threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for olivere/elastic

Threat: Elasticsearch Query Injection

• Threat: Elasticsearch Query Injection (Spoofing/Tampering/Information Disclosure/DoS)

  • Description: An attacker crafts malicious input that is directly incorporated into an Elasticsearch query constructed using olivere/elastic. The attacker can manipulate the query's logic to bypass intended access controls, retrieve unauthorized data, modify data, or cause a denial-of-service by executing resource-intensive queries. For example, an attacker might inject a wildcard query or a complex aggregation into a search field intended for simple text matching. This leverages the direct interaction with Elasticsearch via the client.
  • Impact:
    • Data breach (unauthorized data access).
    • Data modification or deletion.
    • Service disruption (DoS).
    • Exposure of internal Elasticsearch schema.
  • Affected Component: Any olivere/elastic function that constructs queries from user input, particularly those involving QueryStringQuery, RawStringQuery, or direct string concatenation to build queries. This affects any part of the application that uses these functions without proper sanitization. The vulnerability exists in how the application uses the client.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Validation: Implement rigorous input validation to ensure that user-provided data conforms to expected types, lengths, and formats before it is used in any query.
    • Parameterized Queries/Query Builders: Use olivere/elastic's query builders (e.g., NewTermQuery, NewMatchQuery, NewBoolQuery) whenever possible. These builders automatically handle escaping and formatting, reducing the risk of injection. Avoid direct string concatenation.
    • Whitelist Allowed Characters: If direct string manipulation is unavoidable, use a whitelist of allowed characters and escape or reject any other characters.
    • Least Privilege: Ensure the application's Elasticsearch credentials have only the minimum necessary permissions.

Threat: Credential Exposure

• Threat: Credential Exposure (Spoofing)

  • Description: The application's Elasticsearch credentials (API keys, usernames/passwords, or TLS certificates) are exposed due to insecure storage or transmission. An attacker could obtain these credentials and impersonate the application, directly using the olivere/elastic client with the stolen credentials. This is a direct threat because the client requires these credentials to function.
  • Impact:
    • Complete compromise of the Elasticsearch cluster.
    • Unauthorized access to all data.
    • Ability to modify or delete data.
  • Affected Component: The olivere/elastic.NewClient function and any code that handles the configuration of the client, including how credentials are provided (e.g., elastic.SetURL, elastic.SetBasicAuth, elastic.SetAPIKey, elastic.SetSniff, elastic.SetHealthcheck). The client itself is the component being misused.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Credential Storage: Never hardcode credentials in the source code. Use environment variables, a secrets management service (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault), or a secure configuration file with appropriate permissions.
    • TLS Encryption: Always use HTTPS (TLS) for communication with Elasticsearch. Ensure the client is configured to verify the server's certificate.
    • Key Rotation: Regularly rotate API keys or certificates.

Threat: Unencrypted Communication

• Threat: Unencrypted Communication (Tampering/Information Disclosure)

  • Description: The application communicates with Elasticsearch over an unencrypted channel (HTTP instead of HTTPS). An attacker could intercept the communication using a man-in-the-middle attack, capturing sensitive data or modifying requests and responses sent through the olivere/elastic client. This is a direct threat because the client handles the communication.
  • Impact:
    • Data breach (e.g., sensitive data transmitted in queries or responses).
    • Data modification (attacker could alter queries or results).
  • Affected Component: The olivere/elastic.NewClient function and the underlying HTTP transport used by the client. Specifically, the URL provided to elastic.SetURL should use https://. The client's communication mechanism is the affected component.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce HTTPS: Always use HTTPS (TLS) for communication with Elasticsearch. Configure the olivere/elastic client to use an https:// URL.
    • Certificate Verification: Ensure the client is configured to verify the Elasticsearch server's certificate to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Use elastic.SetHttpClient to provide a custom http.Client with appropriate TLS configuration if needed.

Threat: Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion

• Threat: Denial of Service via Resource Exhaustion (DoS)

  • Description: An attacker sends a large number of requests or crafts computationally expensive queries (e.g., deeply nested aggregations, wildcard queries on large indices) through the olivere/elastic client to overwhelm the Elasticsearch cluster. This directly exploits the client's ability to send requests to Elasticsearch.
  • Impact:
    • Service unavailability.
    • Performance degradation.
  • Affected Component: All olivere/elastic functions that interact with Elasticsearch, particularly those that execute searches or aggregations. The client is the conduit for the DoS attack.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rate Limiting (Application Level): Implement rate limiting in the application to restrict the number of requests a user or IP address can make within a given time period.
    • Query Optimization: Design efficient queries. Avoid overly broad or complex queries.
    • Query Sanitization (Again): Prevent query injection, which can be used to craft DoS attacks.
    • Elasticsearch Resource Limits: Configure resource limits within Elasticsearch (circuit breakers, thread pool sizes).
    • Timeouts: Set appropriate timeouts on requests made via olivere/elastic.

Threat: Outdated olivere/elastic Version

• Threat: Outdated olivere/elastic Version (Elevation of Privilege)

  • Description: The application uses an outdated version of the olivere/elastic library that contains known security vulnerabilities. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities within the client itself to gain unauthorized access or control. This is a direct threat to the client library.
  • Impact:
    • Varies depending on the specific vulnerability, but could range from information disclosure to complete cluster compromise.
  • Affected Component: The entire olivere/elastic library.
  • Risk Severity: High (depending on the vulnerability)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regular Updates: Keep the olivere/elastic library up to date. Use Go modules to manage dependencies and regularly run go get -u to update them.
    • Vulnerability Scanning: Use vulnerability scanning tools to identify outdated or vulnerable dependencies.