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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for ory/hydra

Mitigation Strategy: Strict Client Registration and Verification (within Hydra)

1. Strict Client Registration and Verification (within Hydra)

  • Description:

    1. Manual Approval (via Admin API): Use Hydra's Admin API to manually approve or reject client registration requests. This prevents automated, malicious client creation.
    2. Redirect URI Whitelist (in hydra.yml): Configure Hydra (via hydra.yml or the Admin API) to only allow pre-approved, exact-match redirect URIs. Prohibit wildcards in production.
    3. Client ID/Secret Generation (Hydra's responsibility): Rely on Hydra to generate unique, cryptographically strong client IDs (UUIDs) and secrets.
    4. Regular Client Review (via Admin API): Use Hydra's Admin API to periodically list and review registered clients. Deactivate inactive or suspicious clients using the API.
    5. Client Secret Rotation (via Admin API): Use Hydra's Admin API to update a client's secret. This should be done regularly.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Client Impersonation (High Severity): Prevents attackers from registering malicious clients.
    • Open Redirect (if redirect URIs are abused) (Medium Severity): Strict redirect URI validation within Hydra prevents this.

  • Impact:

    • Client Impersonation: Risk significantly reduced.
    • Open Redirect: Risk significantly reduced.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Redirect URI whitelist is enforced in the Hydra configuration (hydra.yml).

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Automated client secret rotation via the Admin API is not yet implemented.
    • Regular client review process using the Admin API is manual.

Mitigation Strategy: Strong Client Authentication (Hydra Configuration)

2. Strong Client Authentication (Hydra Configuration)

  • Description:

    1. private_key_jwt Preference (in hydra.yml and client config): Configure Hydra (via hydra.yml) to prefer private_key_jwt for client authentication. When creating clients (via the Admin API), set the appropriate token_endpoint_auth_method.
    2. tls_client_auth Enforcement (in hydra.yml and client config): For highly sensitive clients, configure Hydra to require tls_client_auth. Set the token_endpoint_auth_method accordingly during client creation.
    3. client_secret_basic Discouragement (policy and client config): Avoid using client_secret_basic and client_secret_post whenever possible. If used, ensure strong secrets (managed externally).
    4. Secret Strength (external, but impacts Hydra): While Hydra doesn't directly enforce secret strength for client_secret_basic/post, the system generating/managing those secrets must enforce strong policies.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Client Impersonation (High Severity): Strong client authentication within Hydra makes impersonation very difficult.
    • Credential Stuffing (against /oauth2/token) (Medium Severity): Significantly reduces effectiveness.

  • Impact:

    • Client Impersonation: Risk drastically reduced.
    • Credential Stuffing: Risk significantly reduced.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Hydra is configured to support multiple authentication methods (private_key_jwt, tls_client_auth, etc.).

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Enforcement of private_key_jwt or tls_client_auth for all sensitive operations is not yet complete (some endpoints still allow weaker methods).

Mitigation Strategy: Short-Lived Access Tokens and Refresh Token Rotation (Hydra Configuration)

3. Short-Lived Access Tokens and Refresh Token Rotation (Hydra Configuration)

  • Description:

    1. Access Token Expiry (in hydra.yml): Configure Hydra (via hydra.yml) to issue short-lived access tokens (e.g., ttl.access_token: 15m).
    2. Refresh Token Expiry (in hydra.yml): Configure a reasonable refresh token lifetime (e.g., ttl.refresh_token: 24h).
    3. Refresh Token Rotation (in hydra.yml): Ensure Hydra's built-in refresh token rotation is enabled (this is usually the default, but verify).
    4. Absolute Refresh Token Expiry (in hydra.yml): Configure an absolute maximum lifetime for refresh tokens (e.g., ttl.refresh_token_absolute: 30d).
    5. Token Revocation Endpoint (/oauth2/revoke): Ensure Hydra's /oauth2/revoke endpoint is enabled and accessible.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Token Leakage (High Severity): Short lifespans and rotation minimize the impact.
    • Token Replay Attacks (Medium Severity): Reduced effectiveness.

  • Impact:

    • Token Leakage: Risk significantly reduced.
    • Token Replay Attacks: Risk reduced.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Access and refresh token expiry are configured in hydra.yml.
    • Hydra's built-in refresh token rotation is enabled.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Absolute refresh token expiry is not yet configured.

Mitigation Strategy: Rate Limiting (Hydra Configuration and Reverse Proxy)

4. Rate Limiting (Hydra Configuration and Reverse Proxy)

  • Description:

    1. Endpoint-Specific Rate Limits (Reverse Proxy): Configure rate limits in the reverse proxy (e.g., Nginx, Traefik) in front of Hydra. This is crucial because Hydra itself doesn't have built-in, fine-grained rate limiting. Target:
      • /oauth2/auth
      • /oauth2/token (especially failed attempts)
      • /oauth2/revoke
      • /userinfo
      • /oauth2/keys
    2. Hydra Configuration for Global Limits: While not fine-grained, review Hydra's configuration for any global connection limits or resource constraints that might help mitigate extreme DoS attacks.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks (High Severity): Prevents overwhelming Hydra.
    • Credential Stuffing (Medium Severity): Slows down and deters attacks.
    • Brute-Force Attacks (Medium Severity): Similar to credential stuffing.

  • Impact:

    • DoS Attacks: Risk significantly reduced.
    • Credential Stuffing/Brute-Force: Risk reduced.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Basic rate limiting is configured in the reverse proxy (Nginx).

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Fine-grained, endpoint-specific rate limits in the reverse proxy are not yet fully optimized.

Mitigation Strategy: Audience and Scope Restriction (Client Configuration via Admin API)

5. Audience and Scope Restriction (Client Configuration via Admin API)

  • Description:

    1. aud Claim (Client Configuration): When creating or updating clients (via Hydra's Admin API), always set the audience field to the specific resource server(s) that should accept tokens issued to that client.
    2. Scope Limitation (Client Configuration): When creating or updating clients, grant only the minimum necessary scopes required for the client's functionality. Avoid granting overly broad scopes. Use Hydra's Admin API to manage this.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Token Misuse (Medium Severity): Prevents a token intended for one service from being used to access another.
    • Excessive Permissions (Medium Severity): Limits the potential damage if a client is compromised.

  • Impact:

    • Token Misuse: Risk significantly reduced.
    • Excessive Permissions: Risk reduced.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Scopes are defined and managed.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Consistent enforcement of the aud claim for all clients is not yet complete. Some older clients may be missing this configuration.

Mitigation Strategy: Hydra Configuration Review and Updates

6. Hydra Configuration Review and Updates

  • Description:

    1. Regular hydra.yml Review: Periodically review Hydra's configuration file (hydra.yml) for security best practices. Ensure settings like token lifetimes, CORS configuration, and enabled features are appropriate.
    2. Hydra Updates: Stay up-to-date with the latest stable version of ORY Hydra. Monitor release notes and security advisories. Update promptly when security patches are released.
    3. CORS Configuration (in hydra.yml): Carefully configure Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) settings within Hydra's configuration. Avoid using wildcard origins (*). Specify only the allowed, trusted origins.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Misconfiguration (High Severity): Addresses potential security weaknesses due to incorrect settings.
    • Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities (High Severity): Updates patch known security flaws in Hydra itself.

  • Impact:

    • Misconfiguration: Risk significantly reduced.
    • Known Vulnerabilities: Risk significantly reduced.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Hydra is updated semi-regularly.
    • CORS configuration is defined, but could be more restrictive.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • A formal process for immediate updates upon security releases is not in place.
    • Regular, scheduled reviews of hydra.yml are not yet formalized.

Mitigation Strategy: OpenID Connect Conformance Testing (Against Hydra)

7. OpenID Connect Conformance Testing (Against Hydra)

  • Description:

    1. Regular Testing: Run the OpenID Connect Conformance Test Suite against your deployed Hydra instance.
    2. Automated Testing (Ideal): Integrate the conformance tests into a CI/CD pipeline to run automatically.
    3. Issue Remediation: Address any failures or warnings reported by the tests. This may involve configuration changes to Hydra.

  • Threats Mitigated:

    • Non-Compliance with OIDC Specification (Medium Severity): Ensures correct implementation, preventing interoperability and security issues.
    • Unexpected Behavior (Medium Severity): Identifies deviations from the specification.

  • Impact:

    • Non-Compliance/Unexpected Behavior: Risk significantly reduced.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • None.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Conformance testing is not yet implemented.

This refined list focuses solely on actions directly related to ORY Hydra's configuration and operation, providing a more targeted set of mitigation strategies.