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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for ory/hydra

Attack Surface: Admin API Authentication Bypass

  • Description: Unauthorized access to the Hydra Admin API, allowing attackers to manage Hydra's configuration and data. This is due to weak or missing authentication mechanisms on the /admin endpoint provided by Hydra.
  • Hydra Contribution: Hydra exposes the /admin API for administrative tasks, and vulnerabilities in securing this API directly lead to this attack surface.
  • Example: An attacker gains access to the Admin API because it's exposed without authentication or uses default credentials, allowing them to create malicious OAuth 2.0 clients and manipulate system settings.
  • Impact: Full compromise of the Hydra instance, including manipulation of clients, users (if managed by Hydra), and system settings. This can lead to data breaches, service disruption, and unauthorized access to protected resources.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Authentication: Implement robust authentication for the Admin API using methods like mutual TLS, API keys with strong rotation policies, or integration with dedicated identity providers.
    • Authorization Policies: Enforce strict role-based access control to limit access to specific Admin API endpoints based on administrative roles.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate the Admin API network and restrict access to authorized networks or IP ranges using firewalls.
    • Regular Audits: Conduct regular security audits of Admin API access controls and configurations to identify and remediate weaknesses.

Attack Surface: Public API OAuth 2.0 Protocol Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Exploitation of implementation flaws or misconfigurations in Hydra's OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect protocol handling within its Public API (/oauth2, /.well-known).
  • Hydra Contribution: Hydra's core functionality is implementing OAuth 2.0 and OIDC. Vulnerabilities in its protocol implementation or configuration directly create this attack surface.
  • Example: An attacker exploits an authorization code replay vulnerability in Hydra's token endpoint due to a flaw in Hydra's code or configuration, allowing them to reuse intercepted authorization codes to obtain unauthorized access tokens.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to user accounts and protected resources, data breaches, and potential compromise of relying applications that trust Hydra for authentication and authorization.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regular Updates: Keep Hydra updated to the latest version to benefit from security patches and bug fixes addressing protocol vulnerabilities.
    • Secure Configuration: Follow OAuth 2.0 and OIDC security best practices when configuring Hydra, including enforcing PKCE, using strong cryptographic algorithms, and properly validating redirect URIs.
    • Input Validation: Thoroughly validate all inputs to the Public API to prevent injection attacks and protocol manipulation attempts.
    • Security Audits and Penetration Testing: Regularly conduct security audits and penetration testing specifically focused on OAuth 2.0 and OIDC flows within Hydra to identify implementation weaknesses.

Attack Surface: Insecure Client Registration (Dynamic Client Registration Enabled)

  • Description: Abuse of Hydra's dynamic client registration feature to register malicious clients for nefarious purposes, if dynamic client registration is enabled without sufficient controls.
  • Hydra Contribution: Hydra provides dynamic client registration as a feature. Enabling this feature without proper security measures directly introduces this attack surface.
  • Example: An attacker registers a malicious client through the dynamic client registration endpoint with a misleading name and a redirect URI pointing to a phishing site. Users tricked into authorizing this client unknowingly grant access to the attacker.
  • Impact: Phishing attacks, unauthorized access to resources, data breaches, and potential denial of service through mass registration of clients.
  • Risk Severity: High (if dynamic registration is enabled and not properly secured)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Disable Dynamic Client Registration (if not required): If dynamic client registration is not a necessary feature, disable it to eliminate this attack surface entirely.
    • Strict Client Metadata Validation: Implement robust validation of all client metadata during registration, including name, logo, redirect URIs, grant types, and scopes, to prevent malicious or misleading registrations.
    • Approval Process: Introduce a manual or automated approval process for dynamically registered clients before they become active and can be used in authorization flows.
    • Rate Limiting and Monitoring: Implement rate limiting on client registration endpoints to prevent abuse and monitor registration activity for suspicious patterns.

Attack Surface: Insecure Default Configurations and Weak Secrets

  • Description: Utilizing insecure default configurations or weak cryptographic keys and secrets in Hydra deployments, making the system vulnerable to compromise.
  • Hydra Contribution: Hydra, like any software, has default configurations. Relying on insecure defaults or failing to properly manage secrets during Hydra deployment directly creates a critical vulnerability.
  • Example: A deployment uses default cryptographic keys provided in Hydra's documentation or example configurations. An attacker, aware of these default keys, can forge tokens, decrypt sensitive data, or impersonate Hydra.
  • Impact: Full compromise of the Hydra instance, data breaches, unauthorized access to protected resources, and potential for complete system takeover.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Generate Strong Keys and Secrets: Generate strong, unique, and cryptographically secure keys and secrets for all Hydra components, including signing keys, encryption keys, and database credentials. Never use default keys.
    • Secure Secret Management: Utilize a dedicated and secure secret management system (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes Secrets) to store and manage sensitive secrets. Avoid storing secrets in plain text in configuration files or environment variables.
    • Harden Configurations: Thoroughly review and harden Hydra's configuration settings based on security best practices and the principle of least privilege. Disable unnecessary features, endpoints, and functionalities.
    • Regular Security Scans: Regularly scan the deployed Hydra instance for misconfigurations, weak secrets, and vulnerabilities using automated security scanning tools.