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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for spf13/cobra

Mitigation Strategy: Strict Input Validation and Sanitization (Cobra Focused)

  • Description:

    1. Leverage Cobra's built-in validation: Utilize Cobra's Args validation functions (e.g., cobra.ExactArgs, cobra.RangeArgs, cobra.MinimumNArgs) within your command definitions to enforce basic argument structure and count.
    2. Implement custom flag validation using flag.Value interface: For flags, define custom types that implement the flag.Value interface and include validation logic within the Set(string) error method. This allows validation to occur directly when flags are parsed by Cobra.
    3. Validate within RunE function: For more complex validation logic that depends on multiple flags or arguments, perform validation within the RunE function of your Cobra commands after Cobra has parsed the input.
    4. Sanitize user input received through Cobra: Even after validation, sanitize string inputs obtained from cmd.Flags().GetString(...) or args slice within your RunE function. Sanitize before using these inputs in any potentially unsafe operations (e.g., file path manipulation, external command construction).

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Command Injection (High Severity): Prevents injection by ensuring user-provided arguments and flags are validated and sanitized before being used in command execution logic within the Cobra application.
    • Path Traversal (Medium Severity): Reduces path traversal risks by validating and sanitizing file paths provided as arguments or flags to Cobra commands.
    • Denial of Service (DoS) (Medium Severity): Protects against DoS by rejecting invalid or excessively long inputs early in the Cobra parsing and validation stage, preventing resource exhaustion.
    • Argument Parsing Errors leading to unexpected behavior (Low to Medium Severity): Ensures Cobra parses arguments and flags as expected, preventing unexpected application states due to incorrect input interpretation.

  • Impact:

    • Command Injection: High risk reduction. Directly addresses a primary vulnerability in CLI applications by controlling input at the Cobra layer.
    • Path Traversal: Medium risk reduction. Makes path traversal attacks significantly harder by enforcing path validation within Cobra commands.
    • Denial of Service (DoS): Medium risk reduction. Improves application robustness against input-based DoS attempts handled by Cobra.
    • Argument Parsing Errors: Medium risk reduction. Increases the reliability of argument parsing and reduces logic errors stemming from incorrect input handling by Cobra.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Basic argument count validation might be used: cobra.ExactArgs or similar might be used in some commands.
    • Custom flag validation using flag.Value likely missing: Custom validation within flag types is probably not implemented.
    • Sanitization within RunE might be inconsistent: Sanitization steps are likely not systematically applied across all commands and inputs.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Comprehensive validation for all Cobra arguments and flags: Need to systematically implement validation for every input defined in Cobra commands.
    • Consistent use of flag.Value for flag validation: Implement custom flag types with validation for relevant flags.
    • Sanitization routines applied to all user inputs received via Cobra: Ensure all inputs from cmd.Flags() and args are sanitized before use.
    • Automated tests specifically for Cobra input validation: Lack of tests focused on validating the implemented Cobra input validation logic.

Mitigation Strategy: Secure Help and Usage Information Generation (Cobra Focused)

  • Description:

    1. Review Cobra-generated help text for sensitive information leaks: Carefully examine the help text automatically generated by Cobra for each command and flag. Ensure it does not inadvertently expose internal application details, configuration paths, or potentially sensitive information in example usages or descriptions.
    2. Customize help templates if necessary: If the default Cobra help templates reveal too much information, customize them using Cobra's template functionality to remove or redact sensitive details.
    3. Verify accuracy and avoid misleading help messages: Ensure help messages are accurate and clearly describe the intended usage of commands and flags. Misleading help can lead users to use the application incorrectly, potentially creating security vulnerabilities through misconfiguration or misuse.
    4. Avoid suggesting insecure usage patterns in examples: Review example commands in help text to ensure they do not demonstrate or encourage insecure practices (e.g., insecure file permissions, weak passwords, or vulnerable command sequences).

  • List of Threats Mitigated:

    • Information Disclosure (Low to Medium Severity): Prevents unintentional leakage of sensitive information through Cobra's automatically generated help and usage documentation.
    • Social Engineering (Low Severity): Reduces the risk of attackers exploiting misleading or inaccurate help information to trick users into insecure actions.
    • Misconfiguration leading to vulnerabilities (Low to Medium Severity): Ensures users are guided towards secure usage patterns by providing accurate and secure examples in help text, reducing the chance of misconfiguration.

  • Impact:

    • Information Disclosure: Low to Medium risk reduction. Prevents accidental exposure of potentially sensitive details in help output.
    • Social Engineering: Low risk reduction. Makes it slightly harder for attackers to manipulate users through misleading help information.
    • Misconfiguration vulnerabilities: Low to Medium risk reduction. Guides users towards secure application usage through clear and secure help examples.

  • Currently Implemented:

    • Default Cobra help generation is used: The application likely relies on Cobra's default help text generation.
    • Review of help text for security implications likely not performed: Security review of generated help messages is probably not a standard practice.
    • Custom help templates are likely not used: Customization of Cobra help templates is probably not implemented.

  • Missing Implementation:

    • Security review process for Cobra-generated help text: Implement a process to review help output for each command and flag for potential security issues.
    • Customization of Cobra help templates where needed: Customize templates to remove or redact sensitive information if identified in default help output.
    • Guidelines for writing secure and accurate help messages: Establish guidelines for developers to write help messages that are both informative and security-conscious.

By focusing on these Cobra-specific mitigation strategies, you can directly address security concerns arising from the use of the Cobra library in your command-line application. Remember to integrate these strategies into your development workflow and conduct regular security assessments.