sec-design-deep-analysis.md

DEEP ANALYSIS OF ROOK SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

1. OBJECTIVE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

• Objective:

  • To conduct a thorough security analysis of Rook, focusing on its key components and their interactions within a Kubernetes environment.
  • To identify potential security vulnerabilities and threats associated with Rook's architecture and operation.
  • To provide specific, actionable, and tailored mitigation strategies to enhance the security posture of Rook deployments.

• Scope:

  • This analysis covers the core components of Rook as described in the provided design review, including the Rook Operator, Rook Agent, Ceph Cluster (as a representative storage provider), Kubernetes API Server, etcd, Kubernetes CSI, and the build and deployment processes.
  • The analysis focuses on security considerations related to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data managed by Rook.
  • The analysis considers the Kubernetes environment in which Rook operates as part of the overall security context.

• Methodology:

  • Review of the provided security design review document to understand Rook's architecture, components, and security controls.
  • Inference of data flow and component interactions based on the design review and general knowledge of Kubernetes and distributed storage systems.
  • Identification of potential security threats and vulnerabilities for each key component, considering the project's business posture and security posture.
  • Development of tailored and actionable mitigation strategies for identified threats, specific to Rook and its operational environment.
  • Categorization of security considerations and mitigation strategies based on key security domains (authentication, authorization, input validation, cryptography, etc.).

2. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF KEY COMPONENTS

• Rook Operator:

  • Security Implications: As the control plane of Rook, the Operator is a critical component. Compromise of the Operator could lead to cluster-wide storage disruption, unauthorized access to storage resources, and potential data breaches. Vulnerabilities in the Operator's API or logic could be exploited to manipulate storage configurations or gain unauthorized control.
  • Specific Threats:
    • Unauthorized access to the Operator API leading to configuration changes or control plane disruption.
    • Vulnerabilities in Operator code allowing for remote code execution or privilege escalation.
    • Compromise of Operator's service account credentials leading to Kubernetes API access and resource manipulation.
  • Data Flow: The Operator interacts with the Kubernetes API server to manage Rook components and resources. It also stores configuration data in Kubernetes Secrets or etcd.

• Rook Agent:

  • Security Implications: Agents run on each Kubernetes node and interact directly with storage providers and application pods. Compromise of an Agent could lead to node-level storage access, data manipulation, or denial of service for applications on that node.
  • Specific Threats:
    • Vulnerabilities in Agent code allowing for local privilege escalation or container escape.
    • Unauthorized access to Agent's communication channels from malicious pods on the same node.
    • Compromise of Agent's service account credentials leading to node-level resource access.
  • Data Flow: Agents communicate with the Operator for instructions and status updates. They interact with storage providers to provision and manage storage. They also interact with Kubernetes CSI to mount volumes to application pods.

• Ceph Cluster (Storage Provider):

  • Security Implications: Ceph stores the actual data and is responsible for data durability and availability. Security vulnerabilities in Ceph or misconfigurations could lead to data breaches, data loss, or service disruption.
  • Specific Threats:
    • Unauthorized access to Ceph storage daemons or data due to misconfigured authentication or authorization.
    • Vulnerabilities in Ceph code allowing for data corruption, data exfiltration, or denial of service.
    • Lack of encryption at rest leading to data exposure if storage media is compromised.
    • Insider threats with privileged access to Ceph infrastructure.
  • Data Flow: Ceph OSDs store data on storage devices. Ceph Monitors manage cluster state. Ceph MDS (for CephFS) manages metadata. Rook Agents interact with Ceph to provision and manage storage.

• Kubernetes API Server and etcd:

  • Security Implications: These are core Kubernetes components. Their security is paramount for the overall cluster and Rook's security. Compromise of the API server or etcd would have catastrophic consequences, including complete cluster takeover and data breaches.
  • Specific Threats:
    • Unauthorized access to Kubernetes API due to weak authentication or authorization.
    • Vulnerabilities in Kubernetes API server or etcd allowing for privilege escalation or denial of service.
    • Compromise of etcd data leading to cluster state manipulation or data leaks.
    • Lack of encryption for etcd data at rest or in transit.
  • Data Flow: The Kubernetes API server is the central point of interaction for all Kubernetes components, including Rook. etcd stores the cluster state and Rook configuration.

• Kubernetes CSI:

  • Security Implications: CSI provides the interface between Kubernetes and storage providers. Vulnerabilities in CSI implementations or misconfigurations could lead to storage access control bypasses or denial of service.
  • Specific Threats:
    • Input validation vulnerabilities in CSI drivers allowing for malicious commands to be executed on storage providers.
    • Lack of proper authorization checks in CSI drivers leading to unauthorized storage access.
    • Denial of service attacks targeting CSI controllers or node plugins.
  • Data Flow: Kubernetes components (kubelet, controllers) interact with CSI controllers and node plugins to provision and manage storage. CSI drivers then interact with storage providers like Rook Agents.

• Build and Deployment Processes:

  • Security Implications: Compromised build or deployment pipelines can introduce vulnerabilities into Rook components before they are even deployed. Supply chain attacks targeting dependencies or build tools are a significant risk.
  • Specific Threats:
    • Compromised CI/CD pipelines injecting malicious code into Rook artifacts.
    • Use of vulnerable dependencies in Rook components.
    • Lack of integrity checks for build artifacts leading to deployment of tampered images.
    • Exposure of build secrets or credentials in CI/CD systems.
  • Data Flow: Developers commit code to Git repositories. CI/CD systems build, test, and scan code. Artifacts are stored in registries and deployed to Kubernetes clusters.

3. ACTIONABLE AND TAILORED MITIGATION STRATEGIES

Based on the identified threats and security implications, the following actionable and tailored mitigation strategies are recommended for Rook deployments:

• Rook Operator Security:

  • Mitigation Strategy 1: Implement strong Kubernetes RBAC policies to restrict access to the Rook Operator's API and Kubernetes resources. Only authorized Kubernetes administrators and services should have permissions to interact with the Operator.
    • Action: Review and harden existing RBAC roles and rolebindings related to Rook Operator. Apply the principle of least privilege. Regularly audit RBAC configurations.
  • Mitigation Strategy 2: Securely manage Operator's service account credentials. Avoid storing credentials in plain text. Utilize Kubernetes Secrets encryption at rest or a dedicated secrets management solution like HashiCorp Vault to protect sensitive credentials.
    • Action: Implement Kubernetes Secrets encryption at rest using KMS provider. Explore integration with HashiCorp Vault for Operator secrets management. Regularly rotate service account tokens.
  • Mitigation Strategy 3: Implement robust input validation for all API requests handled by the Rook Operator. Sanitize and validate all inputs to prevent injection attacks and other input-related vulnerabilities.
    • Action: Conduct security code review of Operator API request handling logic. Implement input validation libraries and frameworks. Perform fuzz testing of Operator API endpoints.

• Rook Agent Security:

  • Mitigation Strategy 1: Apply the principle of least privilege to Rook Agent service accounts. Agents should only have the necessary permissions to perform their functions on the node and within the Kubernetes cluster.
    • Action: Review and restrict Rook Agent service account permissions. Minimize access to Kubernetes API and node resources.
  • Mitigation Strategy 2: Implement Kubernetes Network Policies to restrict network traffic to and from Rook Agents. Isolate Agent communication to necessary ports and protocols, limiting lateral movement in case of compromise.
    • Action: Define and enforce Network Policies to restrict Agent communication. Segment network traffic based on component roles.
  • Mitigation Strategy 3: Regularly scan Rook Agent container images for vulnerabilities. Integrate container image scanning into the CI/CD pipeline and deployment process to identify and remediate vulnerabilities before deployment.
    • Action: Integrate container image scanning tools (e.g., Trivy, Clair) into CI/CD pipeline. Establish a process for vulnerability remediation and patching.

• Ceph Cluster Security:

  • Mitigation Strategy 1: Enable Ceph's built-in authentication and authorization mechanisms. Configure Ceph to require authentication for all client and daemon communication. Implement fine-grained authorization policies to control access to Ceph resources.
    • Action: Configure Ceph authentication using ceph auth commands. Define Ceph user roles and permissions based on least privilege. Regularly review and update Ceph authentication configurations.
  • Mitigation Strategy 2: Enable encryption at rest for Ceph OSDs. Utilize Ceph's built-in encryption features or leverage underlying storage provider encryption to protect data at rest.
    • Action: Configure Ceph OSD encryption using LUKS or dm-crypt. Explore integration with KMS for Ceph encryption key management.
  • Mitigation Strategy 3: Implement encryption in transit for communication within the Ceph cluster and between Rook components and Ceph. Use TLS encryption for all Ceph network traffic.
    • Action: Configure Ceph to use TLS for inter-daemon communication. Ensure Rook components communicate with Ceph over TLS.

• Kubernetes API Server and etcd Security:

  • Mitigation Strategy 1: Harden Kubernetes API server authentication and authorization. Enforce strong authentication methods (e.g., client certificates, OIDC). Implement fine-grained RBAC policies to restrict API access.
    • Action: Review and strengthen Kubernetes API server authentication configurations. Implement and enforce robust RBAC policies.
  • Mitigation Strategy 2: Secure etcd deployments. Enable encryption at rest for etcd data. Implement mutual TLS for etcd client-server and peer-to-peer communication. Restrict access to etcd to authorized Kubernetes components.
    • Action: Enable etcd encryption at rest. Configure mutual TLS for etcd communication. Implement firewall rules to restrict access to etcd ports.
  • Mitigation Strategy 3: Regularly audit Kubernetes API server and etcd logs for suspicious activity. Implement security information and event management (SIEM) to monitor for security incidents and anomalies.
    • Action: Integrate Kubernetes audit logs with SIEM system. Configure alerts for suspicious API activity and etcd access patterns.

• Kubernetes CSI Security:

  • Mitigation Strategy 1: Thoroughly review and test CSI drivers used by Rook for security vulnerabilities. Conduct security code reviews and penetration testing of CSI driver implementations.
    • Action: Include CSI driver security reviews in Rook's security audit process. Perform regular penetration testing of CSI functionality.
  • Mitigation Strategy 2: Implement input validation and sanitization within CSI drivers to prevent injection attacks. Validate all inputs from Kubernetes components before processing them in CSI drivers.
    • Action: Conduct security code review of CSI driver input handling logic. Implement input validation libraries and frameworks in CSI drivers.
  • Mitigation Strategy 3: Apply Kubernetes RBAC policies to control access to CSI driver operations. Restrict access to CSI APIs and resources to authorized Kubernetes components and administrators.
    • Action: Review and harden RBAC roles and rolebindings related to CSI drivers. Apply the principle of least privilege to CSI access control.

• Build and Deployment Process Security:

  • Mitigation Strategy 1: Secure the CI/CD pipeline for Rook. Implement access control, secrets management, and audit logging for CI/CD systems. Harden CI/CD infrastructure against compromise.
    • Action: Implement multi-factor authentication for CI/CD access. Securely store CI/CD secrets using dedicated secrets management solutions. Regularly audit CI/CD pipeline configurations and logs.
  • Mitigation Strategy 2: Implement vulnerability scanning and static analysis security testing (SAST) in the CI/CD pipeline. Scan code and dependencies for vulnerabilities during the build process. Fail builds on critical vulnerability findings.
    • Action: Integrate SAST and vulnerability scanning tools into CI/CD pipeline. Define vulnerability thresholds and policies for build failures.
  • Mitigation Strategy 3: Sign and verify build artifacts (container images, binaries). Use container image signing and verification mechanisms to ensure the integrity and authenticity of deployed artifacts.
    • Action: Implement container image signing using tools like Docker Content Trust or Notary. Configure Kubernetes to verify image signatures before deployment.

4. RISK ASSESSMENT

• Critical Business Processes:

  • Persistent storage provisioning and management for Kubernetes applications.
  • Data persistence and durability for stateful workloads.
  • Storage service availability and performance for applications.
  • Data protection and security for sensitive application data.

• Data Sensitivity:

  • Potentially High. Data stored by Rook can include sensitive customer data, business-critical application data, and secrets. The sensitivity level depends on the applications using Rook, but a conservative approach assuming high sensitivity is recommended. Data breaches or loss could have significant financial, reputational, and compliance consequences.

5. QUESTIONS & ASSUMPTIONS

• Questions:

  • What are the specific performance SLAs for storage operations? This will influence the choice of storage provider and security controls that might impact performance (e.g., encryption overhead).
  • What is the data retention policy? This will impact storage capacity planning and security controls related to data archival and deletion.
  • Are there specific regulatory compliance requirements (e.g., GDPR, HIPAA, PCI DSS)? Compliance requirements will dictate specific security controls and configurations.
  • What is the process for security incident response and vulnerability management? A well-defined incident response plan is crucial for handling security incidents effectively.

• Assumptions:

  • Rook is deployed in a production environment and handles sensitive data.
  • Security is a primary concern for the Rook deployment.
  • The organization has skilled Kubernetes administrators and security personnel.
  • The underlying Kubernetes infrastructure is reasonably secure and well-maintained.
  • The latest stable version of Rook and supported storage providers are used.
  • Regular security audits and penetration testing will be conducted for the Rook deployment.