice architecture.