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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector

Threat: Data Injection in Receivers

  • Description: An attacker sends maliciously crafted telemetry data to a receiver endpoint. This could involve exploiting parsing vulnerabilities, exceeding resource limits, or injecting malicious payloads within telemetry attributes. Attackers might use tools to generate and send crafted payloads to exposed receiver endpoints.
  • Impact: Denial of Service (collector crash or performance degradation), potential Remote Code Execution (if receiver parsing logic is vulnerable), data corruption, misleading telemetry data.
  • Affected Component: Receivers (e.g., OTLP receiver, HTTP receiver, gRPC receiver, Prometheus receiver, custom receivers). Specifically, the parsing and processing logic within each receiver.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Validation: Implement robust input validation and sanitization in receivers to reject malformed or unexpected data.
    • Resource Limits: Configure resource limits (e.g., request size limits, rate limiting) on receivers to prevent resource exhaustion attacks.
    • Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Regularly audit and penetration test receivers, especially custom receivers, for injection vulnerabilities.
    • Keep Collector Updated: Apply security patches and updates to the OpenTelemetry Collector and its dependencies promptly.
    • Use Secure Protocols: Enforce secure protocols like TLS for receiver endpoints to protect data in transit and potentially enable authentication.

Threat: Insecure Exporter Data Exfiltration

  • Description: An attacker intercepts telemetry data being exported from the collector due to insecure exporter configurations. This often involves using unencrypted protocols (e.g., HTTP without TLS) or sending data to untrusted destinations. Attackers can perform Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks on network traffic.
  • Impact: Confidentiality breach (exposure of telemetry data), data modification in transit, compromised data integrity, potential exposure of sensitive information within telemetry.
  • Affected Component: Exporters (e.g., OTLP exporter, Prometheus exporter, Jaeger exporter, Zipkin exporter). The network communication of exporters.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce TLS Encryption: Always use TLS encryption for exporter connections to protect data in transit.
    • Destination Validation: Verify and validate the destination of exported telemetry data to ensure it is sent to trusted and authorized systems.
    • Mutual TLS (mTLS): Consider using mTLS for exporters to provide mutual authentication between the collector and the backend system.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate the collector and backend monitoring systems within secure network segments.

Threat: Credential Exposure in Configuration

  • Description: Sensitive credentials (API keys, passwords, tokens) for exporters or other components are exposed due to insecure storage or handling of the collector configuration. Attackers might gain access to configuration files through file system vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, or compromised systems.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to backend monitoring systems, potential lateral movement to other systems if credentials are reused, confidentiality breach of sensitive credentials.
  • Affected Component: Collector Configuration Management, Exporters, potentially Receivers and Extensions if they use credentials. Configuration files and storage mechanisms.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secret Management: Use dedicated secret management solutions (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes Secrets) to store and manage sensitive credentials securely.
    • Environment Variables: Prefer using environment variables for sensitive configuration values instead of hardcoding them in configuration files.
    • Configuration Encryption: Encrypt configuration files at rest if they contain sensitive information.
    • Access Control for Configuration: Restrict access to configuration files and directories to authorized users and processes only.
    • Regular Security Audits: Review configuration storage and handling practices regularly.

Threat: Collector Software Supply Chain Compromise

  • Description: Attackers compromise the OpenTelemetry Collector software supply chain by injecting malicious code into dependencies, build processes, or distribution channels. This could result in compromised collector binaries or distributions. Attackers might target upstream repositories, build pipelines, or distribution infrastructure.
  • Impact: Widespread compromise of collector deployments, potential for data exfiltration, remote code execution, and other malicious activities.
  • Affected Component: Collector Binaries, Dependencies, Build and Release Processes, Distribution Channels. The entire software supply chain.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Dependency Scanning: Regularly scan collector dependencies for known vulnerabilities using vulnerability scanners.
    • Software Bill of Materials (SBOM): Generate and maintain an SBOM for the collector to track dependencies and components.
    • Secure Build Pipeline: Implement a secure build pipeline with integrity checks and code signing to ensure the integrity of collector binaries.
    • Verify Signatures: Verify the signatures of downloaded collector binaries and distributions before deployment.
    • Reputable Distribution Sources: Download collector binaries and distributions only from official and reputable sources.

Threat: Lack of Security Updates and Patching

  • Description: Failure to apply security updates and patches to the OpenTelemetry Collector and its dependencies leaves the system vulnerable to known exploits. Attackers can exploit publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in outdated collector versions.
  • Impact: Exploitation of known vulnerabilities, potential for data breaches, denial of service, remote code execution, and other security compromises.
  • Affected Component: Entire OpenTelemetry Collector installation, including core components and dependencies. Operational maintenance and patching processes.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regularly Check for Updates: Establish a process for regularly checking for security updates and patches for the OpenTelemetry Collector and its dependencies.
    • Automated Patching: Implement automated patching processes where possible to ensure timely application of security updates.
    • Vulnerability Scanning: Regularly scan the collector deployment for known vulnerabilities using vulnerability scanners.
    • Stay Informed: Subscribe to security advisories and mailing lists related to the OpenTelemetry Collector to stay informed about new vulnerabilities and updates.