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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for rook/rook

Attack Surface: Operator Container Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Vulnerabilities present in the Rook Operator container images (base OS, installed packages, Rook Operator code itself).
  • Rook Contribution: Rook deploys and manages the Operator container. Vulnerabilities here directly compromise Rook management and the storage cluster it controls. Rook is responsible for the security of its Operator image.
  • Example: A vulnerability in the Rook Operator code allows an attacker to inject malicious commands into the Operator pod, leading to cluster manipulation.
  • Impact: Full control over the Rook Operator, potentially leading to cluster-wide compromise, data manipulation, or denial of service of the Rook storage cluster.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Follow secure coding practices during Rook Operator development. Regularly perform security audits and penetration testing of the Operator codebase.
    • Users: Regularly scan Rook Operator container images for vulnerabilities using vulnerability scanners. Keep Rook Operator version up-to-date with the latest security patches. Harden the Operator container image by minimizing installed packages. Implement runtime security monitoring for the Operator pod.

Attack Surface: Operator RBAC Permissions Abuse

  • Description: Exploiting overly permissive RBAC roles granted to the Rook Operator service account.
  • Rook Contribution: Rook requires specific RBAC permissions to function. Rook's documentation and deployment processes define the necessary RBAC roles. Overly broad or default RBAC configurations provided by Rook or implemented by users can be exploited.
  • Example: The default Rook Operator RBAC roles are overly permissive, granting more permissions than strictly necessary. An attacker compromises a less privileged pod and leverages the Operator's service account to escalate privileges and manipulate storage resources.
  • Impact: Privilege escalation within the Kubernetes cluster, unauthorized access to and manipulation of Rook-managed storage resources, potential cluster-wide compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Provide minimal and well-defined RBAC role examples and documentation. Emphasize the principle of least privilege in RBAC configurations.
    • Users: Apply the principle of least privilege when configuring RBAC roles for the Rook Operator. Carefully review and restrict the RBAC permissions, ensuring they are only what is strictly necessary. Regularly audit RBAC configurations.

Attack Surface: Ceph Daemon Vulnerabilities (if using Ceph)

  • Description: Security vulnerabilities in the Ceph daemon software (MON, OSD, MDS, RGW) deployed and managed by Rook.
  • Rook Contribution: Rook deploys and manages Ceph daemons. While the vulnerabilities are in Ceph itself, Rook's responsibility for deployment and management makes it a direct contributor to the attack surface in a Rook-managed Ceph cluster. Rook's choice of Ceph version and update practices are relevant.
  • Example: A known vulnerability in a specific version of Ceph OSD daemon allows remote code execution. An attacker exploits this vulnerability to gain control of a storage node managed by Rook, potentially through network exposure facilitated by Rook's default configurations.
  • Impact: Data breach, data corruption, denial of service of the Rook storage cluster, compromise of storage nodes managed by Rook.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Track Ceph security advisories and ensure Rook supports and encourages the use of patched Ceph versions. Provide clear guidance on updating Ceph versions within a Rook cluster.
    • Users: Keep Ceph versions up-to-date with the latest stable releases and security patches. Regularly monitor Ceph security advisories and apply patches promptly. Implement intrusion detection and prevention systems. Harden the operating system and environment where Ceph daemons are running.

Attack Surface: Kubernetes Secrets Exposure

  • Description: Insecure storage or management of Kubernetes Secrets used by Rook to store sensitive information (Ceph keys, NFS credentials, etc.).
  • Rook Contribution: Rook relies heavily on Kubernetes Secrets for managing credentials and configuration. Rook's design and documentation dictate how Secrets are used and managed within a Rook cluster. Insecure default practices or lack of guidance from Rook can contribute to this attack surface.
  • Example: Rook documentation doesn't explicitly warn users about the importance of Secret encryption at rest. Users deploy Rook without enabling Secret encryption, and an attacker gains access to etcd and retrieves sensitive Ceph keys stored as Secrets.
  • Impact: Credential compromise for Rook components (Ceph, NFS, etc.), unauthorized access to storage resources, potential data breach.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Clearly document and emphasize the importance of secure Kubernetes Secret management practices in Rook deployments. Provide guidance on enabling Secret encryption at rest and using external secret management solutions.
    • Users: Enable encryption at rest for Kubernetes Secrets in etcd. Implement RBAC to restrict access to Kubernetes Secrets. Consider using external secret management solutions. Regularly rotate secrets used by Rook components.