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Attack Tree Analysis for open-telemetry/opentelemetry-collector

Objective: Exfiltrate Sensitive Data Processed by the Collector

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Exfiltrate Sensitive Data Processed by the Collector ├── 1. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Receivers │ ├── 1.1. OTLP Receiver Vulnerabilities │ │ ├── 1.1.1. Authentication Bypass (if misconfigured or a vulnerability exists) [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── Send crafted OTLP requests to bypass authentication and inject malicious data or extract existing data. -> (High-Risk Path) │ │ ├── 1.1.2. Authorization Bypass (if misconfigured or a vulnerability exists) [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── Send crafted OTLP requests with elevated privileges to access restricted data. -> (High-Risk Path) │ │ └── 1.1.4. Remote Code Execution (RCE) (if a vulnerability exists) [CRITICAL] │ │ └── Send crafted OTLP requests exploiting a buffer overflow, format string vulnerability, or other code injection flaw. │ ├── 1.2. Jaeger Receiver Vulnerabilities │ │ ├── Authentication Bypass [CRITICAL] -> (High-Risk Path - if Auth/Authz bypassed) │ │ ├── Authorization Bypass [CRITICAL] -> (High-Risk Path - if Auth/Authz bypassed) │ │ └── RCE [CRITICAL] │ ├── 1.4. Other Custom/Contrib Receivers │ │ └── Exploit vulnerabilities specific to the custom receiver's implementation (e.g., insecure deserialization, improper input validation). [CRITICAL - if custom code is poorly written] ├── 2. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Processors │ ├── 2.5. Custom/Contrib Processors │ │ └── Exploit vulnerabilities specific to the custom processor's implementation. [CRITICAL - if custom code is poorly written] │ └── 2.6. Configuration Errors in Processors │ └── Leverage misconfigurations (e.g., overly permissive filters, incorrect sampling rates) to leak data or cause DoS. [CRITICAL - if misconfigured] ├── 3. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Exporters │ ├── 3.1. OTLP Exporter Vulnerabilities │ │ ├── 3.1.1. Authentication Bypass (to the backend) [CRITICAL] │ │ │ └── If the exporter is misconfigured or a vulnerability exists, send data to an attacker-controlled backend. -> (High-Risk Path) │ │ └── 3.1.3. Credential Leakage [CRITICAL] │ │ └── Exploit vulnerabilities or misconfigurations to expose credentials used by the exporter to connect to the backend. -> (High-Risk Path) │ ├── 3.3. Custom/Contrib Exporters │ │ └── Exploit vulnerabilities specific to the custom exporter's implementation. [CRITICAL - if custom code is poorly written] │ └── 3.4. Network Eavesdropping │ └── If the exporter uses unencrypted communication, passively capture data in transit. [CRITICAL - if unencrypted] -> (High-Risk Path) ├── 4. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Extensions │ ├── 4.2. pprof Extension │ │ └── If enabled and exposed without proper authentication, leak profiling data that could reveal sensitive information or be used for performance analysis to identify vulnerabilities. [CRITICAL - if exposed without auth] │ ├── 4.3. zpages Extension │ │ └── If enabled and exposed without proper authentication, leak trace and component data. [CRITICAL - if exposed without auth] │ ├── 4.4. Custom/Contrib Extensions │ │ └── Exploit vulnerabilities specific to the custom extension's implementation. [CRITICAL - if custom code is poorly written] │ └── 4.5 Authentication/Authorization Bypass [CRITICAL] │ └── If extensions are misconfigured or a vulnerability exists, bypass authentication and authorization. ├── 5. Exploit Configuration Errors │ ├── 5.1. Insecure Defaults [CRITICAL] │ │ └── Leverage default configurations that expose sensitive data or allow unauthorized access (e.g., no authentication on receivers). -> (High-Risk Path) │ ├── 5.2. Overly Permissive Access Control [CRITICAL] │ │ └── Exploit configurations that grant excessive permissions to untrusted sources. -> (High-Risk Path) │ ├── 5.3. Exposed Endpoints [CRITICAL] │ │ └── Access receivers, exporters, or extensions that are unintentionally exposed to the public internet or untrusted networks. -> (High-Risk Path) │ ├── 5.4. Weak or Default Credentials [CRITICAL] │ │ └── Use default or easily guessable credentials to gain access to the Collector or its components. -> (High-Risk Path) │ ├── 5.5. Missing TLS/Encryption [CRITICAL] │ └── Intercept unencrypted traffic between the Collector and other components (application, backend). -> (High-Risk Path) ├── 6. Exploit Underlying System Vulnerabilities │ └── 6.3. Dependency Vulnerabilities │ └── Exploit vulnerabilities in third-party libraries used by the Collector. [CRITICAL - if a high-severity vulnerability exists] └── 7. Supply Chain Attacks ├── 7.1 Compromised Dependencies [CRITICAL] │ └── Attacker injects malicious code into a library that opentelemetry-collector depends on. -> (High-Risk Path) ├── 7.2 Malicious Contrib Components [CRITICAL] │ └── Attacker publishes a malicious receiver, processor, exporter, or extension to a public repository. -> (High-Risk Path) └── 7.3 Compromised Build Pipeline [CRITICAL] └── Attacker gains access to the build pipeline and injects malicious code into the opentelemetry-collector binary. -> (High-Risk Path)

Attack Tree Path: 1. Receiver Vulnerabilities

  • 1.1.1/1.1.2/1.2 Authentication/Authorization Bypass (OTLP, Jaeger):
    • Description: The attacker sends specially crafted requests to the receiver, exploiting a lack of authentication or a flaw in the authorization mechanism. This allows them to either inject malicious data or extract existing data without proper credentials.
    • Mitigation: Implement strong authentication (e.g., mTLS) and authorization for all receivers. Enforce least privilege. Validate all input.
  • 1.1.4/1.2 RCE (OTLP, Jaeger):
    • Description: The attacker sends a malicious request that exploits a vulnerability like a buffer overflow or format string vulnerability in the receiver's code, allowing them to execute arbitrary code on the Collector host.
    • Mitigation: Keep the Collector and its dependencies up-to-date. Use memory-safe languages where possible. Perform rigorous code reviews and security testing.
  • 1.4 Custom/Contrib Receiver Vulnerabilities:
    • Description: Custom receivers may have unique vulnerabilities due to implementation flaws (e.g., insecure deserialization, improper input validation, SQL injection if interacting with a database).
    • Mitigation: Thoroughly review and test any custom receiver code. Follow secure coding practices. Use a linter and static analysis tools.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Processor Vulnerabilities

  • 2.5 Custom/Contrib Processor Vulnerabilities:
    • Description: Similar to custom receivers, custom processors can introduce vulnerabilities due to coding errors.
    • Mitigation: Thoroughly review and test any custom processor code. Follow secure coding practices.
  • 2.6 Configuration Errors in Processors:
    • Description: Misconfigurations, such as overly permissive filters or incorrect sampling rates, can lead to data leakage or denial of service.
    • Mitigation: Use configuration validation tools. Follow the principle of least privilege. Regularly review configurations.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exporter Vulnerabilities

  • 3.1.1 OTLP Exporter Authentication Bypass:
    • Description: The attacker exploits a misconfiguration or vulnerability in the exporter's authentication to send data to an attacker-controlled backend instead of the legitimate one.
    • Mitigation: Implement strong authentication (e.g., mTLS) for all exporter connections. Validate backend certificates.
  • 3.1.3 Credential Leakage:
    • Description: The attacker gains access to the credentials used by the exporter to connect to the backend, either through a vulnerability or a misconfiguration (e.g., credentials stored in plain text).
    • Mitigation: Use a secrets management solution. Avoid hardcoding credentials. Regularly rotate credentials.
  • 3.3 Custom/Contrib Exporter Vulnerabilities:
    • Description: Custom exporters may have unique vulnerabilities due to implementation flaws.
    • Mitigation: Thoroughly review and test any custom exporter code. Follow secure coding practices.
  • 3.4 Network Eavesdropping:
    • Description: If the exporter uses unencrypted communication, an attacker on the network can passively capture the data being sent.
    • Mitigation: Enforce TLS for all exporter communication.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Extension Vulnerabilities

  • 4.2 pprof Extension (Data Leak):
    • Description: If the pprof extension is enabled and exposed without authentication, an attacker can access profiling data, which might reveal sensitive information or performance bottlenecks that could be exploited.
    • Mitigation: Disable the pprof extension if not needed. If needed, require authentication.
  • 4.3 zpages Extension (Data Leak):
    • Description: Similar to pprof, the zpages extension can leak trace and component data if exposed without authentication.
    • Mitigation: Disable the zpages extension if not needed. If needed, require authentication.
  • 4.4 Custom/Contrib Extension Vulnerabilities:
    • Description: Custom extensions may have unique vulnerabilities.
    • Mitigation: Thoroughly review and test any custom extension code.
  • 4.5 Authentication/Authorization Bypass:
    • Description: If extensions are misconfigured, authentication and authorization can be bypassed.
    • Mitigation: Implement strong authentication and authorization.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Configuration Errors

  • 5.1 Insecure Defaults:
    • Description: The Collector or its components might have default configurations that are insecure (e.g., no authentication required).
    • Mitigation: Review and change default configurations to secure settings.
  • 5.2 Overly Permissive Access Control:
    • Description: The Collector might be configured to grant excessive permissions to untrusted sources.
    • Mitigation: Follow the principle of least privilege. Use specific, restrictive access control rules.
  • 5.3 Exposed Endpoints:
    • Description: Receivers, exporters, or extensions might be unintentionally exposed to the public internet or untrusted networks.
    • Mitigation: Use network segmentation. Configure firewalls to restrict access. Regularly scan for exposed ports.
  • 5.4 Weak or Default Credentials:
    • Description: The Collector or its components might use default or easily guessable credentials.
    • Mitigation: Change default credentials immediately after installation. Use strong, unique passwords.
  • 5.5 Missing TLS/Encryption:
    • Description: Communication between the Collector and other components (application, backend) might be unencrypted.
    • Mitigation: Enforce TLS for all communication.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Underlying System Vulnerabilities

  • 6.3 Dependency Vulnerabilities:
    • Description: Third-party libraries used by the Collector might have known vulnerabilities.
    • Mitigation: Regularly update dependencies. Use a Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tool to identify vulnerable libraries.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Supply Chain Attacks

  • 7.1 Compromised Dependencies:
    • Description: An attacker injects malicious code into a library that the OpenTelemetry Collector depends on.
    • Mitigation: Use trusted sources for dependencies. Verify dependency integrity (e.g., using checksums). Use a software bill of materials (SBOM).
  • 7.2 Malicious Contrib Components:
    • Description: An attacker publishes a malicious receiver, processor, exporter, or extension to a public repository.
    • Mitigation: Carefully vet any contrib components before using them. Review the source code if possible.
  • 7.3 Compromised Build Pipeline:
    • Description: An attacker gains access to the build pipeline and injects malicious code into the OpenTelemetry Collector binary itself.
    • Mitigation: Secure the build pipeline with strong access controls and multi-factor authentication. Implement build integrity checks.