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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for ory/kratos

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Kratos Configuration using Environment Variables for Secrets.

  • Description:
    1. Identify all sensitive configuration values within kratos.yaml (e.g., database connection strings, cookie encryption keys, SMTP credentials, API keys for integrations).
    2. Replace hardcoded sensitive values in kratos.yaml with environment variable placeholders (e.g., ${KRATOS_DATABASE_URL}).
    3. Configure the deployment environment to provide these environment variables to the Kratos containers or processes at runtime. This could involve using Docker Compose .env files, Kubernetes Secrets, or cloud provider secret management services.
    4. Ensure that the Kratos configuration files themselves (e.g., kratos.yaml) are not committed to version control with actual secret values.
    5. Verify that Kratos correctly reads and utilizes the secrets from environment variables during startup and operation.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Exposure of Secrets in Kratos Configuration Files (High Severity): Accidental exposure of sensitive credentials by committing configuration files with hardcoded secrets to version control or through insecure deployment practices.
    • Unauthorized Access to Secrets via Configuration Files (Medium Severity): Compromise of Kratos configuration files leading to unauthorized access to sensitive credentials needed to access backend services or decrypt data.
  • Impact:
    • Exposure of Secrets in Kratos Configuration Files: High Risk Reduction.
    • Unauthorized Access to Secrets via Configuration Files: Medium Risk Reduction.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. Database credentials for the development environment in docker-compose.yml use environment variables.
  • Missing Implementation: Production environment secrets for Kratos are currently managed through a less secure configuration management system. Migration to a dedicated secrets manager like HashiCorp Vault or cloud provider secret services is needed for production Kratos deployments.

Mitigation Strategy: Strict CORS Configuration in Kratos.

  • Description:
    1. Identify all legitimate origins (domains) that are authorized to make cross-origin requests to the Kratos Public API and Admin API. This typically includes the frontend application's domain(s).
    2. Configure the cors section within kratos.yaml to explicitly list these allowed origins in the allowed_origins setting.
    3. Avoid using wildcard (*) as an allowed origin, as this weakens security significantly.
    4. Regularly review and update the CORS configuration in kratos.yaml whenever new origins require access to Kratos APIs.
    5. Test the CORS configuration to ensure that only the specified allowed origins can successfully make cross-origin requests to Kratos.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Exploitation via Kratos CORS Misconfiguration (Medium Severity): A permissive CORS policy in Kratos could allow malicious websites to make unauthorized requests to Kratos APIs on behalf of a user, potentially leading to data theft or account compromise.
    • CSRF Attacks (Medium Severity): While CORS is not a primary CSRF defense, overly permissive CORS can sometimes make CSRF attacks easier to execute against Kratos APIs.
  • Impact:
    • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Exploitation via Kratos CORS Misconfiguration: Medium Risk Reduction.
    • CSRF Attacks: Low Risk Reduction (CORS is a secondary defense against CSRF in this context).
  • Currently Implemented: CORS is configured in kratos.yaml with specific allowed origins for the frontend application.
  • Missing Implementation: The current CORS configuration should be reviewed and potentially tightened. A process for regularly reviewing and updating the CORS configuration in kratos.yaml as application needs evolve is needed.

Mitigation Strategy: Rate Limiting on Critical Kratos Endpoints.

  • Description:
    1. Identify critical Kratos API endpoints that are susceptible to abuse, such as /self-service/login, /self-service/registration, /self-service/recovery, /self-service/verification, and potentially Admin API endpoints.
    2. Implement rate limiting mechanisms specifically for these Kratos endpoints. This can be done using a reverse proxy in front of Kratos (like Nginx) or by leveraging a dedicated API gateway that can enforce rate limits.
    3. Configure rate limits in a way that balances security with usability. Set limits based on reasonable user behavior and security considerations (e.g., limit login attempts per IP address per minute).
    4. Monitor the effectiveness of rate limiting and adjust the limits as needed based on traffic patterns and security monitoring.
    5. Ensure Kratos and any rate limiting components return appropriate HTTP error responses (e.g., 429 Too Many Requests) when rate limits are exceeded.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Brute-Force Attacks against Kratos Authentication (High Severity): Rate limiting reduces the effectiveness of automated brute-force attacks attempting to guess passwords or security codes for Kratos accounts.
    • Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks targeting Kratos (Medium Severity): Rate limiting can help mitigate DoS attacks that aim to overwhelm Kratos with excessive requests, making it unavailable.
    • Account Enumeration Attempts via Kratos APIs (Low Severity): Rate limiting can make account enumeration attempts slower and less effective by limiting the number of login or registration attempts.
  • Impact:
    • Brute-Force Attacks against Kratos Authentication: High Risk Reduction.
    • Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks targeting Kratos: Medium Risk Reduction.
    • Account Enumeration Attempts via Kratos APIs: Low Risk Reduction.
  • Currently Implemented: Basic rate limiting is implemented at the reverse proxy level (Nginx) for Kratos login and registration endpoints, limiting requests per IP address.
  • Missing Implementation: Rate limiting should be expanded to other critical Kratos self-service endpoints like password recovery and verification. Rate limiting for the Kratos Admin API should also be considered. More advanced rate limiting strategies could be explored for better DoS protection.

Mitigation Strategy: Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) Enforcement in Kratos.

  • Description:
    1. Enable desired MFA providers within Kratos configuration (kratos.yaml). At a minimum, enable email MFA. Consider enabling TOTP (Time-Based One-Time Password) or WebAuthn for stronger security.
    2. Develop or customize the user interface to guide users through the MFA enrollment and verification flows provided by Kratos.
    3. Enforce MFA for all users or at least for users with elevated privileges (administrators) using Kratos policies or application-level authorization logic that checks for MFA enrollment status.
    4. Provide clear instructions and user support for setting up and using MFA within the Kratos-integrated application.
    5. Regularly review and update the enabled MFA methods and enforcement policies in Kratos based on evolving security best practices and user needs.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Account Takeover via Credential Compromise in Kratos (High Severity): MFA significantly reduces the risk of account takeover even if a user's Kratos password is compromised (e.g., through phishing or data breaches).
  • Impact:
    • Account Takeover via Credential Compromise in Kratos: High Risk Reduction.
  • Currently Implemented: MFA is enabled in Kratos configuration with email as a provider. Basic UI elements for MFA enrollment are present but not fully integrated into the user flow.
  • Missing Implementation: MFA is not currently enforced for all users. Mandatory MFA enrollment for all users, especially administrators, needs to be implemented. Integration of TOTP or WebAuthn as additional MFA options in Kratos should be prioritized. Improve the user experience for MFA enrollment and verification within the application UI.

Mitigation Strategy: Strong Password Policies Configuration in Kratos.

  • Description:
    1. Configure password policies directly within kratos.yaml under the identity section.
    2. Enforce a minimum password length that meets or exceeds industry best practices (e.g., 12 characters or more).
    3. Require password complexity by enabling requirements for uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols in Kratos's password policy settings.
    4. Consider implementing password history within Kratos to prevent users from reusing recently used passwords.
    5. Ensure that the user interface for registration and password reset clearly communicates the password policy requirements to users.
    6. Regularly review and update the password policies in kratos.yaml to align with evolving security recommendations and organizational security policies.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Brute-Force Password Guessing against Kratos Accounts (Medium Severity): Strong password policies make it significantly more difficult for attackers to guess passwords through brute-force attacks targeting Kratos.
    • Dictionary Attacks against Kratos Passwords (Medium Severity): Complexity requirements make passwords less vulnerable to dictionary attacks that use lists of common words and phrases.
    • Credential Stuffing Attacks against Kratos Accounts (Medium Severity): Strong, unique passwords reduce the effectiveness of credential stuffing attacks that rely on reusing compromised credentials from other services.
  • Impact:
    • Brute-Force Password Guessing against Kratos Accounts: Medium Risk Reduction.
    • Dictionary Attacks against Kratos Passwords: Medium Risk Reduction.
    • Credential Stuffing Attacks against Kratos Accounts: Medium Risk Reduction.
  • Currently Implemented: Basic password policies are configured in kratos.yaml with minimum length and complexity requirements.
  • Missing Implementation: Password history is not currently implemented in Kratos's password policy. The user interface feedback for password policy enforcement during registration and password reset could be improved for better user guidance. Consider implementing periodic password rotation recommendations for users within the application.

Mitigation Strategy: Access Control to Kratos Admin API.

  • Description:
    1. Restrict network access to the Kratos Admin API. Ideally, the Admin API should only be accessible from a secure internal network or through a VPN. Configure network firewalls or security groups accordingly.
    2. Implement strong authentication for all requests to the Kratos Admin API. Kratos supports API keys and JWT-based authentication for the Admin API. Utilize one of these methods.
    3. Use API keys with the principle of least privilege. Grant API keys only the minimum necessary permissions required for the intended purpose. Avoid creating overly permissive API keys.
    4. Implement a policy for regular rotation of Kratos Admin API keys to limit the impact of key compromise.
    5. Enable logging and monitoring of all access to the Kratos Admin API to detect and respond to any suspicious or unauthorized activity.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Unauthorized Access and Abuse of Kratos Admin API (High Severity): Compromise of the Kratos Admin API can grant attackers full control over the identity system, allowing them to manipulate user data, create rogue accounts, bypass security controls, and disrupt the application.
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized Access and Abuse of Kratos Admin API: High Risk Reduction.
  • Currently Implemented: Network access to the Kratos Admin API is restricted to the internal network. API keys are used for authentication.
  • Missing Implementation: API key permissions are not granularly defined. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) for Kratos Admin API keys should be implemented to enforce least privilege more effectively. A formal API key rotation policy needs to be established and ideally automated.

Mitigation Strategy: API Input Validation and Output Encoding for Kratos APIs.

  • Description:
    1. Input Validation: Implement robust input validation for all Kratos API endpoints (both Public and Admin APIs). Validate all request parameters, headers, and body data against expected data types, formats, lengths, and allowed values. Utilize Kratos's built-in validation features where possible and implement custom validation logic as needed.
    2. Output Encoding: Apply appropriate output encoding to all data returned in Kratos API responses to prevent injection vulnerabilities, particularly Cross-Site Scripting (XSS). Use context-aware encoding functions based on the response content type (e.g., HTML encoding for HTML responses, JSON encoding for JSON responses).
    3. Regularly review and update input validation and output encoding logic for Kratos APIs as the APIs evolve and new endpoints are added.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Injection Attacks against Kratos APIs (SQL Injection, XSS, etc.) (High Severity): Insufficient input validation in Kratos APIs can allow attackers to inject malicious code or commands, potentially leading to data breaches, account compromise, or system disruption.
    • Data Integrity Issues in Kratos (Medium Severity): Invalid input processed by Kratos APIs can lead to data corruption or unexpected behavior within the identity management system.
  • Impact:
    • Injection Attacks against Kratos APIs: High Risk Reduction.
    • Data Integrity Issues in Kratos: Medium Risk Reduction.
  • Currently Implemented: Basic input validation is in place for some Kratos API endpoints, primarily using Kratos's built-in validation mechanisms. Output encoding is generally handled by the frontend application consuming the APIs.
  • Missing Implementation: Input validation needs to be systematically reviewed and strengthened across all Kratos API endpoints, including custom endpoints or integrations. Output encoding should be consistently applied on the backend (within Kratos or backend services) to ensure security regardless of the client application.

Mitigation Strategy: Regular Kratos Updates and Dependency Management.

  • Description:
    1. Establish a process for regularly monitoring for new Kratos releases and security advisories. Subscribe to Ory's security mailing list and monitor the Ory Kratos GitHub repository for release announcements.
    2. Schedule regular updates of Kratos to the latest stable version. This ensures that security patches and bug fixes are applied promptly.
    3. Utilize dependency scanning tools (e.g., Snyk, OWASP Dependency-Check) to automatically monitor Kratos's dependencies for known security vulnerabilities.
    4. Promptly update vulnerable dependencies identified by scanning tools or security advisories.
    5. Thoroughly test Kratos updates and dependency updates in a staging environment before deploying them to production to minimize the risk of introducing regressions or instability.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities in Kratos or its Dependencies (High Severity): Running outdated versions of Kratos or its dependencies exposes the application to publicly known security vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit.
  • Impact:
    • Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities in Kratos or its Dependencies: High Risk Reduction.
  • Currently Implemented: Kratos and its dependencies are updated periodically, but the process is manual and not consistently scheduled.
  • Missing Implementation: Implement automated dependency scanning and vulnerability monitoring for Kratos. Establish a regular, scheduled update process for Kratos and its dependencies. Automate testing of updates in a staging environment to ensure smooth and secure updates.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Passwordless Login Configuration in Kratos (if used).

  • Description:
    1. If using Kratos's passwordless login features (e.g., email or SMS magic links), configure them securely in kratos.yaml.
    2. Set short expiration times for passwordless login links in kratos.yaml to limit the window of opportunity for link interception or reuse.
    3. Implement rate limiting specifically for passwordless login request endpoints in Kratos to prevent abuse and DoS attacks.
    4. Ensure that secure communication channels (HTTPS, secure SMS gateways) are used for delivering passwordless login links generated by Kratos.
    5. Consider implementing additional security measures like device binding or risk-based authentication in conjunction with passwordless login for enhanced security.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Passwordless Login Link Hijacking (Medium Severity): If links are not properly secured or expire too late, attackers could potentially intercept and use passwordless login links to gain unauthorized access.
    • Abuse of Passwordless Login Feature (Medium Severity): Without rate limiting and proper security measures, attackers could potentially abuse passwordless login features for spamming or other malicious purposes.
  • Impact:
    • Passwordless Login Link Hijacking: Medium Risk Reduction.
    • Abuse of Passwordless Login Feature: Medium Risk Reduction.
  • Currently Implemented: Passwordless login is not currently actively used in the project.
  • Missing Implementation: If passwordless login is to be implemented in the future, all the security configuration steps outlined above in kratos.yaml and related infrastructure will need to be implemented.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Social Sign-In Configuration in Kratos (if used).

  • Description:
    1. When configuring social sign-in providers in Kratos (kratos.yaml), strictly adhere to OAuth 2.0 best practices for secure integration.
    2. Carefully manage OAuth 2.0 client secrets for social providers. Store these secrets securely (using environment variables or a secrets manager) and avoid hardcoding them in kratos.yaml.
    3. Request only the necessary scopes from social providers. Avoid requesting overly broad permissions that are not required for user authentication and identity management.
    4. Implement secure account linking mechanisms within the application to prevent account takeover during social sign-in flows. Properly validate and verify user identities during account linking.
    5. Regularly review and update the configured social sign-in providers and OAuth 2.0 configurations in Kratos to ensure they remain secure and aligned with best practices.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • OAuth 2.0 Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities (Medium Severity): Improper OAuth 2.0 configuration in Kratos or with social providers can lead to vulnerabilities like authorization code interception or access token theft.
    • Account Takeover via Social Sign-In (Medium Severity): Insecure account linking mechanisms or vulnerabilities in social sign-in flows could potentially be exploited to take over user accounts.
  • Impact:
    • OAuth 2.0 Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities: Medium Risk Reduction.
    • Account Takeover via Social Sign-In: Medium Risk Reduction.
  • Currently Implemented: Social sign-in is not currently actively used in the project.
  • Missing Implementation: If social sign-in is to be implemented in the future, all the security configuration steps outlined above in kratos.yaml and related application logic will need to be implemented.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Account Recovery Flow Configuration in Kratos.

  • Description:
    1. Configure secure account recovery methods in kratos.yaml. Use secure recovery methods like email or phone verification for password reset.
    2. Implement rate limiting specifically for account recovery request endpoints in Kratos to prevent abuse and brute-force attempts against the recovery flow.
    3. Implement account verification steps in the recovery flow to help prevent unauthorized account recovery. This could involve sending verification codes or links to the user's registered email or phone number.
    4. Ensure that account recovery links or codes generated by Kratos expire after a short period to limit the window of opportunity for misuse.
    5. Provide clear and user-friendly instructions for the account recovery process to guide users through the secure recovery flow.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Unauthorized Account Recovery (Medium Severity): Insecure account recovery flows in Kratos could be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorized access to user accounts by bypassing password controls.
    • Abuse of Account Recovery Feature (Medium Severity): Without rate limiting and proper security measures, attackers could potentially abuse account recovery features for spamming or other malicious purposes.
  • Impact:
    • Unauthorized Account Recovery: Medium Risk Reduction.
    • Abuse of Account Recovery Feature: Medium Risk Reduction.
  • Currently Implemented: Basic account recovery flow using email verification is implemented using Kratos's built-in features.
  • Missing Implementation: Rate limiting for the account recovery endpoint should be implemented. Consider adding stronger account verification steps or risk-based authentication to the recovery flow. Review and potentially shorten the expiration time for account recovery links generated by Kratos.