Objective: Exfiltrate Data or Manipulate Repositories via 'hub'
Goal: Exfiltrate Data or Manipulate Repositories via 'hub' ├── 1. Compromise GitHub API Token [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.1 Exploit 'hub' Configuration File Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK] │ │ ├── 1.1.1 Insecure File Permissions on ~/.config/hub [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── Action: Read the file directly (if permissions allow). │ │ ├── 1.1.3 Environment Variable Hijacking (e.g., HUB_CONFIG) [HIGH-RISK] │ │ │ └── Action: Set HUB_CONFIG to a malicious file controlled by the attacker. │ ├── 1.3 Social Engineering / Phishing [HIGH-RISK] │ │ └── Action: Trick the user into revealing their token or using a compromised version of 'hub'. │ └── 1.4 Exploit 'hub' Command Injection Vulnerabilities │ ├── 1.4.1 Improper Input Sanitization in 'hub' Commands [CRITICAL] │ │ └── Action: Craft malicious input to 'hub' commands that are passed unsanitized to the shell or GitHub API. ├── 2. Manipulate Repositories (Assuming Token Compromise or Direct Access) [HIGH-RISK] └── 3. Leverage 'hub' for Lateral Movement [HIGH-RISK] ├── 3.1 Access Other Repositories [CRITICAL] │ └── Action: Use the compromised token to access other repositories the user has access to. └── 3.2 Access Other GitHub Resources (e.g., Organizations) [CRITICAL] └── Action: Use the compromised token to access other GitHub resources associated with the user or their organizations.
Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise GitHub API Token [CRITICAL]
- This is the primary objective for most attackers, as the API token grants access to GitHub resources.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Exploit 'hub' Configuration File Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK]
- This attack path focuses on weaknesses related to how
hub
stores the API token.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 Insecure File Permissions on ~/.config/hub [CRITICAL]
- Description:
hub
stores the GitHub API token in~/.config/hub
. If this file has overly permissive permissions (e.g., world-readable), any user on the system (or potentially remote attackers with some level of access) can read the token. - Likelihood: High
- Impact: High (complete token compromise)
- Effort: Very Low (reading a file)
- Skill Level: Novice
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (requires auditing file permissions)
- Mitigation:
hub
: Ensure secure file permissions (0600
) are set upon creation. Warn users if insecure permissions are detected.- Users: Manually set secure permissions:
chmod 600 ~/.config/hub
. - Application Developers: Document security implications and recommend secure configuration.
Attack Tree Path: 1.1.3 Environment Variable Hijacking (e.g., HUB_CONFIG) [HIGH-RISK]
- Description: If
hub
uses theHUB_CONFIG
environment variable to determine the configuration file location, an attacker could set this variable to point to a malicious file they control. - Likelihood: Medium (requires some control over the environment)
- Impact: High (token compromise)
- Effort: Low (setting an environment variable)
- Skill Level: Intermediate
- Detection Difficulty: Hard (requires monitoring environment variables)
- Mitigation:
hub
: Sanitize or validateHUB_CONFIG
before use. Consider disallowing it or providing a warning.- Application Developers: Avoid setting
HUB_CONFIG
in untrusted environments.
Attack Tree Path: 1.3 Social Engineering / Phishing [HIGH-RISK]
- Description: Attackers trick the user into revealing their GitHub API token or installing a compromised version of
hub
. This could involve fake login pages, phishing emails, or malicious websites. - Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: High (token compromise)
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Intermediate
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (depends on user awareness)
- Mitigation:
- User Education: Train users to recognize phishing attempts and verify the authenticity of websites and software.
- 2FA: Encourage the use of two-factor authentication on GitHub.
Attack Tree Path: 1.4 Exploit 'hub' Command Injection Vulnerabilities
- This attack path focuses on injecting malicious code through
hub
commands.
Attack Tree Path: 1.4.1 Improper Input Sanitization in 'hub' Commands [CRITICAL]
- Description: If
hub
doesn't properly sanitize user-provided input before passing it to the shell or the GitHub API, an attacker could craft malicious input that executes arbitrary commands or manipulates API calls. - Likelihood: Low (but critical if present)
- Impact: Very High (potential for arbitrary code execution)
- Effort: High (requires finding and exploiting a specific vulnerability)
- Skill Level: Advanced
- Detection Difficulty: Hard (requires code analysis and dynamic analysis)
- Mitigation:
hub
: Thoroughly sanitize all user input. Use parameterized API calls. Perform rigorous security testing.
Attack Tree Path: 2. Manipulate Repositories (Assuming Token Compromise or Direct Access) [HIGH-RISK]
- Description: Once an attacker has the GitHub API token, they can use
hub
(or the API directly) to manipulate repositories the user has access to. This includes injecting code, deleting branches, modifying settings, etc. - Likelihood: High (given token compromise)
- Impact: High (potential for data loss, code compromise, disruption)
- Effort: Low (using
hub
commands) - Skill Level: Intermediate
- Detection Difficulty: Varies (Easier with branch protection and audit logs)
- Mitigation:
- GitHub: Use branch protection rules, require pull request reviews, enable 2FA.
- Users: Use strong passwords, enable 2FA, be cautious about granting access.
Attack Tree Path: 3. Leverage 'hub' for Lateral Movement [HIGH-RISK]
- Description: A compromised token can be used to access other GitHub resources beyond the initially targeted repository.
Attack Tree Path: 3.1 Access Other Repositories [CRITICAL]
- Description: The attacker uses the compromised token to access other repositories the user has access to, potentially escalating the impact of the compromise.
- Likelihood: High (given token compromise)
- Impact: Very High (widespread compromise)
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Intermediate
- Detection Difficulty: Medium/Hard (requires monitoring API usage)
- Mitigation: Principle of least privilege, regular access reviews.
Attack Tree Path: 3.2 Access Other GitHub Resources (e.g., Organizations) [CRITICAL]
- Description: The attacker uses the compromised token to access other GitHub resources associated with the user or their organizations, such as organization settings, teams, or other applications.
- Likelihood: High (given token compromise)
- Impact: Very High (widespread compromise)
- Effort: Low
- Skill Level: Intermediate
- Detection Difficulty: Medium/Hard (requires monitoring API usage)
- Mitigation: Principle of least privilege, regular access reviews.