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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for mozilla/sops

Mitigation Strategy: Configure sops to Utilize Key Management System (KMS) for Encryption

  • Description:

    1. Specify KMS in .sops.yaml: Modify your .sops.yaml configuration file to define a KMS provider (like AWS KMS, Google Cloud KMS, Azure Key Vault, or HashiCorp Vault) as the primary encryption method. This is done by adding the relevant KMS stanza (e.g., kms, gcp_kms, azure_kv, hc_vault) under the creation_rules section in .sops.yaml.
    2. Define KMS Key ARN/ID in .sops.yaml: Within the KMS stanza in .sops.yaml, specify the ARN (Amazon Resource Name), ID, or path of the KMS key that sops should use for encryption and decryption.
    3. Remove GPG Recipients (Production): In your production .sops.yaml configuration, remove or comment out any GPG key recipients. This enforces the use of KMS and prevents decryption using local GPG keys in production environments.
    4. Test KMS Configuration: Verify that sops correctly encrypts and decrypts secrets using the configured KMS key. Test this in a non-production environment before deploying to production.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Compromised Local GPG Private Key (High Severity): If a developer's local GPG private key is compromised, attackers could decrypt secrets if GPG is used for production. Configuring sops to use KMS exclusively mitigates this by removing reliance on local GPG keys in production.
    • Accidental Exposure of GPG Private Key (Medium Severity): GPG private keys stored locally can be accidentally exposed. KMS usage in sops reduces this risk by centralizing key management.

  • Impact:

    • Compromised Local GPG Private Key: Risk reduced from High to Low. Production secrets are now protected by KMS access controls, not individual GPG keys.
    • Accidental Exposure of GPG Private Key: Risk reduced from Medium to Low for production secrets.

  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. KMS (AWS KMS) is configured in .sops.yaml for staging and production environments. GPG recipients are still present for development convenience.

  • Missing Implementation: Fully remove GPG recipients from production .sops.yaml. Consider enforcing KMS usage even in development environments for consistency and enhanced security posture, or explore developer-friendly KMS solutions if local GPG is preferred for development.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) via sops Configuration

  • Description:

    1. Define Access Rules in .sops.yaml: Utilize sops's creation_rules in .sops.yaml to define granular access control based on file paths or regular expressions.
    2. Map Roles to Recipients in .sops.yaml: Within creation_rules, specify different sets of recipients (KMS ARNs, GPG fingerprints) for different secret paths or types. This effectively maps roles (implicitly defined by recipients) to access permissions. For example, different KMS keys can be used for different environments or applications, and .sops.yaml rules can enforce which keys are used for which secrets.
    3. Utilize unencrypted_regex and encrypted_regex: Leverage unencrypted_regex and encrypted_regex in .sops.yaml to define which files or parts of files should be encrypted and by whom, further refining access control within sops.
    4. Code Review .sops.yaml Configurations: Thoroughly review .sops.yaml files during code reviews to ensure access control rules are correctly defined and maintained, reflecting the intended RBAC policy.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Unauthorized Access to Secrets via sops (High Severity): Without configured access rules in .sops.yaml, anyone with decryption keys (GPG or KMS access) could potentially decrypt all secrets. sops configuration for RBAC limits access based on defined rules.
    • Privilege Escalation within sops (Medium Severity): Improperly configured .sops.yaml might allow users to access secrets beyond their intended scope. RBAC in .sops.yaml prevents this by enforcing permission boundaries within sops itself.

  • Impact:

    • Unauthorized Access to Secrets via sops: Risk reduced from High to Medium. Access is now controlled by rules defined within .sops.yaml, limiting the scope of potential unauthorized access.
    • Privilege Escalation within sops: Risk reduced from Medium to Low. .sops.yaml configurations enforce separation of duties and prevent unauthorized privilege escalation related to secrets managed by sops.

  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. .sops.yaml uses KMS and GPG recipients, providing a basic level of access control. However, fine-grained RBAC using creation_rules and different recipient sets for different secrets is not extensively used.

  • Missing Implementation: Implement more granular RBAC within .sops.yaml using creation_rules, different KMS keys/GPG recipients for different secret types or environments, and unencrypted_regex/encrypted_regex. Document and enforce the RBAC policy defined in .sops.yaml.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure sops Usage in CI/CD Pipelines

  • Description:

    1. sops Decryption Only When Needed: In CI/CD pipelines, invoke sops decryption commands only at the specific stage where decrypted secrets are required for deployment or configuration. Avoid early or unnecessary decryption.
    2. Use sops CLI Securely: When using the sops CLI in CI/CD scripts, avoid logging the decryption commands or any decrypted secret values to CI/CD logs. Redirect output appropriately and use secure methods for passing decrypted secrets to subsequent steps.
    3. Integrate sops with CI/CD Secret Management (if available): Explore if your CI/CD platform offers built-in secret management features that can be integrated with sops. Some platforms might provide secure secret injection mechanisms that can work with decrypted output from sops.
    4. Ephemeral CI/CD Environment for sops Operations: If feasible, perform sops decryption within ephemeral CI/CD environments that are destroyed after the pipeline run. This limits the window of opportunity for potential secret exposure in the CI/CD infrastructure.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Exposure of Secrets in CI/CD Logs due to sops Usage (High Severity): Accidental logging of sops decryption commands or decrypted secrets in CI/CD logs. Secure sops usage in CI/CD minimizes this risk.
    • Compromised CI/CD Environment Exploiting sops (High Severity): If a CI/CD environment is compromised, attackers might try to exploit sops decryption processes to gain access to secrets. Secure sops integration and ephemeral environments reduce this risk.

  • Impact:

    • Exposure of Secrets in CI/CD Logs due to sops Usage: Risk reduced from High to Low. Secure sops CLI usage and integration with CI/CD secret management minimizes logging of sensitive data.
    • Compromised CI/CD Environment Exploiting sops: Risk reduced from High to Medium. Ephemeral environments and secure sops practices limit the impact of a CI/CD environment compromise related to secrets managed by sops.

  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. sops decryption is performed only during the deployment phase. Environment variables are used for secret injection, which can be logged if not handled carefully.

  • Missing Implementation: Implement best practices for secure sops CLI usage in CI/CD scripts to prevent logging secrets. Explore CI/CD platform's secret management integration with sops. Consider using ephemeral CI/CD environments for sops operations.

Mitigation Strategy: Regularly Update sops Binaries

  • Description:

    1. Monitor sops Releases: Keep track of new releases and security updates for sops from the official GitHub repository or project website.
    2. Establish Update Process: Define a process for regularly updating sops binaries in all environments where it is used, including developer machines, CI/CD agents, and servers.
    3. Automate Updates (where possible): Automate the sops update process using package managers, scripts, or configuration management tools to ensure timely updates.
    4. Verify Binary Integrity: When updating sops, always verify the integrity of the downloaded binaries using checksums or signatures provided by the official sops project to prevent supply chain attacks.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Exploitation of sops Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Outdated sops versions may contain known vulnerabilities that could be exploited. Regular updates mitigate this threat.
    • Supply Chain Attacks Targeting sops Binaries (Medium Severity): Using compromised or malicious sops binaries. Verifying binary integrity during updates reduces this risk.

  • Impact:

    • Exploitation of sops Vulnerabilities: Risk reduced from High to Low. Keeping sops updated ensures vulnerabilities are patched.
    • Supply Chain Attacks Targeting sops Binaries: Risk reduced from Medium to Low. Binary verification adds a layer of protection against malicious binaries.

  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Developers are generally responsible for manually updating sops. CI/CD pipelines use a defined version, but automated updates are not in place.

  • Missing Implementation: Implement automated sops updates across all environments. Integrate binary verification into the update process.

Mitigation Strategy: sops-Specific Developer Training and Awareness

  • Description:

    1. sops Security Training Module: Develop a training module specifically focused on secure sops usage within the project's context. This should cover .sops.yaml configuration best practices, KMS/GPG key management as it relates to sops, secure sops workflows in development and CI/CD, and common pitfalls to avoid.
    2. Hands-on sops Training Exercises: Include practical, hands-on exercises in the training to reinforce secure sops usage. This could involve tasks like configuring .sops.yaml rules, encrypting/decrypting secrets with KMS, and simulating secure sops workflows.
    3. sops Best Practices Documentation: Create and maintain clear, concise documentation outlining the project's specific guidelines and best practices for using sops securely. This should be easily accessible to all developers.
    4. Regular sops Security Reminders: Periodically remind developers about secure sops practices through internal communication channels (e.g., newsletters, team meetings) to maintain awareness.

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Misconfiguration of sops due to Lack of Knowledge (Medium Severity): Developers unfamiliar with secure sops practices might misconfigure .sops.yaml or use sops insecurely. Training mitigates this.
    • Improper Secret Handling with sops (Medium Severity): Developers might unintentionally handle secrets insecurely if they don't understand secure sops workflows. Training promotes correct handling.

  • Impact:

    • Misconfiguration of sops due to Lack of Knowledge: Risk reduced from Medium to Low. Training and documentation improve understanding and reduce misconfigurations.
    • Improper Secret Handling with sops: Risk reduced from Medium to Low. Training promotes secure workflows and reduces the chance of improper handling.

  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Basic documentation on sops usage exists, but no dedicated security training specifically for sops is provided.

  • Missing Implementation: Develop and deliver dedicated sops security training with hands-on exercises. Create comprehensive sops best practices documentation. Implement regular security reminders related to sops usage.