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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for minio/minio

Threat: Weak or Default Access Keys and Secret Keys

  • Threat: Weak or Default Access Keys and Secret Keys
    • Description: An attacker might attempt to guess or find default access keys and secret keys that were not changed from initial setup or are easily predictable. They could use brute-force attacks or search for exposed configuration files.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to MinIO buckets and objects. This can lead to data breaches, data manipulation (uploading malicious files, deleting data), or denial of service (deleting critical data).
    • MinIO Component Affected: Authentication Module, API Endpoints
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Generate strong, random access keys and secret keys during MinIO setup.
      • Never use default keys in production environments.
      • Implement regular key rotation policies.

Threat: Insecure Key Management

  • Threat: Insecure Key Management
    • Description: An attacker who gains access to application code, configuration files, or environment variables where MinIO access keys and secret keys are stored insecurely (e.g., plain text, easily decrypted) can extract these credentials.
    • Impact: Exposure of credentials leading to unauthorized access to MinIO buckets and objects. This can result in data breaches, data modification, or data deletion.
    • MinIO Component Affected: Authentication Module, Configuration Management
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Utilize dedicated secrets management services (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager).
      • Store keys in environment variables with restricted access at the operating system level.
      • Encrypt configuration files containing credentials.
      • Avoid hardcoding credentials directly in application code.

Threat: Overly Permissive Bucket Policies

  • Threat: Overly Permissive Bucket Policies
    • Description: An attacker, either internal or external (if they gain some level of access), could exploit overly permissive bucket policies that grant more access than necessary. For example, a policy allowing public write access or granting s3:GetObject to everyone when it's not needed.
    • Impact: Unauthorized data access, modification, or deletion. Potential for data breaches if sensitive data is exposed. Data integrity issues if data is modified maliciously.
    • MinIO Component Affected: Authorization Module, Bucket Policy Engine
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement the principle of least privilege when defining bucket policies.
      • Carefully review and test bucket policies before deployment.
      • Regularly audit bucket policies to ensure they remain appropriate.

Threat: Lack of Proper Access Control Lists (ACLs) or Bucket Policies Enforcement

  • Threat: Lack of Proper ACLs or Bucket Policies Enforcement
    • Description: Due to misconfiguration or software bugs, ACLs or bucket policies might not be correctly enforced by MinIO. This could lead to unintended access levels, potentially making buckets publicly accessible or granting incorrect permissions to users.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to data, potential data breaches, and data manipulation. Data leakage if sensitive information becomes publicly accessible.
    • MinIO Component Affected: Authorization Module, ACL Enforcement, Bucket Policy Engine
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Thoroughly configure and test ACLs and bucket policies.
      • Regularly audit access control configurations to ensure they are correctly applied.
      • Keep MinIO server software updated to patch potential bugs related to policy enforcement.

Threat: Data Breaches due to Unauthorized Access

  • Threat: Data Breaches due to Unauthorized Access
    • Description: Exploitation of any of the authentication and authorization vulnerabilities listed above (weak keys, insecure key management, permissive policies, etc.) leading to an attacker gaining unauthorized access to MinIO and exfiltrating sensitive data.
    • Impact: Confidentiality breach, reputational damage, regulatory fines (GDPR, HIPAA, etc.), legal liabilities, loss of customer trust.
    • MinIO Component Affected: Entire MinIO system, Storage Backend, API Endpoints
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement all mitigation strategies listed for authentication and authorization threats.
      • Regular security audits and penetration testing to identify vulnerabilities.

Threat: Data at Rest Encryption Misconfiguration

  • Threat: Data at Rest Encryption Misconfiguration
    • Description: Server-side encryption (SSE) for data at rest is either not enabled for MinIO buckets storing sensitive data, or it is misconfigured (e.g., using weak encryption algorithms, insecure key management for encryption keys). If physical storage is compromised, data is exposed.
    • Impact: If storage media (disks, etc.) is physically compromised or stolen, data at rest can be accessed without encryption, leading to a data breach.
    • MinIO Component Affected: Storage Backend, Encryption Module (SSE)
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Enable server-side encryption (SSE) for all buckets containing sensitive data.
      • Choose strong encryption algorithms (e.g., AES-256).
      • Manage encryption keys securely, preferably using external key management systems (KMS).

Threat: Data in Transit Encryption Misconfiguration

  • Threat: Data in Transit Encryption Misconfiguration
    • Description: Communication between the application and MinIO server occurs over unencrypted HTTP instead of HTTPS. Or, weak or outdated TLS/SSL configurations are used, making communication vulnerable to interception and decryption.
    • Impact: Data transmitted between the application and MinIO can be intercepted and read by attackers in man-in-the-middle attacks. Confidential data leakage during transmission.
    • MinIO Component Affected: API Endpoints, Network Communication, TLS/SSL Configuration
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Enforce HTTPS for all communication with MinIO.
      • Use strong TLS/SSL configurations and valid certificates.
      • Disable insecure protocols (e.g., SSLv3, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1) and weak ciphers.

Threat: MinIO Software Vulnerabilities

  • Threat: MinIO Software Vulnerabilities
    • Description: Undiscovered bugs or security vulnerabilities exist within the MinIO server software itself. Attackers could exploit these vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access, cause server crashes, or manipulate data.
    • Impact: Potential for server crashes, data corruption, unauthorized access, or other security breaches depending on the nature of the vulnerability.
    • MinIO Component Affected: Various MinIO modules depending on the vulnerability (e.g., Authentication, Authorization, API Handling, Storage Engine).
    • Risk Severity: Varies (can be Critical to High depending on the vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep MinIO server software up-to-date with the latest stable versions and security patches.
      • Subscribe to MinIO security advisories and promptly apply patches when released.

Threat: Publicly Exposed Default Ports

  • Threat: Publicly Exposed Default Ports
    • Description: Deploying MinIO with default ports (9000, 9001) directly exposed to the public internet without proper firewalling or network segmentation. This increases the attack surface.
    • Impact: Increased vulnerability to direct attacks from the internet, including unauthorized access attempts, DoS attacks, and exploitation of potential vulnerabilities.
    • MinIO Component Affected: Network Configuration, API Endpoints
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Restrict access to MinIO ports using firewalls or network security groups.
      • Only allow access from trusted networks or specific IP addresses.

Threat: Running MinIO as Root User

  • Threat: Running MinIO as Root User
    • Description: Running the MinIO server process as the root user. If MinIO is compromised, the attacker gains root privileges on the server.
    • Impact: Full system compromise if MinIO is exploited. An attacker can gain complete control over the server, potentially leading to data breaches, system-wide DoS, and further attacks on the infrastructure.
    • MinIO Component Affected: Deployment Configuration, Operating System Security
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Run MinIO server process as a dedicated, non-privileged user with minimal necessary permissions.
      • Follow the principle of least privilege for service accounts.

Threat: Outdated MinIO Version

  • Threat: Outdated MinIO Version
    • Description: Running older, unsupported versions of MinIO that may contain known security vulnerabilities. Attackers can exploit these known vulnerabilities.
    • Impact: Exposure to known vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers, leading to data breaches, service disruption, or other security incidents. Increased attack surface due to unpatched vulnerabilities.
    • MinIO Component Affected: Entire MinIO System, all Modules
    • Risk Severity: Varies (can be Critical to High depending on the age and vulnerabilities of the version)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regularly update MinIO server to the latest stable versions and security patches.
      • Establish a patch management process for MinIO and its dependencies.