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Attack Tree Analysis for nsqio/nsq

Objective: Compromise Application Data and/or Availability via NSQ Exploitation

Attack Tree Visualization

High-Risk Sub-Tree:

  • [Root] Compromise Application Data and/or Availability via NSQ Exploitation
    • [1.2] Exploit Insecure NSQ Configuration/Deployment
      • [1.2.2] Lack of Authentication/Authorization
        • [1.2.2.1] Unauthenticated Access to nsqd
          • --> [1.2.2.1.1] Unauthorized Message Publishing
          • --> [1.2.2.1.2] Unauthorized Message Consumption
          • --> [1.2.2.1.3] Topic/Channel Manipulation
        • [1.2.2.2] Unauthenticated Access to nsqlookupd
          • --> [1.2.2.2.1] Data Poisoning via Registration
          • --> [1.2.2.2.2] Information Disclosure via Lookup Queries
        • [1.2.2.3] Unauthenticated Access to nsqadmin
      • [1.2.3] Unencrypted Communication
        • [1.2.3.1] Sniffing of Messages in Transit
          • --> [1.2.3.1.1] Sniffing nsqd to nsqd Communication
          • --> [1.2.3.1.2] Sniffing Client to nsqd Communication
          • --> [1.2.3.1.3] Sniffing nsqadmin Communication
      • [1.2.4] Exposed Services to Public Network
        • --> [1.2.4.1] Publicly Accessible nsqd
        • --> [1.2.4.2] Publicly Accessible nsqlookupd
        • --> [1.2.4.3] Publicly Accessible nsqadmin
    • [1.4] Abuse NSQ Features for Malicious Purposes
    • [1.1.3] Exploit nsqadmin Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Path: [Root] Compromise Application Data and/or Availability via NSQ Exploitation

This is the attacker's ultimate objective. Success means compromising the application's data confidentiality, integrity, or availability through vulnerabilities or misconfigurations related to NSQ.

Attack Tree Path: [1.2] Exploit Insecure NSQ Configuration/Deployment

This attack vector focuses on exploiting weaknesses arising from how NSQ is set up and run. Misconfigurations are a primary source of high-risk vulnerabilities in NSQ deployments.

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.2] Lack of Authentication/Authorization

NSQ, by default, lacks built-in authentication and authorization. This is a fundamental security gap that attackers can exploit if not addressed at the application or network level.

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.2.1] Unauthenticated Access to nsqd

Attack Vector: Direct, unauthenticated access to the nsqd service. Likelihood: High (Default NSQ configuration) Impact: High (Data breach, service disruption, data manipulation) Effort: Low Skill Level: Low Detection Difficulty: Low to High (Depending on specific attack and monitoring)

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.2.1.1] Unauthorized Message Publishing

Attack Vector: Publishing malicious or spam messages to topics without authentication. Likelihood: High Impact: Medium (Spam, resource exhaustion for consumers) Effort: Low Skill Level: Low Detection Difficulty: Low (If message content is monitored)

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.2.1.2] Unauthorized Message Consumption

Attack Vector: Consuming sensitive messages from topics without authorization. Likelihood: High Impact: High (Data breach, confidentiality violation) Effort: Low Skill Level: Low Detection Difficulty: High (Without deep packet inspection)

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.2.1.3] Topic/Channel Manipulation

Attack Vector: Creating, deleting, or modifying topics/channels to disrupt service. Likelihood: High Impact: Medium (Service disruption, data loss) Effort: Low Skill Level: Low Detection Difficulty: Medium (With topic/channel monitoring)

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.2.2] Unauthenticated Access to nsqlookupd

Attack Vector: Direct, unauthenticated access to the nsqlookupd service. Likelihood: High (Default NSQ configuration) Impact: Medium (Service disruption, data poisoning) Effort: Low Skill Level: Low Detection Difficulty: Low to Medium (Depending on monitoring)

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.2.2.1] Data Poisoning via Registration

Attack Vector: Registering malicious producer information to redirect consumers. Likelihood: High Impact: Medium (Message routing disruption) Effort: Low Skill Level: Low Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires producer registration monitoring)

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.2.2.2] Information Disclosure via Lookup Queries

Attack Vector: Gathering information about NSQ topology and producers without authorization. Likelihood: High Impact: Low (Information gathering for further attacks) Effort: Low Skill Level: Low Detection Difficulty: Low (Easily detectable in access logs, but often benign traffic)

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.2.3] Unauthenticated Access to nsqadmin

Attack Vector: Direct, unauthenticated access to the nsqadmin web interface. Likelihood: Medium (Common misconfiguration) Impact: High (Full administrative control over NSQ cluster) Effort: Low Skill Level: Low Detection Difficulty: Low (Easily detectable in access logs)

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.3] Unencrypted Communication

NSQ communication is not encrypted by default. This allows for eavesdropping and potential Man-in-the-Middle attacks if the network is not secured.

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.3.1] Sniffing of Messages in Transit

Attack Vector: Intercepting network traffic to read unencrypted messages. Likelihood: Medium (If network is not secured) Impact: High (Confidentiality breach) Effort: Low to Medium Skill Level: Low to Medium Detection Difficulty: High (Without network intrusion detection)

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.3.1.1] Sniffing nsqd to nsqd Communication

Attack Vector: Sniffing traffic between nsqd instances within the cluster. Likelihood: Medium Impact: High (Confidentiality breach of internal messages) Effort: Medium Skill Level: Medium Detection Difficulty: High

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.3.1.2] Sniffing Client to nsqd Communication

Attack Vector: Sniffing traffic between application clients and nsqd. Likelihood: Medium Impact: High (Confidentiality breach of application messages) Effort: Low to Medium Skill Level: Low to Medium Detection Difficulty: High

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.3.1.3] Sniffing nsqadmin Communication

Attack Vector: Sniffing traffic to nsqadmin, potentially capturing admin credentials. Likelihood: Medium Impact: High (Admin credential theft, full cluster control) Effort: Low to Medium Skill Level: Low to Medium Detection Difficulty: High (Should be prevented by using HTTPS)

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.4] Exposed Services to Public Network

Exposing NSQ components directly to the public internet significantly increases the attack surface and makes all unauthenticated access vulnerabilities easily exploitable.

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.4.1] Publicly Accessible nsqd

Attack Vector: nsqd service directly accessible from the internet. Likelihood: Medium (Common misconfiguration) Impact: High (All unauthenticated access attacks become highly likely) Effort: Low Skill Level: Low Detection Difficulty: Low (External port scans)

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.4.2] Publicly Accessible nsqlookupd

Attack Vector: nsqlookupd service directly accessible from the internet. Likelihood: Medium (Common misconfiguration) Impact: Medium (Data poisoning, service discovery disruption) Effort: Low Skill Level: Low Detection Difficulty: Low (External port scans)

Attack Tree Path: [1.2.4.3] Publicly Accessible nsqadmin

Attack Vector: nsqadmin web interface directly accessible from the internet. Likelihood: Medium (Common misconfiguration) Impact: High (Full administrative control over NSQ cluster) Effort: Low Skill Level: Low Detection Difficulty: Low (External port scans)

Attack Tree Path: [1.4] Abuse NSQ Features for Malicious Purposes

This attack vector involves using intended NSQ features in unintended, harmful ways. This is especially effective when combined with unauthenticated access.

Attack Tree Path: [1.1.3] Exploit nsqadmin Vulnerabilities

This focuses on exploiting web application vulnerabilities within the nsqadmin interface itself, such as XSS, CSRF, or authentication bypass. These vulnerabilities can lead to administrative access and control over the NSQ cluster.