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Attack Tree Analysis for open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector

Objective: Compromise Application by Exploiting OpenTelemetry Collector

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via OpenTelemetry Collector (ROOT - AND)

  • OR 1. Exploit Collector Vulnerabilities Directly
    • OR 1.1. Exploit Receiver Vulnerabilities
      • 1.1.1. Exploit OTLP Receiver Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]
    • OR 1.4. Exploit Core Collector Logic Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]
      • 1.4.3. Concurrency/Race Condition Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]
    • OR 1.5. Exploit Dependency Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]
      • 1.5.1. Vulnerable Go Libraries [CRITICAL]
      • 1.5.2. Vulnerable C/C++ Libraries (via CGo) [CRITICAL]
  • OR 2. Exploit Collector Misconfiguration [CRITICAL]
    • OR 2.1. Insecure Access Control [CRITICAL]
      • 2.1.1. Exposed Management Ports without Authentication [CRITICAL]
      • 2.1.3. Weak Authentication Mechanisms [CRITICAL]
    • OR 2.4. Insecure Network Configuration [CRITICAL]
      • 2.4.1. Collector Directly Exposed to Public Internet [CRITICAL]
      • 2.4.2. Unencrypted Communication (No TLS/SSL) [CRITICAL]
  • OR 3. Abuse Collector Functionality for Malicious Purposes
    • OR 3.1. Data Injection/Flooding
      • 3.1.1. Denial of Service via Data Flooding
      • 3.1.3. Noise Generation in Telemetry Data
    • OR 3.3. Information Disclosure via Telemetry
      • 3.3.1. Exploiting Application Logging Practices [CRITICAL]
  • OR 4. Compromise Collector Infrastructure
    • OR 4.1. Exploit Underlying OS/System Vulnerabilities
      • 4.1.3. Infrastructure Misconfiguration (Cloud Provider, Network) [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Exploit OTLP Receiver Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]:

Attack Vectors:

  • Sending specially crafted OTLP/gRPC requests designed to trigger parsing errors, buffer overflows, or other vulnerabilities in the OTLP receiver code.
  • Exploiting known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) in the OTLP receiver component if the Collector is not updated.
  • Fuzzing the OTLP receiver with malformed data to discover new vulnerabilities (zero-day).

Attack Tree Path: 1.4.3. Concurrency/Race Condition Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]:

Attack Vectors:

  • Sending a high volume of concurrent requests or data streams to the Collector to trigger race conditions in multi-threaded or asynchronous operations.
  • Crafting specific sequences of requests or data inputs that exploit timing windows in the Collector's internal logic, leading to unexpected states or vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 1.5.1. Vulnerable Go Libraries [CRITICAL]:

Attack Vectors:

  • Exploiting known CVEs in Go libraries used by the OpenTelemetry Collector. This often involves triggering specific code paths in the vulnerable library through Collector's functionality.
  • If a vulnerable library allows remote code execution, attackers could potentially gain control of the Collector instance.

Attack Tree Path: 1.5.2. Vulnerable C/C++ Libraries (via CGo) [CRITICAL]:

Attack Vectors:

  • Similar to Go libraries, exploiting known CVEs in C/C++ libraries linked via CGo. This can be more complex due to the CGo bridge, but vulnerabilities can still be exploited.
  • Memory corruption vulnerabilities in C/C++ libraries can be particularly dangerous and lead to code execution or DoS.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1. Exposed Management Ports without Authentication [CRITICAL]:

Attack Vectors:

  • Scanning for open ports (e.g., gRPC, HTTP) used for Collector management interfaces.
  • Directly accessing these exposed ports without any authentication, gaining administrative control over the Collector.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.3. Weak Authentication Mechanisms [CRITICAL]:

Attack Vectors:

  • Brute-force attacks or password dictionary attacks against weak passwords used for Collector management interfaces.
  • Exploiting easily bypassed or flawed authentication methods if implemented.

Attack Tree Path: 2.4.1. Collector Directly Exposed to Public Internet [CRITICAL]:

Attack Vectors:

  • Directly targeting the publicly exposed Collector with vulnerability exploits, misconfiguration attacks, or DoS attacks.
  • Increased visibility and accessibility for attackers to probe and attack the Collector.

Attack Tree Path: 2.4.2. Unencrypted Communication (No TLS/SSL) [CRITICAL]:

Attack Vectors:

  • Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks to intercept and potentially modify telemetry data in transit between Collector components or between applications and the Collector.
  • Network sniffing to capture sensitive data transmitted in unencrypted telemetry streams.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.1. Denial of Service via Data Flooding:

Attack Vectors:

  • Sending a massive volume of telemetry data to the Collector receivers, overwhelming its processing capacity (CPU, memory, network).
  • Causing resource exhaustion and making the Collector unresponsive or crash, leading to DoS.

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.3. Noise Generation in Telemetry Data:

Attack Vectors:

  • Injecting a large amount of irrelevant, misleading, or garbage telemetry data into the Collector.
  • Diluting legitimate telemetry data, making it difficult to analyze and detect real issues or malicious activities.

Attack Tree Path: 3.3.1. Exploiting Application Logging Practices [CRITICAL]:

Attack Vectors:

  • Manipulating application behavior or exploiting existing logging practices to cause applications to log sensitive information (credentials, PII, API keys) that is then captured by the Collector through log exporters.
  • Exfiltrating this sensitive information by observing the telemetry data exported by the Collector.

Attack Tree Path: 4.1.3. Infrastructure Misconfiguration (Cloud Provider, Network) [CRITICAL]:

Attack Vectors:

  • Exploiting misconfigured cloud security groups, network access control lists (ACLs), or firewall rules to gain unauthorized access to the Collector's infrastructure.
  • Leveraging misconfigurations in cloud IAM (Identity and Access Management) roles to escalate privileges or access sensitive resources related to the Collector.
  • Exploiting insecure network segmentation to move laterally from compromised systems to the Collector's infrastructure.