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Attack Tree Analysis for pingcap/tidb

Objective: Compromise Application Using TiDB by Exploiting TiDB-Specific Weaknesses (Focused on High-Risk Areas)

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via TiDB Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]
├─── 1. Exploit SQL Injection Vulnerabilities (TiDB Specific) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│    ├─── 1.1. Leverage TiDB-Specific SQL Dialect Features [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│    │    ├─── 1.1.1.  Exploit TiDB Extensions (e.g., specific functions, syntax differences from MySQL) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│    ├─── 1.2.  Second-Order SQL Injection via TiDB Features [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│    │    ├─── 1.2.1.  Store Malicious Data in TiDB and Trigger Execution Later [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│    └─── 1.3.  Blind SQL Injection to Extract Data or Modify State [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├─── 2. Exploit Authentication and Authorization Weaknesses in TiDB [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│    ├─── 2.1.  Bypass TiDB Authentication [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│    │    ├─── 2.1.1.  Exploit Default TiDB Credentials (if any are left unchanged) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH if defaults are not changed]
│    │    ├─── 2.1.2.  Credential Stuffing/Brute-Force Attacks against TiDB [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│    ├─── 2.2.  Exploit TiDB Authorization Flaws [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│    │    ├─── 2.2.2.  Bypass Application-Level Authorization via Direct TiDB Access [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├─── 4. Data Exfiltration and Manipulation via TiDB Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]
│    ├─── 4.2.  Data Exfiltration via Backup/Restore Processes (if insecurely configured) [CRITICAL NODE if backups are not secured]
│    │    ├─── 4.2.1.  Unauthorized Access to TiDB Backups [CRITICAL NODE if backups are not secured] [HIGH-RISK PATH if backups are easily accessible]
├─── 5. Exploiting TiDB Management Interfaces and Tools (if exposed and vulnerable) [CRITICAL NODE]
│    ├─── 5.1.  Compromise TiDB Dashboard (if exposed without proper authentication) [CRITICAL NODE if Dashboard is exposed and unsecured] [HIGH-RISK PATH if Dashboard is easily accessible]
│    │    ├─── 5.1.1.  Default Credentials on TiDB Dashboard [CRITICAL NODE if defaults are not changed] [HIGH-RISK PATH if defaults are not changed and Dashboard is exposed]
│    ├─── 5.2.  Exploit TiDB Operator or other Management Tools (if used and vulnerable) [CRITICAL NODE if Operator is exposed and unsecured]
│    │    ├─── 5.2.2.  Misconfiguration of Operator leading to TiDB Compromise [CRITICAL NODE if Operator is misconfigured]
└─── 6. Supply Chain Attacks Targeting TiDB Dependencies (Less Direct, but possible) [CRITICAL NODE in broader context]
     └─── 6.1.  Compromised TiDB Dependencies (e.g., vulnerable libraries) [CRITICAL NODE in broader context]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Exploit SQL Injection Vulnerabilities (TiDB Specific) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • 1.1. Leverage TiDB-Specific SQL Dialect Features [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • 1.1.1. Exploit TiDB Extensions (e.g., specific functions, syntax differences from MySQL) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vectors:
        • Identifying and exploiting SQL injection points in application code that interact with TiDB.
        • Crafting malicious SQL payloads that utilize TiDB-specific syntax, functions, or behaviors that are not correctly handled by application-side input validation or WAFs designed for standard MySQL.
        • Exploiting differences in error handling or data type coercion between TiDB and MySQL to bypass security measures.
        • Using TiDB-specific features to perform advanced SQL injection techniques like out-of-band data exfiltration or command execution (if applicable and exploitable).

  • 1.2. Second-Order SQL Injection via TiDB Features [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • 1.2.1. Store Malicious Data in TiDB and Trigger Execution Later [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vectors:
        • Injecting malicious SQL code into database fields through application inputs that are not properly sanitized during data insertion.
        • Waiting for the application to retrieve and process this malicious data in a later operation without proper output encoding or context-aware sanitization.
        • Triggering the execution of the injected SQL code when the application uses the stored data in a dynamic SQL query, stored procedure, or other database operation.

  • 1.3. Blind SQL Injection to Extract Data or Modify State [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • Attack Vectors:
      • Exploiting vulnerabilities where the application does not directly display database errors or output, but the attacker can infer information based on application behavior (e.g., response times, HTTP status codes).
      • Using techniques like time-based blind SQL injection (e.g., using BENCHMARK() or similar TiDB-compatible functions to introduce delays) to extract data bit by bit.
      • Using boolean-based blind SQL injection to infer information based on true/false responses from the application to crafted SQL queries.
      • Potentially modifying application state or data by crafting blind SQL injection queries that perform UPDATE or DELETE operations based on inferred conditions.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Authentication and Authorization Weaknesses in TiDB [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • 2.1. Bypass TiDB Authentication [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • 2.1.1. Exploit Default TiDB Credentials (if any are left unchanged) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH if defaults are not changed]:

      • Attack Vectors:
        • Attempting to connect to TiDB using well-known default usernames and passwords (e.g., root with no password, or common default passwords).
        • Scanning for exposed TiDB ports (typically 4000 for TiDB server, 10080 for PD server, 20160 for TiKV server) and attempting to authenticate.
        • If default credentials are not changed after deployment, gaining immediate administrative access to the TiDB cluster.

    • 2.1.2. Credential Stuffing/Brute-Force Attacks against TiDB [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

      • Attack Vectors:
        • Using lists of compromised usernames and passwords (obtained from data breaches elsewhere) to attempt login to TiDB.
        • Performing brute-force attacks to guess TiDB user passwords, especially if weak passwords are used or if rate limiting is not in place.
        • Exploiting any lack of account lockout policies to repeatedly attempt logins.

  • 2.2. Exploit TiDB Authorization Flaws [HIGH-RISK PATH]:

    • 2.2.2. Bypass Application-Level Authorization via Direct TiDB Access [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
      • Attack Vectors:
        • If application-level authorization is solely relied upon and database user permissions are overly permissive, attackers might bypass application logic.
        • Gaining direct access to TiDB (e.g., through a compromised server or network access) and performing unauthorized operations if the database user used by the application has excessive privileges.
        • Exploiting misconfigurations where the application database user has broader permissions than necessary, allowing attackers to access or modify data outside the intended application scope.

Attack Tree Path: 4. Data Exfiltration and Manipulation via TiDB Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • 4.2. Data Exfiltration via Backup/Restore Processes (if insecurely configured) [CRITICAL NODE if backups are not secured]:
    • 4.2.1. Unauthorized Access to TiDB Backups [CRITICAL NODE if backups are not secured] [HIGH-RISK PATH if backups are easily accessible]:
      • Attack Vectors:
        • If TiDB backups are stored in publicly accessible locations (e.g., unsecured cloud storage buckets, network shares).
        • If access control to backup storage is weak or non-existent.
        • If backups are not encrypted, allowing attackers to directly access and extract sensitive data from backup files.
        • Compromising systems or accounts that have access to backup storage to download and exfiltrate backups.

Attack Tree Path: 5. Exploiting TiDB Management Interfaces and Tools (if exposed and vulnerable) [CRITICAL NODE]:

  • 5.1. Compromise TiDB Dashboard (if exposed without proper authentication) [CRITICAL NODE if Dashboard is exposed and unsecured] [HIGH-RISK PATH if Dashboard is easily accessible]:

    • 5.1.1. Default Credentials on TiDB Dashboard [CRITICAL NODE if defaults are not changed] [HIGH-RISK PATH if defaults are not changed and Dashboard is exposed]:
      • Attack Vectors:
        • Accessing the TiDB Dashboard web interface if it is exposed to the internet or untrusted networks.
        • Attempting to log in using default credentials for the Dashboard (if not changed).
        • Gaining administrative control over the TiDB cluster through the Dashboard if default credentials are used.

  • 5.2. Exploit TiDB Operator or other Management Tools (if used and vulnerable) [CRITICAL NODE if Operator is exposed and unsecured]:

    • 5.2.2. Misconfiguration of Operator leading to TiDB Compromise [CRITICAL NODE if Operator is misconfigured]:
      • Attack Vectors:
        • Exploiting misconfigurations in the TiDB Operator deployment, such as overly permissive RBAC settings, insecure API access, or exposed management interfaces.
        • Using misconfigured Operator settings to gain unauthorized access to the TiDB cluster or the underlying infrastructure.
        • Manipulating the Operator to disrupt TiDB cluster operations or inject malicious configurations.

Attack Tree Path: 6. Supply Chain Attacks Targeting TiDB Dependencies (Less Direct, but possible) [CRITICAL NODE in broader context]:

  • 6.1. Compromised TiDB Dependencies (e.g., vulnerable libraries) [CRITICAL NODE in broader context]:
    • Attack Vectors:
      • If TiDB or its dependencies rely on vulnerable third-party libraries or components.
      • If attackers compromise the supply chain of these dependencies and inject malicious code.
      • Exploiting vulnerabilities in compromised dependencies to gain control over TiDB or the application using it.
      • This is a less direct attack vector but can have widespread and significant impact if successful.