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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for shopify/sarama

Attack Surface: 1. Insecure Communication (TLS/SSL Misconfiguration)

  • Description: Failure to properly configure TLS/SSL encryption for communication between the sarama client and the Kafka brokers.
    • How Sarama Contributes: sarama provides configuration options for TLS/SSL (Net.TLS.Enable, Net.TLS.Config), but incorrect or missing configuration leads to insecure connections.
    • Example: Setting Net.TLS.Enable = true but providing an empty or invalid Net.TLS.Config structure, or not setting Net.TLS.Enable at all when the broker requires TLS.
    • Impact: Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, data interception, and potential compromise of credentials.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Always set Net.TLS.Enable = true when connecting to a TLS-enabled Kafka cluster.
      • Provide a valid Net.TLS.Config structure, including:
        • RootCAs: A certificate pool containing the trusted Certificate Authority (CA) certificates for the Kafka brokers.
        • Certificates: (If client authentication is required) A slice of tls.Certificate containing the client's certificate and private key.
        • InsecureSkipVerify: Never set this to true in production. It disables certificate validation.
      • Use a secure mechanism to store and load certificates and keys.
      • Regularly rotate certificates.

Attack Surface: 2. Authentication Bypass (SASL Misconfiguration)

  • Description: Failure to properly configure SASL authentication or using weak authentication mechanisms.
    • How Sarama Contributes: sarama provides configuration options for various SASL mechanisms (Net.SASL.Enable, Net.SASL.Mechanism, Net.SASL.User, Net.SASL.Password, etc.). Misconfiguration or weak credentials lead to authentication bypass.
    • Example: Setting Net.SASL.Enable = true but providing incorrect Net.SASL.User and Net.SASL.Password values, or using a weak password. Using SASL/PLAIN without TLS.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to Kafka topics, data theft, data manipulation, and potential denial-of-service.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Always set Net.SASL.Enable = true when the Kafka cluster requires authentication.
      • Choose a strong SASL mechanism (e.g., SASL/SCRAM-SHA-256 or SASL/SCRAM-SHA-512).
      • Use strong, unique passwords or other appropriate credentials.
      • Store credentials securely.
      • Never use SASL/PLAIN without TLS.
      • Consider Kerberos or OAuth.

Attack Surface: 3. Data Loss (Producer Configuration)

  • Description: Incorrect producer configuration leading to message loss.
    • How Sarama Contributes: sarama's producer configuration options (Producer.RequiredAcks, Producer.Return.Successes, Producer.Return.Errors, Producer.Retry.Max, etc.) directly impact message delivery guarantees.
    • Example: Setting Producer.RequiredAcks = sarama.NoResponse. Not checking for errors returned by producer.SendMessages() or producer.Input() when Producer.Return.Errors = true.
    • Impact: Loss of critical data, potentially leading to business disruption or data integrity issues.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Set Producer.RequiredAcks appropriately: sarama.WaitForAll (strongest), sarama.WaitForLocal, or sarama.NoResponse (only when data loss is acceptable).
      • Always set Producer.Return.Successes = true and Producer.Return.Errors = true and handle the returned channels.
      • Implement robust error handling and retry logic.
      • Consider idempotent producers (Producer.Idempotent = true).

Attack Surface: 4. Consumer Offset Mismanagement

  • Description: Incorrect consumer configuration or improper handling of consumer offsets leading to data loss or duplicate processing.
    • How Sarama Contributes: sarama's consumer configuration options (Consumer.Offsets.Initial, Consumer.Offsets.AutoCommit.Enable, Consumer.Offsets.AutoCommit.Interval, etc.) and offset management functions control how the consumer tracks its progress.
    • Example: Setting Consumer.Offsets.Initial = sarama.OffsetOldest when only new messages should be processed. Failing to manually commit offsets when Consumer.Offsets.AutoCommit.Enable = false.
    • Impact: Data loss (if offsets are advanced prematurely), duplicate processing (if offsets are not advanced or are reset), and potential data inconsistency.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Choose Consumer.Offsets.Initial carefully: sarama.OffsetNewest (new messages) or sarama.OffsetOldest (all messages).
      • If using automatic commits, ensure Consumer.Offsets.AutoCommit.Interval is appropriate.
      • If using manual commits, commit after successful processing, and handle errors. Use consumer.MarkOffset() and consumerGroup.CommitOffsets().
      • Implement "at-least-once" or "exactly-once" semantics as required.

Attack Surface: 5. Denial of Service (Resource Exhaustion)

  • Description: A compromised or misconfigured client using sarama could flood the Kafka cluster with requests.
    • How Sarama Contributes: sarama's configuration options (e.g., Producer.Flush.Frequency, Metadata.Retry.Max, Net.ReadTimeout, Net.DialTimeout) and the application's usage patterns can contribute.
    • Example: Setting Producer.Flush.Frequency very low. Setting Metadata.Retry.Max very high.
    • Impact: Kafka cluster becomes unavailable.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Use reasonable values for sarama configuration options related to timeouts, retries, and flush frequency.
      • Implement rate limiting on the client-side.
      • Use Kafka quotas.
      • Monitor Kafka broker metrics.
      • Implement circuit breakers.

Attack Surface: 6. Dependency Vulnerabilities

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in the sarama library itself or its transitive dependencies.
    • How Sarama Contributes: sarama is a library and can have vulnerabilities, as can its dependencies.
    • Example: Using an outdated version of sarama with a known vulnerability, or a version that depends on a vulnerable library.
    • Impact: Varies, but could range from denial-of-service to remote code execution.
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regularly update sarama to the latest stable version.
      • Use dependency management tools (e.g., go mod).
      • Use vulnerability scanning tools.
      • Monitor security advisories.