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Attack Tree Analysis for olivere/elastic

Objective: To compromise application that use given project by exploiting weaknesses or vulnerabilities within the project itself, focusing on high-risk areas.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Elasticsearch (using olivere/elastic) [CRITICAL NODE] ├───(OR)─ Exploit Elasticsearch Server-Side Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───(OR)─ Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerability (CVEs) [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Utilize Exploit (e.g., Remote Code Execution, Data Breach) │ └───(OR)─ Exploit Elasticsearch Misconfigurations [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ └───(AND)─ Exploit Insecure Elasticsearch Settings [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├─── Disable Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Access Elasticsearch API directly (e.g., data retrieval, index manipulation) │ ├─── Default Credentials [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ └─── Attempt default username/password combinations │ └─── Insecure Network Configuration (e.g., exposed to public internet without proper firewall) [CRITICAL NODE] │ └─── Direct access from attacker's network ├───(OR)─ Exploit Client-Side Vulnerabilities (Application using olivere/elastic) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ └───(OR)─ Elasticsearch Query Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├───(AND)─ Inject Malicious Elasticsearch Query [CRITICAL NODE] │ │ ├─── Parameter Manipulation (e.g., search terms, filters, aggregations) │ │ ├─── Craft malicious JSON query payload │ │ └─── Bypass Input Validation (if any) │ └───(AND)─ Execute Malicious Query on Elasticsearch [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├─── Data Exfiltration (e.g., using script_fields to extract sensitive data) [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├─── Data Modification/Deletion (e.g., using update_by_query, delete_by_query) [CRITICAL NODE] │ └─── Information Disclosure (e.g., error messages revealing internal data) └───(OR)─ Insecure Credentials Management in Application [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE] └───(AND)─ Access Credential Storage [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├─── File system access (if config files are exposed) │ ├─── Environment variable access (if application environment is compromised) │ └─── Reverse engineering/decompilation (if credentials are hardcoded) └───(AND)─ Compromise Elasticsearch Credentials [CRITICAL NODE] └─── Use stolen credentials to access Elasticsearch directly

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Application via Elasticsearch (using olivere/elastic) [CRITICAL NODE]

  • This is the overarching goal. Success means the attacker has achieved unauthorized access to sensitive data or disrupted application functionality by exploiting Elasticsearch related vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Elasticsearch Server-Side Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerability (CVEs) [CRITICAL NODE]:

    • Attack Vector: Identify the Elasticsearch version in use (through reconnaissance). Search for publicly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVEs) affecting that version. Utilize available exploits (publicly available or custom-developed) to target the vulnerability.
    • Examples: Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), arbitrary file read, data breach vulnerabilities.

  • Exploit Elasticsearch Misconfigurations [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

    • Exploit Insecure Elasticsearch Settings [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Disable Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: If authentication and authorization are disabled, the Elasticsearch API is directly accessible without any credentials. Attackers can directly interact with the API to retrieve, modify, or delete data, and perform administrative actions.
      • Default Credentials [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: If default usernames and passwords for Elasticsearch are not changed, attackers can use these well-known credentials to gain administrative access to Elasticsearch.
      • Insecure Network Configuration (e.g., exposed to public internet without proper firewall) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: If Elasticsearch is exposed to the public internet without proper firewall rules or network segmentation, attackers from anywhere can directly connect to the Elasticsearch instance and attempt to exploit any weaknesses.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerability (CVEs) [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Identify the Elasticsearch version in use (through reconnaissance). Search for publicly disclosed vulnerabilities (CVEs) affecting that version. Utilize available exploits (publicly available or custom-developed) to target the vulnerability.
    • Examples: Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), arbitrary file read, data breach vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Elasticsearch Misconfigurations [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Exploit Insecure Elasticsearch Settings [CRITICAL NODE]: * Disable Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: If authentication and authorization are disabled, the Elasticsearch API is directly accessible without any credentials. Attackers can directly interact with the API to retrieve, modify, or delete data, and perform administrative actions. * Default Credentials [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: If default usernames and passwords for Elasticsearch are not changed, attackers can use these well-known credentials to gain administrative access to Elasticsearch. * Insecure Network Configuration (e.g., exposed to public internet without proper firewall) [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: If Elasticsearch is exposed to the public internet without proper firewall rules or network segmentation, attackers from anywhere can directly connect to the Elasticsearch instance and attempt to exploit any weaknesses.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Insecure Elasticsearch Settings [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Disable Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: If authentication and authorization are disabled, the Elasticsearch API is directly accessible without any credentials. Attackers can directly interact with the API to retrieve, modify, or delete data, and perform administrative actions. * Default Credentials [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: If default usernames and passwords for Elasticsearch are not changed, attackers can use these well-known credentials to gain administrative access to Elasticsearch. * Insecure Network Configuration (e.g., exposed to public internet without proper firewall) [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: If Elasticsearch is exposed to the public internet without proper firewall rules or network segmentation, attackers from anywhere can directly connect to the Elasticsearch instance and attempt to exploit any weaknesses.

Attack Tree Path: Disable Authentication/Authorization [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: If authentication and authorization are disabled, the Elasticsearch API is directly accessible without any credentials. Attackers can directly interact with the API to retrieve, modify, or delete data, and perform administrative actions.

Attack Tree Path: Default Credentials [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: If default usernames and passwords for Elasticsearch are not changed, attackers can use these well-known credentials to gain administrative access to Elasticsearch.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Network Configuration (e.g., exposed to public internet without proper firewall) [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: If Elasticsearch is exposed to the public internet without proper firewall rules or network segmentation, attackers from anywhere can directly connect to the Elasticsearch instance and attempt to exploit any weaknesses.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Client-Side Vulnerabilities (Application using olivere/elastic) [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Elasticsearch Query Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
    • Inject Malicious Elasticsearch Query [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Parameter Manipulation (e.g., search terms, filters, aggregations):
        • Attack Vector: Manipulate user-controlled input parameters that are directly used in Elasticsearch queries (e.g., search terms, filters, sorting criteria) to inject malicious Elasticsearch query syntax.
      • Craft malicious JSON query payload:
        • Attack Vector: If the application constructs Elasticsearch queries using JSON payloads, attackers can attempt to inject malicious JSON structures or code into these payloads through user input.
      • Bypass Input Validation (if any):
        • Attack Vector: Identify and bypass any input validation or sanitization mechanisms implemented by the application to allow malicious query components to reach Elasticsearch.
    • Execute Malicious Query on Elasticsearch [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Data Exfiltration (e.g., using script_fields to extract sensitive data) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Inject Elasticsearch queries that utilize features like script_fields to execute scripts on the Elasticsearch server and extract sensitive data that the application might not normally expose.
      • Data Modification/Deletion (e.g., using update_by_query, delete_by_query) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Inject queries that use Elasticsearch's update or delete by query APIs to modify or delete data within Elasticsearch indices, potentially causing data integrity issues or denial of service.
      • Information Disclosure (e.g., error messages revealing internal data):
        • Attack Vector: Craft queries designed to trigger verbose error messages from Elasticsearch that might reveal internal information about the Elasticsearch setup, data structure, or application logic.

Attack Tree Path: Elasticsearch Query Injection [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Inject Malicious Elasticsearch Query [CRITICAL NODE]: * Parameter Manipulation (e.g., search terms, filters, aggregations): * Attack Vector: Manipulate user-controlled input parameters that are directly used in Elasticsearch queries (e.g., search terms, filters, sorting criteria) to inject malicious Elasticsearch query syntax. * Craft malicious JSON query payload: * Attack Vector: If the application constructs Elasticsearch queries using JSON payloads, attackers can attempt to inject malicious JSON structures or code into these payloads through user input. * Bypass Input Validation (if any): * Attack Vector: Identify and bypass any input validation or sanitization mechanisms implemented by the application to allow malicious query components to reach Elasticsearch.
    • Execute Malicious Query on Elasticsearch [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Data Exfiltration (e.g., using script_fields to extract sensitive data) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Inject Elasticsearch queries that utilize features like script_fields to execute scripts on the Elasticsearch server and extract sensitive data that the application might not normally expose.
      • Data Modification/Deletion (e.g., using update_by_query, delete_by_query) [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Inject queries that use Elasticsearch's update or delete by query APIs to modify or delete data within Elasticsearch indices, potentially causing data integrity issues or denial of service.
      • Information Disclosure (e.g., error messages revealing internal data):
        • Attack Vector: Craft queries designed to trigger verbose error messages from Elasticsearch that might reveal internal information about the Elasticsearch setup, data structure, or application logic.

Attack Tree Path: Inject Malicious Elasticsearch Query [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Parameter Manipulation (e.g., search terms, filters, aggregations): * Attack Vector: Manipulate user-controlled input parameters that are directly used in Elasticsearch queries (e.g., search terms, filters, sorting criteria) to inject malicious Elasticsearch query syntax. * Craft malicious JSON query payload: * Attack Vector: If the application constructs Elasticsearch queries using JSON payloads, attackers can attempt to inject malicious JSON structures or code into these payloads through user input. * Bypass Input Validation (if any): * Attack Vector: Identify and bypass any input validation or sanitization mechanisms implemented by the application to allow malicious query components to reach Elasticsearch.

Attack Tree Path: Execute Malicious Query on Elasticsearch [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Data Exfiltration (e.g., using script_fields to extract sensitive data) [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Inject Elasticsearch queries that utilize features like script_fields to execute scripts on the Elasticsearch server and extract sensitive data that the application might not normally expose. * Data Modification/Deletion (e.g., using update_by_query, delete_by_query) [CRITICAL NODE]: * Attack Vector: Inject queries that use Elasticsearch's update or delete by query APIs to modify or delete data within Elasticsearch indices, potentially causing data integrity issues or denial of service. * Information Disclosure (e.g., error messages revealing internal data): * Attack Vector: Craft queries designed to trigger verbose error messages from Elasticsearch that might reveal internal information about the Elasticsearch setup, data structure, or application logic.

Attack Tree Path: Data Exfiltration (e.g., using script_fields to extract sensitive data) [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Inject Elasticsearch queries that utilize features like script_fields to execute scripts on the Elasticsearch server and extract sensitive data that the application might not normally expose.

Attack Tree Path: Data Modification/Deletion (e.g., using update_by_query, delete_by_query) [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Inject queries that use Elasticsearch's update or delete by query APIs to modify or delete data within Elasticsearch indices, potentially causing data integrity issues or denial of service.

Attack Tree Path: Information Disclosure (e.g., error messages revealing internal data)

  • Attack Vector: Craft queries designed to trigger verbose error messages from Elasticsearch that might reveal internal information about the Elasticsearch setup, data structure, or application logic.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Credentials Management in Application [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Access Credential Storage [CRITICAL NODE]: * File system access (if config files are exposed): * Attack Vector: If configuration files containing Elasticsearch credentials are stored in the file system with insecure permissions or are accessible through web directories, attackers can gain access to these files and extract the credentials. * Environment variable access (if application environment is compromised): * Attack Vector: If Elasticsearch credentials are stored as environment variables and the application environment is compromised (e.g., through server-side vulnerabilities), attackers can access these environment variables and retrieve the credentials. * Reverse engineering/decompilation (if credentials are hardcoded): * Attack Vector: If, against best practices, Elasticsearch credentials are hardcoded directly into the application code, attackers can reverse engineer or decompile the application to extract these embedded credentials.
    • Compromise Elasticsearch Credentials [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Use stolen credentials to access Elasticsearch directly:
        • Attack Vector: Once Elasticsearch credentials are obtained through any of the above methods, attackers can use these credentials to directly authenticate to the Elasticsearch API, bypassing the application entirely and gaining full control over the Elasticsearch data and functionality.

Attack Tree Path: Access Credential Storage [CRITICAL NODE]

  • File system access (if config files are exposed): * Attack Vector: If configuration files containing Elasticsearch credentials are stored in the file system with insecure permissions or are accessible through web directories, attackers can gain access to these files and extract the credentials. * Environment variable access (if application environment is compromised): * Attack Vector: If Elasticsearch credentials are stored as environment variables and the application environment is compromised (e.g., through server-side vulnerabilities), attackers can access these environment variables and retrieve the credentials. * Reverse engineering/decompilation (if credentials are hardcoded): * Attack Vector: If, against best practices, Elasticsearch credentials are hardcoded directly into the application code, attackers can reverse engineer or decompile the application to extract these embedded credentials.

Attack Tree Path: File system access (if config files are exposed)

  • Attack Vector: If configuration files containing Elasticsearch credentials are stored in the file system with insecure permissions or are accessible through web directories, attackers can gain access to these files and extract the credentials.

Attack Tree Path: Environment variable access (if application environment is compromised)

  • Attack Vector: If Elasticsearch credentials are stored as environment variables and the application environment is compromised (e.g., through server-side vulnerabilities), attackers can access these environment variables and retrieve the credentials.

Attack Tree Path: Reverse engineering/decompilation (if credentials are hardcoded)

  • Attack Vector: If, against best practices, Elasticsearch credentials are hardcoded directly into the application code, attackers can reverse engineer or decompile the application to extract these embedded credentials.

Attack Tree Path: Compromise Elasticsearch Credentials [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Use stolen credentials to access Elasticsearch directly: * Attack Vector: Once Elasticsearch credentials are obtained through any of the above methods, attackers can use these credentials to directly authenticate to the Elasticsearch API, bypassing the application entirely and gaining full control over the Elasticsearch data and functionality.

Attack Tree Path: Use stolen credentials to access Elasticsearch directly

  • Attack Vector: Once Elasticsearch credentials are obtained through any of the above methods, attackers can use these credentials to directly authenticate to the Elasticsearch API, bypassing the application entirely and gaining full control over the Elasticsearch data and functionality.