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Threat Model Analysis for shopify/sarama

Threat: Plaintext Credentials in Configuration

  • Description: Attacker gains unauthorized access to application configuration files and extracts plaintext Kafka credentials used by Sarama.
  • Impact: Attacker can authenticate as the application to Kafka brokers, enabling unauthorized data access, manipulation, or disruption within Kafka.
  • Sarama Component Affected: Configuration loading, affecting all Sarama components (Producer, Consumer, Admin) that rely on authentication.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use secure secrets management systems to store Kafka credentials instead of plaintext configuration.
    • Encrypt configuration files at rest.
    • Utilize environment variables with restricted access for credentials.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in SASL Mechanisms

  • Description: Attacker exploits vulnerabilities in SASL mechanisms implemented within Sarama or its underlying Go dependencies for authentication.
  • Impact: Complete bypass of Kafka authentication, granting unauthorized access to Kafka brokers and data. Potential for data breaches, data manipulation, and denial of service.
  • Sarama Component Affected: sarama/sasl package, specifically the implementation of SASL mechanisms.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use strong and up-to-date SASL mechanisms like SCRAM-SHA-256 or SCRAM-SHA-512.
    • Regularly update Sarama and Go dependencies to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Monitor security advisories related to Sarama and Go's SASL implementations.

Threat: Unencrypted Communication (Plaintext Kafka Protocol)

  • Description: Sarama is configured to communicate with Kafka brokers using the plaintext Kafka protocol without TLS encryption.
  • Impact: Exposure of sensitive data transmitted in Kafka messages to network eavesdroppers. Potential for data breaches and compromise of confidential information.
  • Sarama Component Affected: Network connection handling within Sarama's Producer and Consumer components.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Always enable TLS encryption for Kafka communication in Sarama configuration.
    • Configure Sarama to use net.Config.TLSConfig to enable TLS and verify server certificates.
    • Ensure Kafka brokers are configured to enforce TLS.

Threat: Weak TLS Configuration

  • Description: TLS is enabled in Sarama, but configured with weak settings (outdated TLS versions, weak cipher suites, disabled certificate verification).
  • Impact: Compromise of data confidentiality and integrity in transit. Potential for man-in-the-middle attacks to intercept or modify Kafka messages despite TLS being enabled in principle.
  • Sarama Component Affected: net.Config.TLSConfig configuration within Sarama's Producer and Consumer components.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use strong TLS versions (TLS 1.2 or higher).
    • Configure strong cipher suites and disable weak ones.
    • Enable and enforce certificate verification in Sarama's TLS configuration.
    • Regularly review and update TLS configurations based on security best practices.

Threat: Message Tampering in Transit (Without TLS)

  • Description: If TLS is not used, an attacker can intercept and modify messages in transit between the application and Kafka brokers.
  • Impact: Compromised data integrity. Attacker can alter message content, potentially leading to incorrect application behavior, data corruption, or malicious data injection.
  • Sarama Component Affected: Network communication within Sarama's Producer and Consumer components.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce TLS encryption for all Kafka communication. This is the primary mitigation.
    • Consider application-level message signing or encryption for defense in depth.