Objective: Compromise Application by Exploiting Viper Vulnerabilities
- Compromise Application via Viper CRITICAL NODE
- (OR) Manipulate Application Configuration via Viper CRITICAL NODE
- (OR) Control Configuration Source CRITICAL NODE
- (AND) Control Configuration File HIGH RISK PATH CRITICAL NODE
- (+) File Inclusion/Overwrite HIGH RISK PATH
- (AND) Control Environment Variables HIGH RISK PATH CRITICAL NODE
- (+) Environment Variable Injection HIGH RISK PATH
- (+) Environment Variable Precedence Exploitation HIGH RISK PATH
- (AND) Control Remote Configuration Source (if used) CRITICAL NODE
- (+) Compromise Remote Source Credentials HIGH RISK PATH
- (AND) Control Configuration File HIGH RISK PATH CRITICAL NODE
- (OR) Exploit Viper's Configuration Processing
- (+) Default Configuration Exploitation HIGH RISK PATH
- (OR) Control Configuration Source CRITICAL NODE
- (OR) Abuse Application Logic via Viper Configuration CRITICAL NODE
- (+) Insecure Configuration Parameters HIGH RISK PATH CRITICAL NODE
- (OR) Manipulate Application Configuration via Viper CRITICAL NODE
Attack Tree Path: Control Configuration File -> File Inclusion/Overwrite
- Action: Exploit vulnerabilities allowing file write or inclusion to modify Viper configuration files (e.g., path traversal, insecure file upload, misconfigured permissions).
- Likelihood: Medium-High (Common web app vulnerabilities, misconfigurations possible)
- Impact: High-Critical (Configuration manipulation, potential RCE, data breach)
- Effort: Low-Medium (Tools and techniques readily available)
- Skill Level: Low-Medium (Basic web app exploitation skills)
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (File system monitoring, integrity checks can help, but initial overwrite might be missed)
Attack Tree Path: Control Environment Variables -> Environment Variable Injection
- Action: Inject malicious environment variables that Viper reads and uses to override or manipulate application settings.
- Likelihood: Medium (Depends on environment access, containerization, cloud environments might limit this, but still possible in some setups)
- Impact: Medium-High (Configuration manipulation, potential privilege escalation, service disruption)
- Effort: Low-Medium (Relatively easy if attacker gains access to the environment)
- Skill Level: Low-Medium (Basic system administration/environment manipulation skills)
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (Environment variable changes can be logged, but might be missed in noisy environments)
- Action: Understand Viper's precedence rules and leverage environment variables to override intended configuration values, especially in production environments where environment variables are often used.
- Likelihood: Medium-High (Common practice to use env vars in production, precedence rules can be exploited if not well understood)
- Impact: Medium (Configuration manipulation, potentially subtle changes in application behavior)
- Effort: Low (Requires understanding Viper's precedence, but easy to execute)
- Skill Level: Low (Basic understanding of configuration and environment variables)
- Detection Difficulty: High (Very difficult to detect as it might look like legitimate configuration, unless deviations from intended config are monitored)
- Action: Obtain credentials for remote configuration sources (e.g., etcd, Consul) if used by Viper, allowing direct manipulation of configuration data.
- Likelihood: Low-Medium (Depends on security of credential management, secrets rotation, etc.)
- Impact: Critical (Full control over application configuration, potential for complete compromise)
- Effort: Medium-High (Requires bypassing authentication and authorization mechanisms of the remote source)
- Skill Level: Medium-High (Requires understanding of authentication, authorization, and potentially cryptography)
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (Access logs of remote source, anomaly detection on configuration changes can help)
- Action: If the application relies heavily on Viper's default values and these defaults are insecure or predictable, exploit these defaults when other configuration sources are unavailable or can be bypassed.
- Likelihood: Medium (Developers might rely on defaults, especially in early stages, and defaults might not always be secure)
- Impact: Medium-High (Depends on the nature of insecure defaults, could lead to weakened security, information disclosure, etc.)
- Effort: Low (Requires understanding of default configurations, often easily discoverable)
- Skill Level: Low (Basic understanding of configuration and application defaults)
- Detection Difficulty: High (Very difficult to detect as it relies on lack of configuration, might look like intended behavior if defaults are not well-documented)
Attack Tree Path: Abuse Application Logic via Viper Configuration -> Insecure Configuration Parameters
- Action: Identify configuration parameters managed by Viper that directly control security-sensitive aspects of the application (e.g., database credentials, API keys, feature flags, allowed origins, insecure defaults enabled via config). Manipulate these parameters to weaken security or gain unauthorized access.
- Likelihood: Medium-High (Common issue, developers might expose sensitive settings via configuration)
- Impact: High-Critical (Data breach, unauthorized access, privilege escalation, depending on the sensitive parameter)
- Effort: Low-Medium (Requires reconnaissance to identify sensitive parameters, but manipulation is often straightforward)
- Skill Level: Low-Medium (Basic understanding of application configuration and security principles)
- Detection Difficulty: Medium (Configuration changes can be logged, but detecting insecure configuration requires security policy enforcement and monitoring)