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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for olivere/elastic

Attack Surface: Query Injection

  • Description: Attackers manipulate user-supplied input to alter the intended Elasticsearch query, potentially accessing, modifying, or deleting data. This is the most critical vulnerability.
  • How olivere/elastic Contributes: The library provides the API for interacting with Elasticsearch; incorrect use of this API (string concatenation instead of query builders) creates the vulnerability. The library itself is not vulnerable, but its misuse is.
  • Example: 
    // VULNERABLE: Direct string concatenation
userInput := `"malicious_input" OR 1=1`
query := `{"query": {"match": {"field": "` + userInput + `"}}}`
// ... use query with elastic.NewSearchService ...

// SAFE: Using query builders
userInput := "malicious_input" // Still needs validation, but is safer
query := elastic.NewMatchQuery("field", userInput)
// ... use query with elastic.NewSearchService ...
  • Impact: Data exfiltration, data modification/deletion, denial of service, potential full cluster compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mandatory: Always use olivere/elastic's query builders (e.g., elastic.NewTermQuery, elastic.NewBoolQuery, elastic.NewMatchQuery) to construct queries programmatically. This is the only reliable way to prevent query injection.
    • Never directly concatenate user-supplied input into raw query strings. This is fundamentally insecure.
    • Implement strict input validation and sanitization before using any user input, even with query builders. Validate data types, lengths, and allowed characters. This is a defense-in-depth measure.
    • Employ a "least privilege" principle for Elasticsearch users and roles. The application's Elasticsearch user should only have the minimum necessary permissions.

Attack Surface: Improper Error Handling

  • Description: Failure to properly handle errors returned by olivere/elastic can lead to information leakage, potentially revealing sensitive details about the cluster or queries.
  • How olivere/elastic Contributes: The library returns errors that must be handled; ignoring or improperly handling them creates the vulnerability. The library's behavior is correct; the application's handling is the issue.
  • Example: 
    result, _ := client.Search().Index("myindex").Do(ctx) // Ignoring the error!
fmt.Println(result.Hits.TotalHits.Value) // Potential panic if result is nil, or leak of error details
  • Impact: Information leakage (revealing cluster configuration, query structure, or data snippets through error messages), potential bypass of security checks (if errors related to authorization are ignored).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Check for errors after every olivere/elastic call. Never ignore the returned error. Use if err != nil { ... } blocks.
    • Implement robust error handling: log errors (using structured logging, without exposing sensitive information), and return user-friendly error messages (without revealing internal details). Never expose raw error messages from olivere/elastic to end-users.
    • Consider using a centralized error handling mechanism for consistency.

Attack Surface: Unencrypted Connections (Lack of HTTPS)

  • Description: Connecting to Elasticsearch without HTTPS allows attackers to intercept and potentially modify data in transit (Man-in-the-Middle attack).
  • How olivere/elastic Contributes: The library allows connections without HTTPS; it's the developer's responsibility to enforce HTTPS. The library doesn't force insecure connections, but it doesn't prevent them either.
  • Example: Using http:// instead of https:// in the Elasticsearch URL when creating the client.
  • Impact: Data theft (credentials, sensitive data), data manipulation, man-in-the-middle attacks.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Always use HTTPS to connect to Elasticsearch. Ensure the olivere/elastic client is configured with an https:// URL. This is non-negotiable.
    • Enable and enforce certificate validation. Do not disable certificate verification. Use a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) for your Elasticsearch cluster's certificates.

Attack Surface: Dependency Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in olivere/elastic itself or its dependencies can be exploited.
  • How olivere/elastic Contributes: The library and its dependencies are the potential source of the vulnerability.
  • Example: A hypothetical vulnerability in a JSON parsing library used by olivere/elastic could allow for remote code execution.
  • Impact: Varies depending on the specific vulnerability, ranging from information disclosure to remote code execution.
  • Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical, depending on the vulnerability)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regularly update olivere/elastic and all its dependencies to the latest versions. Use go get -u ./... or go mod tidy followed by go mod vendor.
    • Use a dependency vulnerability scanner (e.g., go list -m -u all, Snyk, Dependabot, Trivy) to identify and track known vulnerabilities. Integrate this into your CI/CD pipeline.
    • Consider using a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) to track all dependencies.