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Attack Tree Analysis for openfaas/faas

Objective: Compromise Application via OpenFaaS Exploitation (Focus on High-Risk Paths)

Attack Tree Visualization

  • Compromise Application via OpenFaaS Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]
    • Exploit OpenFaaS Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Gateway Exploitation
        • Authentication Bypass
          • Weak or Default Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Authorization Bypass
          • Insecure API Permissions [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        • API Vulnerabilities (Injection, DoS, etc.)
          • Command Injection in Function Deployment/Management [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Function Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Vulnerable Function Code [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • Injection Vulnerabilities (SQLi, Command Injection, etc.) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
          • Dependency Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
        • Function Environment Exploitation
          • Access to Secrets/Environment Variables [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Infrastructure Exploitation (OpenFaaS Specific)
        • OpenFaaS Control Plane Vulnerabilities
          • Misconfigurations in OpenFaaS Deployment [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
      • Supply Chain Attacks (OpenFaaS Related)
        • Compromised Base Images [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise Application via OpenFaaS Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • This is the ultimate attacker goal. Success means gaining unauthorized access to application data, functionality, or infrastructure.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit OpenFaaS Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • This is the overarching strategy to achieve the goal. OpenFaaS, like any software, has potential weaknesses that can be exploited.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Weak or Default Credentials (Gateway) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers attempt to use default usernames and passwords (if they exist) or brute-force weak credentials on the OpenFaaS Gateway API.
  • Why High-Risk:
    • High Impact: Successful exploitation grants immediate and full administrative access to the OpenFaaS Gateway. This allows attackers to deploy, invoke, and manage functions, potentially compromising the entire application and underlying infrastructure.
    • Medium Likelihood: While default credentials should be avoided, misconfigurations, forgotten default accounts, or simply weak passwords are common in real-world scenarios. Brute-forcing is a low-effort attack.
  • Mitigation Priority: Highest. Enforce strong password policies, disable default accounts, and implement MFA.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Insecure API Permissions (Gateway) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit overly permissive Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) configurations on the OpenFaaS Gateway API. This allows them to perform actions beyond their intended authorization level, such as deploying malicious functions or accessing sensitive data.
  • Why High-Risk:
    • High Impact: Can lead to unauthorized function deployment, invocation, and management. Attackers can deploy malicious functions, steal data, or disrupt services.
    • Medium Likelihood: Misconfigurations in RBAC are common, especially during initial setup or when not following the principle of least privilege.
  • Mitigation Priority: High. Implement granular RBAC, regularly review and audit API permissions, and adhere to the principle of least privilege.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Command Injection in Function Deployment/Management (Gateway) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers inject malicious commands into function metadata (e.g., function name, labels, annotations) during function deployment or management API calls. If the Gateway or underlying system improperly handles this metadata, these commands can be executed on the server.
  • Why High-Risk:
    • High Impact: Successful command injection leads to Remote Code Execution (RCE) on the OpenFaaS Gateway or the underlying infrastructure. This allows attackers to gain full control of the system.
    • Medium Likelihood: Input validation vulnerabilities are common, and if function metadata is not properly sanitized, this attack is feasible.
  • Mitigation Priority: High. Implement robust input validation and sanitization for all function metadata processed by the Gateway. Follow secure coding practices to prevent command injection.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Function Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Functions are the core of the application. Exploiting vulnerabilities within functions is a direct path to application compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 7. Vulnerable Function Code [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit security vulnerabilities directly within the code of deployed functions. This is a broad category encompassing various coding errors.
  • Why High-Risk:
    • High Impact: Vulnerable function code can lead to data breaches, data manipulation, service disruption, and even remote code execution within the function's environment.
    • High Likelihood: Coding errors are common, and developers may not always be security experts. Functions are often developed rapidly, increasing the chance of vulnerabilities.
  • Mitigation Priority: Highest. Focus on secure coding training, static and dynamic code analysis, and thorough security testing of functions.

Attack Tree Path: 8. Injection Vulnerabilities (SQLi, Command Injection, etc.) (Function Code) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit classic injection vulnerabilities (SQL Injection, Command Injection, etc.) within function code. These occur when functions process user-supplied input without proper validation and sanitization, allowing attackers to inject malicious code or commands.
  • Why High-Risk:
    • High Impact: Injection vulnerabilities can lead to data breaches, data manipulation, and in some cases, remote code execution within the function's environment.
    • High Likelihood: Injection vulnerabilities are a very common class of web application vulnerabilities and are easily introduced if developers are not vigilant about input validation.
  • Mitigation Priority: Highest. Mandatory input validation and sanitization within all functions. Use parameterized queries or ORMs to prevent SQL injection. Avoid executing shell commands directly from user input.

Attack Tree Path: 9. Dependency Vulnerabilities (Function Code) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit known vulnerabilities in third-party libraries and packages (dependencies) used by functions.
  • Why High-Risk:
    • Medium Impact: Impact depends on the specific vulnerability in the dependency, but can range from Denial of Service to Remote Code Execution within the function's environment.
    • High Likelihood: Dependencies are often overlooked, and vulnerabilities are frequently discovered in popular libraries. Functions often rely on numerous dependencies, increasing the attack surface.
  • Mitigation Priority: High. Implement automated dependency scanning and vulnerability management. Regularly update dependencies and use dependency management tools.

Attack Tree Path: 10. Access to Secrets/Environment Variables (Function Environment) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers gain access to improperly secured secrets or environment variables within the function's runtime environment. This can be achieved through function code vulnerabilities, container escape (less likely), or misconfigurations.
  • Why High-Risk:
    • High Impact: Exposed secrets (API keys, database passwords, etc.) can lead to broader compromise, allowing attackers to access other systems, data, or services.
    • Medium Likelihood: Mismanagement of secrets is a common issue. Storing secrets directly in environment variables or in insecure locations is a frequent mistake.
  • Mitigation Priority: High. Use secure secret management solutions (e.g., Kubernetes Secrets, HashiCorp Vault). Avoid storing secrets in environment variables directly. Encrypt secrets at rest and in transit.

Attack Tree Path: 11. Misconfigurations in OpenFaaS Deployment [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit misconfigurations in the overall OpenFaaS deployment. This can include insecure defaults, exposed management ports, weak RBAC configurations, or other security hardening omissions.
  • Why High-Risk:
    • High Impact: Misconfigurations can lead to unauthorized access to the OpenFaaS control plane, allowing attackers to manage the entire FaaS platform, deploy malicious functions, and potentially compromise the underlying infrastructure.
    • Medium Likelihood: Complex systems like OpenFaaS are prone to misconfigurations, especially during initial setup or upgrades.
  • Mitigation Priority: High. Follow security best practices for OpenFaaS deployment and hardening. Regularly audit configurations and use configuration management tools for consistency.

Attack Tree Path: 12. Compromised Base Images [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • Attack Vector: Functions are built upon base container images. If these base images are compromised (contain vulnerabilities or malicious software), all functions built on them inherit these issues.
  • Why High-Risk:
    • Medium Impact: Inherited vulnerabilities in base images can lead to various issues within functions, potentially including remote code execution or data breaches.
    • Medium Likelihood: Using outdated or untrusted base images is common. Vulnerabilities are frequently discovered in base images.
  • Mitigation Priority: High. Use minimal and trusted base images from reputable sources. Regularly scan base images for vulnerabilities and update them promptly. Consider building base images from scratch or using hardened images.