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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for micro/go-micro

Attack Surface: Compromised Service Registry

  • Description: An attacker gains control over the service registry (e.g., Consul, etcd, Kubernetes API server) used by go-micro for service discovery.
  • How go-micro Contributes: go-micro's core functionality depends on the integrity and security of the service registry. The framework's dynamic service registration and discovery make it inherently vulnerable to registry manipulation.
  • Example: An attacker compromises the etcd instance and registers a malicious service that impersonates a legitimate database service. go-micro clients, unaware of the compromise, connect to the malicious service.
  • Impact:
    • Data breaches (sensitive data routed to the attacker).
    • Service disruption (legitimate services become unavailable or unreliable).
    • Man-in-the-Middle attacks.
    • Complete system compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Authentication & Authorization: Implement robust authentication (e.g., strong passwords, API keys, mutual TLS) and authorization (e.g., ACLs, RBAC) for the registry, using the principle of least privilege.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate the registry on a dedicated network segment with strict firewall rules, limiting access to only authorized services and management interfaces.
    • TLS Encryption: Enforce TLS encryption for all communication with the registry (client-to-registry and registry-to-registry). Validate certificates rigorously.
    • Regular Auditing: Continuously monitor registry access logs and configuration changes for suspicious activity. Implement automated alerts for unauthorized access attempts or modifications.
    • Registry-Specific Hardening: Follow the security best practices and hardening guidelines provided by the specific registry vendor (e.g., Consul's security model, etcd's security features).
    • Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS): Deploy IDS/IPS to monitor network traffic to and from the registry for malicious activity.

Attack Surface: Unencrypted Inter-Service Communication

  • Description: Communication between services using go-micro occurs without encryption (no TLS), exposing data in transit.
  • How go-micro Contributes: go-micro provides the abstraction for inter-service communication. While it supports TLS, it's the developer's responsibility to configure and enforce it. The framework's default behavior might not be secure without explicit configuration.
  • Example: A microservice handling user logins transmits authentication tokens in plain text to another microservice. An attacker on the network can sniff this traffic and hijack user sessions.
  • Impact:
    • Data breaches (exposure of sensitive data, including credentials, PII, etc.).
    • Man-in-the-Middle attacks (attacker can intercept and modify data).
    • Loss of confidentiality and integrity.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mandatory TLS: Enforce TLS encryption for all inter-service communication within the go-micro ecosystem. Configure the go-micro transport layer (and the underlying message broker) to require TLS and reject any non-TLS connections.
    • Mutual TLS (mTLS): Implement mTLS to ensure both the client and server authenticate each other using certificates, providing a significantly stronger security posture than one-way TLS.
    • Certificate Management: Establish a robust and secure certificate management process, including secure storage of private keys, regular certificate rotation, and a mechanism for revoking compromised certificates.
    • Configuration Validation: Implement automated checks (e.g., during deployment or CI/CD) to ensure that TLS is enabled and correctly configured for all go-micro services.

Attack Surface: Weak Broker Authentication/Authorization

  • Description: The message broker (e.g., NATS, RabbitMQ) used by go-micro for asynchronous communication has weak or missing authentication and authorization.
  • How go-micro Contributes: go-micro relies on the message broker for its publish/subscribe functionality. The security of this asynchronous communication is directly tied to the broker's security configuration, which go-micro interfaces with but doesn't inherently secure.
  • Example: An attacker gains access to a RabbitMQ instance (used by go-micro) with default credentials and publishes malicious messages to a queue consumed by a critical service, causing it to malfunction or execute arbitrary code.
  • Impact:
    • Service disruption (malicious messages can crash or disable services).
    • Data corruption (malicious messages can alter data).
    • Unauthorized access to data (attacker can subscribe to sensitive topics).
    • Potential for remote code execution (depending on how messages are processed by subscribers).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Authentication: Implement strong authentication for all users and services accessing the message broker. Use strong, unique passwords, API keys, or other robust authentication mechanisms. Disable default accounts and enforce password complexity policies.
    • Fine-Grained Authorization: Implement granular authorization controls (e.g., ACLs, RBAC) to restrict which users and services can publish and subscribe to specific topics/queues within the broker. Apply the principle of least privilege.
    • Broker Hardening: Follow the security best practices and hardening guidelines for the specific message broker being used (e.g., RabbitMQ, NATS, Kafka). This includes configuring appropriate security settings, disabling unnecessary features, and keeping the broker software up-to-date.
    • Regular Security Audits: Periodically review and audit the broker's security configuration and access logs to identify and address any potential vulnerabilities or misconfigurations.

Attack Surface: Deserialization Vulnerabilities

  • Description: An attacker exploits vulnerabilities in the deserialization process of message payloads (handled by go-micro's codecs) to execute arbitrary code.
  • How go-micro Contributes: go-micro uses codecs (e.g., protobuf, JSON, gRPC) to serialize and deserialize messages exchanged between services. Vulnerabilities in these codecs, or in custom codecs used with go-micro, can be directly exploited.
  • Example: A service using go-micro uses a vulnerable version of a JSON library or a custom, insecure codec. An attacker sends a crafted JSON payload that, when deserialized by the go-micro service, triggers a remote code execution vulnerability.
  • Impact:
    • Remote code execution (attacker gains full control of the affected go-micro service).
    • System compromise.
    • Data breaches.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Secure Codecs: Prefer well-vetted and actively maintained codecs like protobuf or the standard Go json package (and ensure they are kept up-to-date). Avoid using obscure or custom codecs unless absolutely necessary, and if used, subject them to rigorous security auditing and penetration testing.
    • Input Validation: Always validate the structure and content of deserialized data before using it within the go-micro service. Implement strict schema validation (e.g., using Protobuf's schema definition or JSON Schema) to ensure that the data conforms to the expected format.
    • Least Privilege: Run go-micro services with the minimum necessary privileges to limit the impact of a successful deserialization exploit.
    • Regular Security Updates: Keep all codecs and related libraries used by go-micro updated to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities. This includes the go-micro framework itself and any plugins.
    • Avoid Untrusted Data: Never deserialize data from untrusted sources without extreme caution and thorough validation within the context of the go-micro service.

Attack Surface: Unintentional Service Exposure

  • Description: Services are inadvertently registered with public visibility via go-micro's service discovery, making them accessible to unauthorized external actors.
  • How go-micro Contributes: go-micro's service discovery mechanism is the direct means by which services become discoverable. Incorrect configuration within go-micro can lead to unintended exposure.
  • Example: A developer registers a new go-micro service without specifying a private namespace or network policy, making it accessible from the public internet via the registry.
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized access to internal services.
    • Data breaches.
    • Service disruption.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Explicit Visibility Control: Always explicitly define the intended visibility of each go-micro service during registration (e.g., using namespaces, tags, or other mechanisms provided by the registry and supported by go-micro).
    • Network Policies: Implement network policies (e.g., Kubernetes Network Policies, firewall rules) to restrict network access to services based on their intended visibility, as defined in go-micro. Default-deny policies are strongly recommended.
    • Code Review: Mandatory code reviews should specifically include checks for proper go-micro service registration and visibility settings.
    • Configuration Management: Use infrastructure-as-code (IaC) tools to manage go-micro service registration and network policies consistently and prevent manual errors. This ensures that the intended visibility is enforced.