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Attack Tree Analysis for mozilla/sops

Objective: Attacker's Goal: Gain unauthorized access to sensitive data managed by SOPS, leading to application compromise.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application via SOPS Exploitation [HIGH RISK PATH]
└── OR 1: [CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Encryption Keys [HIGH RISK PATH]
    ├── OR 1.1: [HIGH RISK PATH] Exploit Key Provider Vulnerabilities
    │   └── AND 1.1.1: [HIGH RISK PATH] Key Provider IAM/Access Control Misconfiguration [HIGH RISK PATH]
    │       └── 1.1.1.1: [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Overly Permissive IAM Roles/Policies (e.g., AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault) [HIGH RISK PATH]
    └── OR 1.2: [HIGH RISK PATH] Steal Encryption Keys [HIGH RISK PATH]
        ├── AND 1.2.1: [HIGH RISK PATH] Compromise SOPS User's Machine [HIGH RISK PATH]
        │   └── 1.2.1.1: [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Malware on Developer/Operator Machine with Key Access [HIGH RISK PATH]
        ├── AND 1.2.2: [HIGH RISK PATH] Key Material Leakage [HIGH RISK PATH]
        │   └── 1.2.2.1: [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Accidental Commit of Private Keys to Version Control [HIGH RISK PATH]
└── OR 3: Configuration and Operational Misuse of SOPS [HIGH RISK PATH]
    └── AND 3.2: [HIGH RISK PATH] Exposure of Decrypted Secrets in Application Runtime [HIGH RISK PATH]
        ├── 3.2.1: [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Secrets Logged in Plaintext by Application After Decryption [HIGH RISK PATH]
        └── 3.2.3: [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH RISK PATH] Secrets Exposed via Application Vulnerabilities (e.g., reflected in error messages, debug endpoints) [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Attack Goal: Compromise Application via SOPS Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: The ultimate objective of the attacker. Success means gaining unauthorized access to sensitive application data protected by SOPS, potentially leading to full application compromise, data breaches, and reputational damage.
  • Likelihood: Overall, the likelihood depends on the cumulative security posture of the application and its environment.
  • Impact: Critical - Full application compromise, data breach, severe business impact.
  • Effort: Varies greatly depending on the chosen attack path and application security.
  • Skill Level: Varies greatly depending on the chosen attack path and application security.
  • Detection Difficulty: Varies greatly depending on the chosen attack path and application security.
  • Actionable Insights: Focus on securing all attack paths identified in this threat model, especially the high-risk paths detailed below. Implement layered security, regular security testing, and continuous monitoring.

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Encryption Keys [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: Gaining access to the encryption keys used by SOPS is the most direct path to decrypting all protected secrets. This bypasses the entire security mechanism of SOPS.
  • Likelihood: Medium - While key management best practices exist, vulnerabilities in key providers or key handling processes can still occur.
  • Impact: Critical - Complete compromise of all secrets protected by SOPS.
  • Effort: Varies depending on the specific key compromise method.
  • Skill Level: Varies depending on the specific key compromise method.
  • Detection Difficulty: Can be difficult if key compromise is subtle and not immediately followed by decryption attempts.
  • Actionable Insights: Prioritize strong key management practices. Implement robust access control for keys, use hardware security modules (HSMs) where appropriate, and regularly audit key access and usage.

Attack Tree Path: Key Provider IAM/Access Control Misconfiguration [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: Exploiting misconfigurations in the Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies of the key provider (e.g., AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault). This allows unauthorized entities to gain access to encryption keys.
  • Likelihood: Medium-High - Cloud IAM can be complex to configure correctly, and overly permissive policies are a common mistake.
  • Impact: Critical - Access to encryption keys, leading to secret decryption.
  • Effort: Low-Medium - Identifying misconfigurations can be relatively easy with cloud security assessment tools or manual review. Exploiting them depends on the misconfiguration.
  • Skill Level: Intermediate - Understanding cloud IAM concepts and tools is required.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium - Cloud security monitoring and IAM policy audits can detect misconfigurations.
  • Actionable Insights: Implement the Principle of Least Privilege for IAM roles and policies related to KMS. Regularly review and audit KMS access policies. Use infrastructure-as-code to manage IAM configurations and prevent drift. Employ cloud security posture management tools.

Attack Tree Path: Overly Permissive IAM Roles/Policies (e.g., AWS KMS, GCP KMS, Azure Key Vault) [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: Specifically, IAM roles or policies that grant excessive permissions to access or manage encryption keys, allowing unintended users or services to decrypt secrets.
  • Likelihood: Medium-High - A common consequence of complex IAM systems and rushed deployments.
  • Impact: Critical - Direct access to decryption keys.
  • Effort: Low-Medium - Identifying overly permissive roles can be done with IAM policy analysis tools or manual review.
  • Skill Level: Intermediate - Requires understanding of cloud IAM and policy structures.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium - IAM policy analysis tools and security audits can detect overly permissive roles.
  • Actionable Insights: Strictly adhere to the Principle of Least Privilege. Regularly review and right-size IAM roles. Automate IAM policy reviews and alerts for policy changes that increase permissions.

Attack Tree Path: Steal Encryption Keys via Compromise SOPS User's Machine [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: Targeting the machines of developers or operators who have access to decryption keys (e.g., PGP private keys, Age keys). Compromising these machines allows attackers to steal the keys directly.
  • Likelihood: Medium - Endpoint compromise is a common attack vector, and developer/operator machines are often high-value targets.
  • Impact: Critical - Theft of encryption keys.
  • Effort: Low-Medium - Malware and phishing tools are readily available.
  • Skill Level: Beginner-Intermediate - Malware deployment and phishing attacks are relatively common skills.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium - EDR and antivirus can detect malware, but sophisticated attacks can evade detection. Phishing detection relies on user awareness and email security.
  • Actionable Insights: Implement robust endpoint security on developer and operator machines, including EDR, antivirus, and host-based firewalls. Enforce strong password policies and multi-factor authentication. Provide regular security awareness training to users, especially regarding phishing.

Attack Tree Path: Malware on Developer/Operator Machine with Key Access [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: Specifically, using malware (viruses, trojans, spyware, etc.) to infect a developer or operator's machine to steal encryption keys stored on that machine.
  • Likelihood: Medium - Malware is a persistent threat, and targeted attacks on developer machines are increasing.
  • Impact: Critical - Key theft.
  • Effort: Low-Medium - Malware tools are widely available and easy to deploy.
  • Skill Level: Beginner-Intermediate - Malware deployment is a common attacker skill.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium - EDR and antivirus can detect known malware, but zero-day malware and sophisticated evasion techniques can be harder to detect.
  • Actionable Insights: Deploy and maintain up-to-date EDR and antivirus solutions. Implement application whitelisting to limit executable code. Regularly patch operating systems and applications. Isolate development environments where possible.

Attack Tree Path: Key Material Leakage via Accidental Commit of Private Keys to Version Control [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: Developers accidentally committing private encryption keys (e.g., PGP private keys, Age private keys) directly into version control systems (like Git). This makes the keys publicly or internally accessible depending on repository visibility.
  • Likelihood: Medium - A surprisingly common mistake, especially in fast-paced development environments or when onboarding new team members.
  • Impact: Critical - Public exposure of private keys.
  • Effort: Low - Simple mistake by a developer.
  • Skill Level: Novice - No attacker skill required, just a developer mistake.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium - Code scanning tools and Git history analysis can detect committed secrets, but timely detection and remediation are crucial.
  • Actionable Insights: Implement pre-commit hooks to prevent committing private keys. Use .gitignore effectively. Regularly scan repositories for accidentally committed secrets. Educate developers about secure key handling and the risks of committing secrets to version control.

Attack Tree Path: Accidental Commit of Private Keys to Version Control [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: The specific act of a developer mistakenly including private key material in a commit to a version control system.
  • Likelihood: Medium - Human error in development workflows.
  • Impact: Critical - Direct exposure of private keys.
  • Effort: Low - Simple mistake.
  • Skill Level: Novice - No attacker skill needed, just a developer error.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium - Code scanning tools and Git history analysis can detect, but proactive prevention is better.
  • Actionable Insights: As mentioned above: pre-commit hooks, .gitignore, repository scanning, developer education.

Attack Tree Path: Exposure of Decrypted Secrets in Application Runtime [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: Even if SOPS encryption is correctly implemented, vulnerabilities can arise after secrets are decrypted and used by the application. This includes logging secrets, storing them insecurely in memory or temporary files, or exposing them through application vulnerabilities.
  • Likelihood: Medium - Common coding mistakes and web application vulnerabilities can lead to secret exposure after decryption.
  • Impact: Critical - Direct exposure of decrypted secrets.
  • Effort: Low-Medium - Exploiting common coding mistakes or web application vulnerabilities.
  • Skill Level: Beginner-Intermediate - Exploiting common web application vulnerabilities is a widely available skill.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium - Code review, security testing, and log analysis can detect some of these issues.
  • Actionable Insights: Implement secure coding practices to handle secrets in memory and logs. Avoid logging secrets in plaintext. Sanitize outputs to prevent secrets from being reflected in error messages or debug endpoints. Regularly conduct web application security testing.

Attack Tree Path: Secrets Logged in Plaintext by Application After Decryption [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: Developers accidentally or intentionally logging decrypted secrets in plaintext in application logs. Logs are often stored and accessed in less secure ways than the original encrypted secrets.
  • Likelihood: Medium-High - A very common coding mistake, especially during debugging or error handling.
  • Impact: Critical - Direct exposure of secrets in logs.
  • Effort: Low - Simple coding mistake.
  • Skill Level: Novice - No attacker skill needed, just a coding error.
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy - Log analysis and code review can easily identify plaintext secrets in logs.
  • Actionable Insights: Implement strict logging policies that prohibit logging sensitive data. Use structured logging and avoid including secrets in log messages. Implement automated log scanning for potential secret leaks. Educate developers about secure logging practices.

Attack Tree Path: Secrets Exposed via Application Vulnerabilities (e.g., reflected in error messages, debug endpoints) [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Description: Exploiting common web application vulnerabilities (like XSS, Server-Side Request Forgery - SSRF, insecure direct object references, etc.) to extract or expose decrypted secrets that are processed or stored by the application.
  • Likelihood: Medium - Web application vulnerabilities are common, and if secrets are not handled carefully, they can be exposed through these vulnerabilities.
  • Impact: Critical - Direct exposure of secrets.
  • Effort: Low-Medium - Exploiting common web application vulnerabilities is a well-known attack vector.
  • Skill Level: Beginner-Intermediate - Exploiting common web application vulnerabilities is a widely available skill.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium - Web application security testing and vulnerability scanning can detect many of these vulnerabilities.
  • Actionable Insights: Implement robust web application security practices. Conduct regular vulnerability scanning and penetration testing. Sanitize inputs and outputs to prevent injection vulnerabilities. Follow secure coding guidelines to prevent common web application flaws.