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Attack Tree Analysis for micro/go-micro

Objective: To gain unauthorized access to, disrupt, or exfiltrate data from a Go-Micro based application by exploiting vulnerabilities specific to the Go-Micro framework.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                 Compromise Go-Micro Application
                                              |
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    |                                         |
  1. Service Disruption 2. Unauthorized Access/Data Exfiltration
    | |

| | |
1.1 DoS 2.1 Bypass Auth 2.2 Intercept Traffic
| | |

| | | |
1.1.2 2.1.1 2.1.2 2.2.1
Flood Weak Improper MITM
Attacks Token Config Attack
Handling

Attack Tree Path: 1. Service Disruption

  • 1.1 DoS (Denial of Service)
    • 1.1.2 Flood Attacks (Critical Node & High-Risk Path):
      • Description: The attacker overwhelms the service with a large number of requests, making it unavailable to legitimate users. This can target the Go-Micro service itself, its message broker (NATS, RabbitMQ, Kafka), or the service registry (Consul, etcd).
      • Likelihood: High
      • Impact: High (Service unavailability)
      • Effort: Low (Tools readily available, botnets can be rented)
      • Skill Level: Novice
      • Detection Difficulty: Easy (High traffic volume is easily noticeable)
      • Attack Steps:
        1. Attacker identifies the target Go-Micro service or infrastructure component (broker, registry).
        2. Attacker uses a tool (e.g., hping3, LOIC) or a botnet to generate a large volume of requests.
        3. The targeted component becomes overwhelmed and unable to process legitimate requests.
        4. Legitimate users are unable to access the service.
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement rate limiting and request throttling (at the proxy, within Go-Micro services using middleware, or at the broker/registry level).
        • Configure the message broker and service registry for high availability and resilience.
        • Use circuit breakers to prevent cascading failures.
        • Monitor traffic volume and resource usage.
        • Employ a Web Application Firewall (WAF) or DDoS mitigation service.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Unauthorized Access/Data Exfiltration

  • 2.1 Bypass Authentication/Authorization

    • 2.1.1 Weak Token Handling (Critical Node & High-Risk Path):

      • Description: The attacker exploits weaknesses in the authentication token mechanism (e.g., JWT) to gain unauthorized access. This could involve forging tokens, bypassing validation, or exploiting weak secret management.
      • Likelihood: Medium
      • Impact: Very High (Complete compromise of user accounts and data)
      • Effort: Medium (Requires understanding of token formats and potential weaknesses)
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Hard (May appear as legitimate authenticated traffic)
      • Attack Steps:
        1. Attacker analyzes the authentication mechanism used by the Go-Micro service.
        2. Attacker identifies weaknesses (e.g., weak signing key, predictable token generation, lack of proper validation).
        3. Attacker crafts a malicious token or modifies an existing token to bypass authentication.
        4. Attacker uses the forged token to access protected resources.
      • Mitigation:
        • Use a well-vetted authentication library with strong cryptographic algorithms.
        • Implement robust token validation (signature verification, expiration checks, audience/issuer checks).
        • Store secrets securely (e.g., using a secrets management solution like HashiCorp Vault).
        • Implement token revocation mechanisms.
        • Follow the principle of least privilege.
        • Regularly audit authentication code and configuration.

    • 2.1.2 Improper Configuration (Critical Node & High-Risk Path):

      • Description: Misconfigured access control rules, routing rules, or default credentials allow unauthorized access to resources.
      • Likelihood: Medium (Common mistake in complex systems)
      • Impact: High to Very High (Depends on the misconfigured resource)
      • Effort: Low to Medium (Depends on the complexity of the configuration)
      • Skill Level: Intermediate
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires auditing of configuration files and access logs)
      • Attack Steps:
        1. Attacker probes the Go-Micro service for exposed endpoints or misconfigured resources.
        2. Attacker identifies a misconfiguration (e.g., missing authorization checks, incorrect routing, default credentials).
        3. Attacker exploits the misconfiguration to access unauthorized resources or perform unauthorized actions.
      • Mitigation:
        • Implement strict access control policies and enforce them consistently.
        • Use a centralized authorization service (e.g., OPA).
        • Regularly audit configuration files and code for security vulnerabilities.
        • Avoid using default credentials. Change them immediately upon deployment.
        • Use a configuration management system to ensure consistency and prevent drift.
        • Implement least privilege principles.

  • 2.2 Intercept Traffic

    • 2.2.1 MITM Attack (Critical Node):
      • Description: If TLS is not properly configured or enforced, an attacker intercepts and potentially modifies communication between Go-Micro services or between the service and its clients.
      • Likelihood: Low (If TLS is properly enforced) / High (If TLS is not enforced or misconfigured)
      • Impact: Very High (Complete compromise of communication, data theft, and potential for further attacks)
      • Effort: Medium to High (Requires network access and potentially exploiting certificate vulnerabilities)
      • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
      • Detection Difficulty: Hard (If TLS is not enforced, traffic appears normal. If TLS is misconfigured, certificate warnings might be ignored.)
      • Attack Steps:
        1. Attacker gains access to the network between the client and the Go-Micro service, or between Go-Micro services.
        2. Attacker intercepts the communication.
        3. If TLS is not enforced, the attacker can read and modify the traffic directly.
        4. If TLS is misconfigured (e.g., weak ciphers, invalid certificates), the attacker may be able to decrypt or forge the communication.
        5. Attacker steals sensitive data or injects malicious data.
      • Mitigation:
        • Enforce TLS for all communication (both internal and external).
        • Use strong cipher suites and protocols (e.g., TLS 1.3).
        • Validate certificates properly (check hostname, expiration, and trust chain).
        • Consider using mutual TLS (mTLS) for service-to-service communication.
        • Use a trusted Certificate Authority (CA).
        • Implement certificate pinning where appropriate.
        • Monitor for TLS errors and warnings.