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Threat Model Analysis for mozilla/sops

Threat: Compromised Encryption Keys

  • Threat: Compromised Encryption Keys
    • Description: An attacker gains unauthorized access to the private keys used by sops for encryption and decryption. This could be achieved by exploiting vulnerabilities in the KMS, stealing key files, or compromising systems where keys are stored or used. Once keys are compromised, the attacker can decrypt all secrets protected by these keys.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of all secrets managed by sops, leading to data breaches, unauthorized access to systems, and potential financial and reputational damage.
    • Affected SOPS Component: Key Management System (KMS) integration, GPG key handling, IAM role assumptions.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Implement strong access control and auditing for the KMS and key storage locations.
      • Enforce regular key rotation policies.
      • Utilize Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) for key protection where feasible.
      • Employ secure key generation and storage practices, following KMS provider recommendations.
      • Monitor KMS access logs for suspicious activities.
      • Implement principle of least privilege for key access.

Threat: Weak or Insecure Key Generation

  • Threat: Weak or Insecure Key Generation
    • Description: Keys used by sops are generated using weak cryptographic algorithms, insufficient key lengths, or flawed random number generation. An attacker with sufficient resources and cryptographic expertise might be able to break the encryption without directly compromising the keys themselves, potentially through brute-force or cryptanalysis.
    • Impact: Compromise of secrets due to weak encryption, potentially leading to data breaches and unauthorized access.
    • Affected SOPS Component: Encryption module, Key generation functions (indirectly through KMS or GPG).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Use strong, recommended encryption algorithms and key sizes supported by sops and the chosen KMS (e.g., AES-256, RSA 4096).
      • Ensure proper entropy during key generation, relying on cryptographically secure random number generators.
      • Follow best practices for key generation as recommended by security standards and KMS providers.
      • Regularly review and update cryptographic configurations to align with current security recommendations.

Threat: Key Mismanagement and Loss

  • Threat: Key Mismanagement and Loss
    • Description: Encryption keys are lost, accidentally deleted, or become inaccessible due to operational errors, infrastructure failures, or inadequate backup procedures. This can happen due to human error, system failures, or lack of proper key lifecycle management.
    • Impact: Permanent inability to decrypt secrets, leading to application downtime, data loss, and potential business disruption. If backups are also encrypted with the lost keys, data recovery becomes impossible.
    • Affected SOPS Component: Key Management System (KMS) integration, Key storage mechanisms.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Establish robust key backup and recovery procedures, including offsite backups.
      • Implement key redundancy and replication within the KMS.
      • Develop and regularly test disaster recovery plans for key management infrastructure.
      • Use version control for key configurations and policies.
      • Train personnel on proper key management procedures.

Threat: Overly Permissive Access Control in sops Configuration

  • Threat: Overly Permissive Access Control in sops Configuration
    • Description: The .sops.yaml configuration file or KMS access policies are misconfigured to grant decryption permissions to users, roles, or services that should not have access to the secrets. This could be due to errors in specifying GPG key IDs, IAM roles, or KMS permissions. An attacker exploiting a vulnerability or misconfiguration in a service with overly broad decryption permissions could gain access to secrets.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to secrets by unintended users or services, potentially leading to data breaches and privilege escalation.
    • Affected SOPS Component: Configuration parsing (.sops.yaml), Access control logic, KMS policy enforcement.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Apply the principle of least privilege when configuring sops access control.
      • Regularly review and audit .sops.yaml files and KMS access policies.
      • Use groups or roles for managing access instead of individual users where possible to simplify management and reduce errors.
      • Implement automated checks to validate sops configuration against security policies.

Threat: Logging or Storage of Decrypted Secrets

  • Threat: Logging or Storage of Decrypted Secrets
    • Description: Decrypted secrets are accidentally or intentionally logged to files, console output, or stored in temporary files or databases in plaintext by the application code. An attacker gaining access to these logs or temporary storage locations could retrieve the decrypted secrets.
    • Impact: Exposure of secrets in logs or temporary storage, potentially leading to data breaches and unauthorized access.
    • Affected SOPS Component: Application integration (how application handles decrypted secrets), Logging practices.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strictly avoid logging decrypted secrets in application code.
      • Implement code reviews and automated static analysis checks to prevent accidental logging of secrets.
      • Configure logging systems to prevent unintended exposure of sensitive data.
      • Avoid storing decrypted secrets persistently unless absolutely necessary and with strong justification and security measures (and even then, reconsider the design).

Threat: Vulnerabilities in sops Software

  • Threat: Vulnerabilities in sops Software
    • Description: sops software itself contains security vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflows, injection flaws, logic errors) that could be exploited by an attacker. An attacker exploiting these vulnerabilities could potentially gain unauthorized decryption capabilities, cause denial of service, or even achieve remote code execution on systems running sops.
    • Impact: Compromise of secrets, denial of service, or remote code execution, depending on the nature of the vulnerability.
    • Affected SOPS Component: Core sops codebase, Encryption/Decryption modules, Configuration parsing, KMS integrations.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on vulnerability type)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep sops software up-to-date with the latest security patches and versions.
      • Monitor security advisories and vulnerability databases for known issues in sops.
      • Perform security testing and code reviews of sops usage and integration within the application.
      • Consider using static and dynamic analysis tools to identify potential vulnerabilities in sops usage.

Threat: Accidental Commit of Decrypted Secrets to Version Control

  • Threat: Accidental Commit of Decrypted Secrets to Version Control
    • Description: Developers mistakenly commit decrypted secret files to version control systems (e.g., Git) instead of the encrypted .sops files. This can happen due to oversight, misconfiguration of version control ignore rules, or lack of awareness. Once committed, secrets become exposed in the repository's history.
    • Impact: Exposure of secrets in version control history, potentially accessible to anyone with access to the repository, even after the commit is removed from the main branch.
    • Affected SOPS Component: Version control integration, Developer workflows.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Use .gitignore or similar mechanisms to explicitly prevent accidental commit of decrypted files (e.g., .gitignore decrypted file extensions, or specific decrypted file names).
      • Educate developers on secure secret management practices and the importance of committing only encrypted files.
      • Implement pre-commit hooks to automatically check for decrypted secrets before allowing commits.
      • Regularly audit repositories for accidentally committed secrets and remove them from history using tools like git filter-branch or BFG Repo-Cleaner (with caution and understanding of their implications).