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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for ory/hydra

Attack Surface: Misconfigured Secrets and Credentials

  • Description: Hydra relies on various secrets (system secret, database credentials, TLS certificates, client secrets). Improper management exposes these secrets.
    • Hydra Contribution: Hydra's core functionality depends on the secure management of these secrets. Its configuration files and database store these sensitive values. This is entirely within Hydra's domain.
    • Example: A developer accidentally commits the SYSTEM_SECRET to a public GitHub repository.
    • Impact: Complete compromise of Hydra. Attackers can decrypt all data, forge tokens, and impersonate any client or user.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Use a dedicated secrets management solution (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager).
      • Never hardcode secrets in code or configuration files.
      • Use strong, randomly generated secrets.
      • Implement regular secret rotation.
      • Use environment variables to inject secrets into Hydra's runtime environment.
      • Regularly scan code repositories and logs for accidental secret exposure.

Attack Surface: Insecure Transport Security (TLS/HTTPS)

  • Description: Failure to properly secure Hydra's endpoints (public and admin) with TLS allows for Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks.
    • Hydra Contribution: Hydra exposes network endpoints for OAuth 2.0/OIDC flows, which must be secured with TLS. The configuration of TLS is a direct responsibility of the Hydra deployment.
    • Example: Hydra is deployed without TLS, or with an expired certificate, allowing an attacker on the same network to intercept authorization codes and tokens.
    • Impact: Interception of sensitive data (tokens, authorization codes, user information), leading to unauthorized access and impersonation.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Enforce HTTPS for all Hydra endpoints (public and admin).
      • Use strong, modern TLS configurations (TLS 1.3, strong cipher suites).
      • Regularly update and monitor TLS certificates.
      • Use a reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx) to handle TLS termination, ensuring it's also securely configured.
      • Consider using mutual TLS (mTLS) for internal communication between Hydra and its database.

Attack Surface: Exposed Admin API

  • Description: The Hydra Admin API provides full control over Hydra's configuration. Exposing it publicly allows attackers to take over the system.
    • Hydra Contribution: Hydra provides a powerful Admin API for managing clients, policies, and other configurations. The exposure and protection of this API are directly related to Hydra's deployment.
    • Example: The Admin API is accessible from the public internet without any authentication.
    • Impact: Complete control of Hydra by the attacker. They can create malicious clients, modify policies, and access all data.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Never expose the Admin API to the public internet.
      • Use network segmentation (firewalls, VPCs) to restrict access to trusted networks only.
      • Implement strong authentication and authorization for the Admin API (e.g., mTLS, API keys with limited scope).
      • Consider using a VPN or bastion host for administrative access.

Attack Surface: Open Redirect Vulnerability

  • Description: If Hydra doesn't properly validate the redirect_uri, attackers can redirect users to malicious sites after authentication.
    • Hydra Contribution: Hydra uses the redirect_uri parameter as part of the OAuth 2.0 flow to redirect the user back to the client application. Hydra's validation of this parameter is the key security control.
    • Example: An attacker crafts a malicious authorization request with a redirect_uri pointing to their own website. After the user authenticates, Hydra redirects them to the attacker's site, which can then steal the authorization code or token.
    • Impact: Token theft, phishing attacks, and potential compromise of user accounts.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Hydra must strictly validate the redirect_uri against a pre-registered whitelist of allowed redirect URIs for each client.
      • Avoid using wildcard matching in redirect URIs unless absolutely necessary and with careful consideration of the security implications.

Attack Surface: Unpatched Hydra Version

  • Description: Running an outdated version of Hydra with known vulnerabilities.
    • Hydra Contribution: Vulnerabilities may exist within Hydra's codebase itself. This is entirely within Hydra's domain.
    • Example: A known vulnerability in Hydra allows for remote code execution, and an attacker exploits this vulnerability because the system is not patched.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the vulnerability, but can range from information disclosure to complete system compromise.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (if a known, exploitable vulnerability exists) or High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regularly update Hydra to the latest stable version.
      • Monitor ORY Hydra security advisories and release notes.
      • Implement a robust patching process.