Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize and Filter Sensitive Data Before Logging with Logrus
-
Description:
- Identify Sensitive Data in Application Context: Pinpoint all sensitive data points within your application code that might be passed to
logrus
for logging. - Implement Sanitization Functions (External to Logrus): Create dedicated functions outside of your
logrus
configuration to sanitize identified sensitive data. These functions should redact, mask, filter, or use allow-lists to process data. - Apply Sanitization Before Logrus Calls: Before calling any
logrus
logging function (logrus.Info
,logrus.Error
, etc.), apply the sanitization functions to the sensitive data you intend to log. Ensure this happens before the data enterslogrus
. - Use Logrus Structured Logging for Sanitized Data: Pass the sanitized data to
logrus
using structured logging features likelogrus.WithField
orlogrus.WithFields
. This ensures you are logging the safe, processed version. - Code Reviews Focused on Pre-Logrus Sanitization: During code reviews, specifically check that sanitization is consistently applied before any sensitive data is handed to
logrus
for logging.
- Identify Sensitive Data in Application Context: Pinpoint all sensitive data points within your application code that might be passed to
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Information Disclosure (High Severity): Logging sensitive data directly through
logrus
exposes it in logs, potentially leading to breaches. - Compliance Violations (High Severity): Logging PII or regulated data via
logrus
without sanitization can violate privacy regulations.
- Information Disclosure (High Severity): Logging sensitive data directly through
-
Impact:
- Information Disclosure (High Reduction): Prevents sensitive data from being logged by
logrus
in the first place, significantly reducing exposure risk. - Compliance Violations (High Reduction): Helps meet compliance requirements by ensuring
logrus
only logs sanitized, non-sensitive representations of data.
- Information Disclosure (High Reduction): Prevents sensitive data from being logged by
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially implemented. Basic password redaction occurs before logging with
logrus
in user authentication modules.
- Partially implemented. Basic password redaction occurs before logging with
-
Missing Implementation:
- Lack of comprehensive sanitization before
logrus
calls for API keys, session tokens, and PII across all application modules. - No automated checks to ensure sanitization happens before data reaches
logrus
.
- Lack of comprehensive sanitization before
Mitigation Strategy: Control Log Levels Configured in Logrus for Production
-
Description:
- Define Log Level Policy for Logrus: Establish a clear policy for which
logrus
log levels are appropriate for different environments (development, staging, production). - Configure Logrus Levels Dynamically (External Configuration): Implement a mechanism to set
logrus
log levels via external configuration (environment variables, config files) outside of the application code itself. This allows changinglogrus
verbosity without code changes. - Set Production Logrus Level to Appropriate Verbosity: Configure
logrus
in production to useInfo
,Warning
,Error
, orFatal
levels by default. AvoidDebug
orTrace
in productionlogrus
configurations unless temporarily needed for specific debugging and then promptly reverted. - Monitor and Adjust Logrus Levels (Configuration Changes): Monitor production logs. If
logrus
is logging too much debug information, adjust the external configuration to reduce thelogrus
log level. If more detail is needed, temporarily increase thelogrus
level via configuration changes.
- Define Log Level Policy for Logrus: Establish a clear policy for which
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Information Disclosure (Medium Severity): Overly verbose
logrus
logging (Debug/Trace levels) in production can expose internal details throughlogrus
outputs. - Performance Degradation (Medium Severity): Excessive
logrus
logging, especially at verbose levels, consumes resources, impacting performance.
- Information Disclosure (Medium Severity): Overly verbose
-
Impact:
- Information Disclosure (Medium Reduction): Limits the amount of potentially sensitive information
logrus
outputs in production by controlling verbosity. - Performance Degradation (Medium Reduction): Reduces
logrus
logging overhead, improving application performance.
- Information Disclosure (Medium Reduction): Limits the amount of potentially sensitive information
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially implemented.
logrus
log levels are configurable via environment variables. Production default forlogrus
is set toInfo
.
- Partially implemented.
-
Missing Implementation:
- No formal policy document specifically for
logrus
log levels in different environments. - No monitoring or alerts for unexpectedly verbose
logrus
logging in production.
- No formal policy document specifically for
Mitigation Strategy: Utilize Logrus Structured Logging (Fields) to Prevent Injection
-
Description:
- Adopt Logrus Structured Logging (Fields) Consistently: Mandate and enforce the use of
logrus.WithField
andlogrus.WithFields
throughout the codebase for logging dynamic data. - Avoid String Concatenation in Logrus Messages: Prohibit string concatenation or formatting directly within
logrus
logging calls when including user-supplied or dynamic data. - Train Developers on Logrus Fields for Security: Train developers specifically on how
logrus.Fields
prevents log injection and why it's crucial for secure logging withlogrus
. - Code Review Enforcement of Logrus Fields: During code reviews, strictly enforce the use of
logrus.Fields
and reject code that uses string concatenation withinlogrus
logging for dynamic data.
- Adopt Logrus Structured Logging (Fields) Consistently: Mandate and enforce the use of
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Log Injection Vulnerabilities (Medium Severity): String concatenation in
logrus
messages can be exploited for log injection attacks.
- Log Injection Vulnerabilities (Medium Severity): String concatenation in
-
Impact:
- Log Injection Vulnerabilities (High Reduction):
logrus.Fields
effectively eliminates the primary log injection vector by separating log messages from dynamic data withinlogrus
itself.
- Log Injection Vulnerabilities (High Reduction):
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially implemented. Structured logging with
logrus.Fields
is used in some modules, but older code still uses string concatenation inlogrus
calls.
- Partially implemented. Structured logging with
-
Missing Implementation:
- Inconsistent usage of
logrus.Fields
across all modules. - No coding guidelines specifically prohibiting string concatenation within
logrus
calls for dynamic data. - No automated checks to detect string concatenation within
logrus
logging.
- Inconsistent usage of
Mitigation Strategy: Sanitize User Inputs Before Logging with Logrus Fields (Defense in Depth)
-
Description:
- Identify Input Points Logged via Logrus Fields: Locate all places where user inputs or external data are logged using
logrus.Fields
. - Implement Input Sanitization (Pre-Logrus Fields): Develop sanitization functions to process user inputs before they are added as fields to
logrus.WithField
orlogrus.WithFields
. Focus on escaping or removing characters that could be misinterpreted by systems processinglogrus
outputs. - Apply Sanitization Before Logrus Field Assignment: Apply these sanitization functions to user input data immediately before assigning it as a value in
logrus.WithField
orlogrus.WithFields
. - Context-Aware Sanitization for Logrus Fields: Consider the context where
logrus
outputs will be processed when designing sanitization rules for data logged vialogrus.Fields
.
- Identify Input Points Logged via Logrus Fields: Locate all places where user inputs or external data are logged using
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Log Injection Vulnerabilities (Low to Medium Severity - Residual Risk): While
logrus.Fields
helps, certain characters in user inputs withinlogrus.Fields
might still cause issues in downstream log processing. - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Log Viewers (Low Severity): If
logrus
outputs are displayed in web viewers, unsanitized inputs inlogrus.Fields
could lead to XSS.
- Log Injection Vulnerabilities (Low to Medium Severity - Residual Risk): While
-
Impact:
- Log Injection Vulnerabilities (Medium Reduction): Further reduces residual log injection risks even when using
logrus.Fields
. - Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Log Viewers (Low Reduction): Minimizes XSS risks in log viewers displaying
logrus
outputs.
- Log Injection Vulnerabilities (Medium Reduction): Further reduces residual log injection risks even when using
-
Currently Implemented:
- Not implemented. User inputs are generally logged as fields in
logrus
without specific sanitization for log processing contexts before being passed tologrus.Fields
.
- Not implemented. User inputs are generally logged as fields in
-
Missing Implementation:
- No input sanitization functions specifically designed for data logged via
logrus.Fields
. - No consideration of downstream log processing when handling data for
logrus.Fields
.
- No input sanitization functions specifically designed for data logged via
Mitigation Strategy: Implement Log Rate Limiting or Sampling using Logrus Hooks
-
Description:
- Identify High-Volume Log Sources Handled by Logrus: Analyze application components that generate high log volumes through
logrus
. - Develop Logrus Hook for Rate Limiting/Sampling: Create a custom
logrus
hook that implements rate limiting or sampling logic. This hook will intercept log entries withinlogrus
itself.- Rate Limiting Hook: The hook tracks log frequency and discards entries exceeding a threshold within a time window.
- Sampling Hook: The hook randomly discards a percentage of log entries based on a sampling rate.
- Register the Logrus Hook: Register the custom rate limiting or sampling hook with
logrus
usinglogrus.AddHook()
. - Configure Hook Thresholds: Configure the rate limiting thresholds or sampling rates within the
logrus
hook's settings. - Monitor Log Volume After Hook Implementation: Monitor log volume after deploying the
logrus
hook to ensure it effectively reduces excessive logging without losing critical information.
- Identify High-Volume Log Sources Handled by Logrus: Analyze application components that generate high log volumes through
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) through Excessive Logging (Medium to High Severity): Attackers or application errors causing log floods through
logrus
, consuming resources.
- Denial of Service (DoS) through Excessive Logging (Medium to High Severity): Attackers or application errors causing log floods through
-
Impact:
- Denial of Service (DoS) through Excessive Logging (Medium Reduction): Reduces DoS risk by limiting log volume within
logrus
, preventing resource exhaustion.
- Denial of Service (DoS) through Excessive Logging (Medium Reduction): Reduces DoS risk by limiting log volume within
-
Currently Implemented:
- Not implemented. No
logrus
hooks for rate limiting or sampling are in place.
- Not implemented. No
-
Missing Implementation:
- No custom
logrus
hook developed for rate limiting or sampling. - No analysis to identify components suitable for
logrus
hook-based rate limiting.
- No custom
Mitigation Strategy: Optimize Logrus Formatter for Performance
-
Description:
- Benchmark Logrus Formatters: Benchmark different
logrus
formatters (e.g.,TextFormatter
,JSONFormatter
) in your application's logging context to assess performance. - Choose Efficient Logrus Formatter: Select the most performant
logrus
formatter suitable for your logging needs.JSONFormatter
is often more efficient for machine processing and centralized logging, whileTextFormatter
might be simpler for human readability in development. - Configure Logrus to Use Optimized Formatter: Configure
logrus
to use the chosen, optimized formatter usinglogrus.SetFormatter()
. - Re-benchmark After Formatter Change: After changing the
logrus
formatter, re-benchmark logging performance to confirm performance improvements.
- Benchmark Logrus Formatters: Benchmark different
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Performance Degradation (Medium Severity): Inefficient
logrus
formatters can contribute to performance slowdowns. - Denial of Service (DoS) (Low Severity - Indirect): In extreme cases, very inefficient
logrus
formatting could contribute to resource exhaustion.
- Performance Degradation (Medium Severity): Inefficient
-
Impact:
- Performance Degradation (Medium Reduction): Improves application performance by reducing
logrus
formatting overhead. - Denial of Service (DoS) (Low Reduction): Reduces indirect DoS risk from inefficient
logrus
logging.
- Performance Degradation (Medium Reduction): Improves application performance by reducing
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially implemented.
TextFormatter
is currently used as thelogrus
formatter.
- Partially implemented.
-
Missing Implementation:
- No benchmarking of different
logrus
formatters. - No evaluation of switching to
JSONFormatter
or other more performant formatters inlogrus
.
- No benchmarking of different
Mitigation Strategy: Thoroughly Review and Test Logrus Configuration
-
Description:
- Configuration Review of Logrus Setup: Carefully review all aspects of
logrus
configuration in your application code, including:- Formatter selection (
logrus.SetFormatter()
). - Output destination (
logrus.SetOutput()
). - Hooks registration (
logrus.AddHook()
). - Log level setting (
logrus.SetLevel()
).
- Formatter selection (
- Test Logrus Configuration in Non-Production: Test the configured
logrus
setup in staging or testing environments to verify it behaves as intended and meets security requirements. Check log levels, formatting, output destinations, and hook behavior. - Automated Logrus Configuration Checks (If Possible): If feasible, implement automated checks to validate
logrus
configuration against security best practices. - Version Control Logrus Configuration Code: Ensure the code that configures
logrus
is under version control to track changes and enable rollbacks.
- Configuration Review of Logrus Setup: Carefully review all aspects of
-
List of Threats Mitigated:
- Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities (Variable Severity): Incorrect
logrus
configuration can lead to various security issues (e.g., overly verbose logging, ineffective hooks).
- Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities (Variable Severity): Incorrect
-
Impact:
- Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities (Variable Reduction): Reduces risks arising from misconfigured
logrus
settings by ensuring proper setup and validation.
- Misconfiguration Vulnerabilities (Variable Reduction): Reduces risks arising from misconfigured
-
Currently Implemented:
- Partially implemented. Manual code reviews include basic checks of
logrus
setup.
- Partially implemented. Manual code reviews include basic checks of
-
Missing Implementation:
- No dedicated testing process specifically for
logrus
configuration. - No automated checks to validate
logrus
configuration.
- No dedicated testing process specifically for