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Threat Model Analysis for pingcap/tidb

Threat: Unauthorized Direct Access to TiKV Data

  • Threat: Unauthorized Direct Access to TiKV Data

    • Description: An attacker gains direct network access to TiKV nodes, bypassing TiDB's SQL-level security. They might use custom tools or exploit vulnerabilities in the TiKV server to read, modify, or delete raw data without going through the SQL interface. This could involve exploiting misconfigured network security, compromised credentials, or zero-day vulnerabilities in TiKV.
    • Impact: Complete data breach (confidentiality loss), data corruption or deletion (integrity loss), and potential system instability (availability loss). Bypassing SQL-level access controls means RBAC and application-level security are ineffective.
    • Affected Component: TiKV (storage engine), specifically the gRPC endpoints and data storage mechanisms.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate TiKV nodes on a dedicated, restricted network segment with strict firewall rules, allowing access only from PD and TiDB nodes.
      • Strong Authentication: Enforce strong authentication (e.g., mutual TLS) for all TiKV inter-node communication and any external access.
      • Encryption at Rest: Enable TiKV's encryption-at-rest feature to protect data even if physical storage is compromised.
      • Regular Security Audits: Conduct penetration testing and vulnerability scanning specifically targeting TiKV nodes.
      • Intrusion Detection/Prevention: Deploy IDS/IPS to monitor network traffic to and from TiKV nodes for suspicious activity.
      • Least Privilege: Ensure that any service accounts accessing TiKV have the absolute minimum necessary permissions.

Threat: PD Server Compromise

  • Threat: PD Server Compromise

    • Description: An attacker gains control of a PD (Placement Driver) server, either through network intrusion, credential theft, or exploiting a vulnerability. The attacker could then manipulate cluster metadata, disrupt scheduling, redirect data placement, or even initiate data deletion commands. They could also use the compromised PD server as a launchpad for further attacks within the cluster.
    • Impact: Complete cluster disruption, potential data loss, data corruption, and unauthorized data access. The attacker could effectively control the entire TiDB cluster.
    • Affected Component: PD (Placement Driver) server, specifically the API endpoints, internal state management, and communication with TiKV and TiDB nodes.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Network Segmentation: Isolate PD servers on a highly restricted network segment.
      • Strong Authentication: Enforce strong authentication (e.g., mutual TLS, multi-factor authentication) for all access to PD servers.
      • Hardening: Harden the PD server operating system and apply all security patches promptly.
      • Intrusion Detection/Prevention: Deploy IDS/IPS to monitor network traffic and system activity on PD servers.
      • Regular Security Audits: Conduct penetration testing and vulnerability scanning targeting PD servers.
      • High Availability: Deploy PD in a high-availability configuration (at least 3 nodes) to mitigate the impact of a single server compromise.
      • Least Privilege: Restrict access to PD servers to only authorized administrators and services.

Threat: SQL Injection via TiDB Server

  • Threat: SQL Injection via TiDB Server

    • Description: An attacker crafts malicious SQL queries that are not properly sanitized by the application, allowing them to bypass intended application logic and execute arbitrary SQL commands on the TiDB server. This is similar to traditional SQL injection, but the attacker leverages TiDB's MySQL compatibility. They might try to read sensitive data, modify data, or even execute operating system commands if the database user has excessive privileges.
    • Impact: Data breach (confidentiality loss), data modification or deletion (integrity loss), potential denial of service (availability loss), and possible system compromise if the database user has OS-level privileges.
    • Affected Component: TiDB server (SQL processing engine), specifically the query parser and executor.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Prepared Statements: Use parameterized queries (prepared statements) exclusively for all SQL interactions. This is the primary defense.
      • Input Validation: Strictly validate and sanitize all user-supplied input before using it in any SQL query, even with prepared statements (defense in depth).
      • Least Privilege: Grant database users only the minimum necessary privileges. Never use the root user for application access.
      • Web Application Firewall (WAF): Deploy a WAF configured to detect and block SQL injection attempts.
      • Regular Code Reviews: Conduct regular security-focused code reviews to identify and fix potential SQL injection vulnerabilities.

Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) against TiDB Server

  • Threat: Denial of Service (DoS) against TiDB Server

    • Description: An attacker overwhelms the TiDB server with a large number of requests, connections, or computationally expensive queries, causing it to become unresponsive or crash. This could be a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack or a targeted attack exploiting a specific query weakness. The attacker might aim to disrupt service availability for legitimate users.
    • Impact: Service unavailability (availability loss), potential data inconsistency if transactions are interrupted, and financial losses if the application is critical.
    • Affected Component: TiDB server (SQL processing engine, connection handling), potentially affecting PD and TiKV if the TiDB server becomes a bottleneck.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting on API requests and database connections to prevent overload.
      • Connection Pooling: Use connection pooling to efficiently manage database connections and prevent resource exhaustion.
      • Resource Limits: Configure resource limits (CPU, memory, connections) for TiDB server instances.
      • Load Balancing: Distribute traffic across multiple TiDB server instances using a load balancer.
      • Query Optimization: Enforce query optimization best practices and monitor for slow or resource-intensive queries.
      • DDoS Protection: Utilize a DDoS protection service to mitigate large-scale attacks.
      • Circuit Breakers: Implement circuit breakers in the application to prevent cascading failures.

Threat: Vulnerability in TiDB Extension/Plugin (High Severity Cases)

  • Threat: Vulnerability in TiDB Extension/Plugin (High Severity Cases)

    • Description: A custom-developed or third-party TiDB extension or plugin contains a high-severity security vulnerability (e.g., remote code execution, privilege escalation) that directly impacts the core TiDB components. An attacker exploits this vulnerability to gain unauthorized access, execute arbitrary code on the TiDB server itself, or disrupt the TiDB cluster. This differs from lower-severity vulnerabilities that might only affect the plugin's functionality.
    • Impact: Could range from data breaches (confidentiality loss) with direct access to TiDB data, to complete system compromise of the TiDB server and potentially other cluster components.
    • Affected Component: The specific TiDB extension or plugin, and critically, other core TiDB components (TiDB server, potentially TiKV or PD if the vulnerability allows for privilege escalation).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Thorough Code Review: Conduct rigorous security-focused code reviews of all custom extensions and plugins, with a particular emphasis on identifying high-severity vulnerabilities.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Use static and dynamic analysis tools, focusing on identifying vulnerabilities that could lead to RCE or privilege escalation.
      • Sandboxing: Strongly consider running extensions in a highly restricted, sandboxed environment to limit their access to the TiDB server and other system resources, even if this impacts functionality.
      • Regular Updates: Keep extensions and plugins up to date with the latest security patches. Prioritize updates that address high-severity vulnerabilities.
      • Least Privilege: Grant extensions only the absolute minimum necessary privileges. Re-evaluate privileges regularly.
      • Vendor Security: If using third-party plugins, choose reputable vendors with a strong security track record and a demonstrated commitment to promptly addressing vulnerabilities. Consider alternatives if the vendor's security posture is questionable.
      • Disable if Unnecessary: If a plugin or extension is not strictly required, disable it to reduce the attack surface.