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attack-tree.md

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Attack Tree Analysis for spf13/cobra

Objective: Compromise a Cobra-based CLI application by exploiting vulnerabilities related to Cobra's features and usage.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Cobra CLI Application [CRITICAL NODE]
├─── Input Manipulation Attacks [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│    ├─── Command Injection [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│    │    ├─── Unsanitized Flag Values [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│    │    │    └─── Execute arbitrary shell commands [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│    │    ├─── Unsanitized Argument Values [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│    │    │    └─── Execute arbitrary shell commands [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│    └─── Path Traversal via Input [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│         └─── Supply malicious paths in flags/arguments intended for file operations [HIGH-RISK PATH]
├─── Configuration Exploitation (Viper Integration) [CRITICAL NODE]
│    └─── Insecure Default Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│         └─── Exploiting weak default settings in configuration files [HIGH-RISK PATH]
└─── Logic & Implementation Flaws (Cobra Specific) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
     └─── Lack of Input Validation in Command Logic [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
          └─── Exploit vulnerabilities in custom command logic [HIGH-RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: Input Manipulation Attacks [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Description: This category encompasses attacks that exploit vulnerabilities arising from improper handling of user-supplied input provided through Cobra flags and arguments. Attackers aim to manipulate the application's behavior by crafting malicious input.

    • Breakdown of Attack Vectors within Input Manipulation:

      • 1.1. Command Injection [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

        • Description: Attackers inject malicious commands into flag or argument values that are then executed by the application within a shell environment.
          • 1.1.1. Unsanitized Flag Values [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
            • Attack Vector: Providing malicious shell commands as values for Cobra flags.
            • Impact: Critical - Full system compromise, arbitrary code execution.
            • Likelihood: Medium-High
            • Effort: Low-Medium
            • Skill Level: Intermediate
            • Detection Difficulty: Hard
            • Actionable Mitigations:
              • Strictly validate and sanitize all flag inputs.
              • Avoid executing shell commands with user-provided input.
              • If shelling out is necessary, use proper escaping or safer alternatives.
          • 1.1.2. Unsanitized Argument Values [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
            • Attack Vector: Providing malicious shell commands as Cobra command arguments.
            • Impact: Critical - Full system compromise, arbitrary code execution.
            • Likelihood: Medium-High
            • Effort: Low-Medium
            • Skill Level: Intermediate
            • Detection Difficulty: Hard
            • Actionable Mitigations:
              • Strictly validate and sanitize all argument inputs.
              • Avoid executing shell commands with user-provided input.
              • If shelling out is necessary, use proper escaping or safer alternatives.

      • 1.2. Path Traversal via Input [HIGH-RISK PATH]

        • Description: Attackers provide malicious file paths (e.g., using ../) in flags or arguments to access files or directories outside the intended scope.
          • Attack Vector: Supplying path traversal sequences in flags or arguments intended for file operations.
          • Impact: High - Unauthorized file access, data leakage, potential arbitrary file read/write.
          • Likelihood: Medium
          • Effort: Low
          • Skill Level: Beginner
          • Detection Difficulty: Medium
          • Actionable Mitigations:
            • Strictly validate and sanitize all file paths provided by users.
            • Use filepath.Clean and filepath.Abs in Go to normalize paths.
            • Consider chroot environments to restrict file system access.

Attack Tree Path: Configuration Exploitation (Viper Integration) [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Description: If the Cobra application uses Viper for configuration, vulnerabilities can arise from insecure default configurations.

    • Breakdown of Attack Vectors within Configuration Exploitation:

      • 2.1. Insecure Default Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Description: Exploiting weak or insecure default settings in configuration files that are shipped with the application.
          • Attack Vector: Leveraging vulnerabilities present in default configuration settings (e.g., weak default credentials, insecure protocols enabled by default).
          • Impact: Medium-High - Unauthorized access, data breach, application compromise (depending on the specific insecure setting).
          • Likelihood: Medium-High
          • Effort: Very Low
          • Skill Level: Novice
          • Detection Difficulty: Easy-Medium (through security audits)
          • Actionable Mitigations:
            • Security harden all default configuration settings.
            • Disable unnecessary features and services by default.
            • Regularly audit default configurations for security vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Logic & Implementation Flaws (Cobra Specific) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Description: This category highlights vulnerabilities stemming from flaws in the custom logic implemented within Cobra commands, specifically focusing on insufficient input validation within the command's execution logic.

    • Breakdown of Attack Vectors within Logic & Implementation Flaws:

      • 3.1. Lack of Input Validation in Command Logic [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH]
        • Description: Vulnerabilities arising from insufficient or missing input validation within the RunE functions of Cobra commands, leading to exploitable flaws in the application's core logic.
          • Attack Vector: Exploiting missing or weak input validation within the custom command logic to trigger unintended behavior, errors, or security vulnerabilities.
          • Impact: High - Varies greatly depending on the specific flaw in the logic, can range from data corruption to arbitrary code execution in vulnerable logic paths.
          • Likelihood: Medium-High
          • Effort: Medium
          • Skill Level: Intermediate
          • Detection Difficulty: Medium-Hard (requires code audits and thorough testing)
          • Actionable Mitigations:
            • Implement robust input validation within the RunE functions of each command.
            • Use defensive programming techniques to handle unexpected inputs.
            • Conduct thorough code reviews and security testing of command logic.