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Attack Tree Analysis for sirupsen/logrus

Objective: Compromise Application Data and/or Availability by Exploiting Logrus

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Data and/or Availability [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[1.0] Exploit Logged Sensitive Data [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[1.1] Identify Sensitive Data in Logs [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[1.2] Access Log Files/Streams [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[1.2.1] Unauthorized Access to Log Storage (Filesystem, Database, etc.) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │       └───[1.2.1.1] Exploit File Permission Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └───[1.3] Analyze Log Data for Sensitive Information [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └───[1.3.1] Automated/Manual Log Analysis for Credentials, API Keys, PII, etc. [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├───[2.0] Exploit Log Injection Vulnerabilities (Indirect via Logrus) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[2.1] Inject Malicious Data into Logs [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[2.1.1] Control Input Logged by Application [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │       └───[2.1.1.1] Exploit Application Input Validation Weaknesses [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├───[3.0] Exploit Log Storage/Destination Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[3.1] Target Insecure Log Storage Locations [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───[3.1.1] World-Readable Log Files [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │   └───[3.1.2] Publicly Accessible Network Log Storage (e.g., Misconfigured S3 buckets) [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├───[4.0] Exploit Log Configuration Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[4.1] Identify Misconfigured Log Levels [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └───[4.1.1] Overly Verbose Logging in Production [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   │       └───[4.1.1.1] Reveal Sensitive Data Unnecessarily [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └───[4.3] Weak Access Controls on Log Configuration [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └───[4.3.1] Unauthorized Modification of Log Configuration [CRITICAL NODE]
│           └───[4.3.1.2] Redirect Logs to Attacker-Controlled Location [HIGH-RISK PATH]
└───[4.2] Identify Insecure Log Destinations
    └───[4.2.1] Logging to Publicly Accessible Locations [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        └───[4.2.1.1] Expose Logs to Unauthorized Parties [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1.0 Exploit Logged Sensitive Data [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: This path focuses on compromising sensitive information that is unintentionally logged by the application using Logrus.
  • Breakdown:
    • 1.1 Identify Sensitive Data in Logs [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Reconnaissance to determine if the application logs sensitive data (e.g., passwords, API keys, personal information, internal system details).
      • Details: Attackers analyze application code, configurations, and documentation to understand logging practices and identify potential sensitive data being logged.
    • 1.2 Access Log Files/Streams [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Gaining unauthorized access to the log files or streams where Logrus output is stored.
      • Details: This involves exploiting vulnerabilities to access log storage locations (filesystem, databases, log management systems) or intercepting log transmissions over networks.
      • 1.2.1 Unauthorized Access to Log Storage (Filesystem, Database, etc.) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Directly accessing the storage where logs are kept.
        • Details: Exploiting file permission issues, database vulnerabilities, or weaknesses in log management systems to read log data.
        • 1.2.1.1 Exploit File Permission Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
          • Attack Vector: Exploiting overly permissive file system permissions on log files.
          • Details: If log files are world-readable or accessible to unauthorized users, attackers can directly read them.
    • 1.3 Analyze Log Data for Sensitive Information [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Analyzing the accessed log data to extract sensitive information.
      • Details: Using manual review or automated scripts to search logs for patterns and keywords indicative of sensitive data like credentials, API keys, or PII.
      • 1.3.1 Automated/Manual Log Analysis for Credentials, API Keys, PII, etc. [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Performing the actual analysis of log data to find sensitive information.
        • Details: This step involves using tools or manual techniques to parse and search through log files for sensitive data patterns.

Attack Tree Path: 2.0 Exploit Log Injection Vulnerabilities (Indirect via Logrus) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Indirectly exploiting Logrus by injecting malicious data into logs, which can then be used to attack downstream systems or cause other issues.
  • Breakdown:
    • 2.1 Inject Malicious Data into Logs [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Injecting malicious data into the logs generated by Logrus.
      • Details: This is achieved by controlling input that the application logs or crafting specific log messages.
      • 2.1.1 Control Input Logged by Application [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Manipulating user-controlled input that is subsequently logged by the application.
        • Details: Exploiting input validation weaknesses in the application to inject malicious strings that will be logged via Logrus.
      • 2.1.1.1 Exploit Application Input Validation Weaknesses [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Specifically targeting vulnerabilities in the application's input validation mechanisms.
        • Details: By bypassing or exploiting weak input validation, attackers can inject arbitrary data that gets logged.

Attack Tree Path: 3.0 Exploit Log Storage/Destination Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities related to how and where logs are stored, leading to data breaches or denial of service.
  • Breakdown:
    • 3.1 Target Insecure Log Storage Locations [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Targeting log storage locations that are insecurely configured and accessible to unauthorized parties.
      • Details: Identifying and exploiting misconfigurations like world-readable log files or publicly accessible network storage.
      • 3.1.1 World-Readable Log Files [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Exploiting log files configured with overly permissive permissions.
        • Details: If log files are set to be readable by everyone, attackers can easily access and read them.
      • 3.1.2 Publicly Accessible Network Log Storage (e.g., Misconfigured S3 buckets) [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigured network storage locations where logs are stored, making them publicly accessible.
        • Details: If cloud storage buckets or network shares used for logging are misconfigured for public access, attackers can access and download logs.

Attack Tree Path: 4.0 Exploit Log Configuration Weaknesses [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector: Exploiting weaknesses in the configuration of Logrus to gain unauthorized access to logs or manipulate logging behavior.
  • Breakdown:
    • 4.1 Identify Misconfigured Log Levels [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Identifying applications with overly verbose logging levels in production environments.
      • Details: Finding applications running with debug or trace logging levels in production, which can inadvertently log sensitive information.
      • 4.1.1 Overly Verbose Logging in Production [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Applications running with unnecessarily detailed logging in production.
        • Details: This misconfiguration leads to logging more information than necessary, increasing the risk of sensitive data exposure.
        • 4.1.1.1 Reveal Sensitive Data Unnecessarily [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
          • Attack Vector: The direct consequence of overly verbose logging, leading to the exposure of sensitive data in logs.
          • Details: Verbose logging can cause the application to log sensitive data that should not be present in production logs.
    • 4.2 Identify Insecure Log Destinations:
      • 4.2.1 Logging to Publicly Accessible Locations [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
        • 4.2.1.1 Expose Logs to Unauthorized Parties [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
          • Attack Vector: Configuring Logrus to send logs to publicly accessible destinations.
          • Details: Directly logging to public locations exposes all log data to anyone who can access that location.
    • 4.3 Weak Access Controls on Log Configuration [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack Vector: Exploiting weak or missing access controls on the Logrus configuration itself.
      • Details: If access to log configuration is not properly secured, attackers can modify it for malicious purposes.
      • 4.3.1 Unauthorized Modification of Log Configuration [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Gaining unauthorized access to modify the logging configuration.
        • Details: Attackers can exploit weak access controls to change log settings for their benefit.
        • 4.3.1.2 Redirect Logs to Attacker-Controlled Location [HIGH-RISK PATH]:
          • Attack Vector: Modifying the log configuration to redirect logs to a location controlled by the attacker.
          • Details: By redirecting logs, attackers can capture all log data for their own analysis and potentially manipulate or delete logs at the legitimate destination.