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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for traefik/traefik

Attack Surface: Exposed Traefik Dashboard

  • Description: The Traefik dashboard, providing insights and control over Traefik's configuration, is accessible without proper authentication.
  • Traefik Contribution: Traefik provides a web-based dashboard for monitoring and management. If not secured, this becomes a direct entry point. Default configurations might expose it without authentication.
  • Example: An attacker accesses https://your-domain.com:8080 (default dashboard port) without credentials and views backend service details, routing rules, and potentially modifies configurations if allowed.
  • Impact: Information disclosure, unauthorized configuration changes, service disruption, potential for complete compromise of the reverse proxy and backend services.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable Authentication: Configure strong authentication (e.g., BasicAuth, DigestAuth, ForwardAuth) for the Traefik dashboard.
    • Restrict Access: Limit access to the dashboard to specific IP addresses or networks using network policies or firewall rules.
    • Disable Dashboard in Production: If the dashboard is not actively needed in production, disable it entirely to eliminate the attack surface.

Attack Surface: Insecure API Access

  • Description: Traefik's API, used for dynamic configuration, is accessible without or with weak authentication and authorization.
  • Traefik Contribution: Traefik offers an API for dynamic configuration updates. Lack of proper security on this API is a direct vulnerability.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a misconfigured API endpoint to inject malicious routing rules, redirecting traffic intended for a legitimate service to a malicious server under their control.
  • Impact: Service hijacking, data exfiltration, denial of service, complete compromise of routing and backend service access.
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enable API Authentication: Implement strong authentication and authorization mechanisms for the Traefik API (e.g., API keys, OAuth 2.0).
    • Restrict API Access: Limit API access to authorized users and services only, using network policies or firewall rules.
    • Use HTTPS: Ensure API communication is over HTTPS to protect credentials and data in transit.

Attack Surface: Misconfigured Configuration Providers

  • Description: Configuration providers (Docker, Kubernetes, Consul, file providers) used by Traefik are misconfigured, allowing unauthorized access or modification.
  • Traefik Contribution: Traefik relies on external configuration providers. Vulnerabilities in these providers directly impact Traefik's security posture.
  • Example: In Kubernetes, a ConfigMap used by Traefik is created with overly permissive RBAC roles. An attacker gains access to this ConfigMap and modifies Traefik's configuration, altering routing rules.
  • Impact: Unauthorized configuration changes, service disruption, potential for hijacking traffic, information disclosure.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Configuration Providers: Implement strong access control and authentication for all configuration providers used by Traefik.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant Traefik and other services only the minimum necessary permissions to access configuration providers.

Attack Surface: Insecure File Providers

  • Description: When using file providers (TOML, YAML), configuration files are not properly secured, allowing unauthorized modification.
  • Traefik Contribution: Traefik supports file-based configuration. If these files are not protected, they become a direct attack vector.
  • Example: Configuration files for Traefik are stored with world-readable permissions. An attacker gains access to the server and modifies the configuration file to redirect traffic or inject malicious middlewares.
  • Impact: Unauthorized configuration changes, service disruption, potential for hijacking traffic, information disclosure, potential for privilege escalation if configuration files contain sensitive credentials.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Restrict File Permissions: Ensure configuration files are readable only by the Traefik process user and administrators.
    • Secure File Storage: Store configuration files in secure locations with appropriate access controls.

Attack Surface: Exposed Entrypoints without Proper Security Middlewares

  • Description: Traefik entrypoints are exposed without essential security middlewares, leaving applications vulnerable to common web attacks.
  • Traefik Contribution: Traefik's entrypoints define network exposure. Lack of security middlewares on these entrypoints directly exposes backend services.
  • Example: An HTTP entrypoint is exposed without HTTPS redirection or HSTS headers. An attacker performs a man-in-the-middle attack to intercept user credentials transmitted over unencrypted HTTP.
  • Impact: Man-in-the-middle attacks, session hijacking, cross-site scripting (XSS) if security headers are missing, denial of service if rate limiting is absent.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce HTTPS: Always redirect HTTP to HTTPS and enable HSTS headers to enforce secure connections.
    • Implement Security Headers: Configure security headers (e.g., X-Frame-Options, Content-Security-Policy, X-XSS-Protection, X-Content-Type-Options) using Traefik middlewares.

Attack Surface: Path Traversal Vulnerabilities in Routing Rules

  • Description: Complex or poorly designed routing rules in Traefik allow attackers to bypass intended routing and access unauthorized resources.
  • Traefik Contribution: Traefik's routing logic, especially with path manipulation and regular expressions, can introduce vulnerabilities if not carefully implemented.
  • Example: A routing rule intended to expose /api/v1/public is misconfigured, allowing access to /api/v1/private by manipulating the URL path.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to backend services and resources, information disclosure, potential for privilege escalation.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Carefully Design Routing Rules: Thoroughly test and validate routing rules, especially those involving path manipulation or regular expressions.
    • Principle of Least Privilege in Routing: Design routing rules to grant access only to explicitly intended resources and paths.

Attack Surface: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Misconfigured Middlewares or Plugins

  • Description: Misconfigured middlewares or plugins that interact with external services can be exploited to perform SSRF attacks.
  • Traefik Contribution: Traefik's extensibility through middlewares and plugins can introduce SSRF risks if these components are not securely configured and validated.
  • Example: A custom authentication middleware fetches user profiles from an external API based on user-provided input. An attacker manipulates the input to force the middleware to make requests to internal services or external malicious sites.
  • Impact: Access to internal resources, information disclosure, potential for further attacks on internal systems, denial of service against internal or external services.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Middleware and Plugin Configuration: Carefully configure and validate all middlewares and plugins that interact with external services.
    • Input Validation and Sanitization: Sanitize and validate all input to middlewares and plugins to prevent malicious manipulation of external requests.

Attack Surface: Weak TLS Configuration

  • Description: Traefik is configured with weak TLS settings, making connections vulnerable to attacks.
  • Traefik Contribution: Traefik handles TLS termination. Misconfiguration in TLS settings directly impacts the security of encrypted connections.
  • Example: Traefik is configured to use outdated TLS 1.0 protocol or weak cipher suites. An attacker performs a downgrade attack or exploits vulnerabilities in weak ciphers to decrypt traffic.
  • Impact: Man-in-the-middle attacks, data interception, session hijacking, compromise of confidentiality and integrity.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Strong TLS Configuration: Configure Traefik to use TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.3 and strong cipher suites. Disable outdated protocols and weak ciphers.
    • Enforce HTTPS: Always enforce HTTPS for all entrypoints handling sensitive data.

Attack Surface: Insecure Certificate Storage and Management

  • Description: TLS certificates and private keys are stored and managed insecurely, allowing unauthorized access.
  • Traefik Contribution: Traefik manages TLS certificates. Insecure storage and management of these certificates is a critical vulnerability.
  • Example: Private keys are stored in publicly readable files or in unencrypted configuration files. An attacker gains access to the server and steals the private key, allowing them to impersonate the application.
  • Impact: Impersonation of the application, man-in-the-middle attacks, loss of confidentiality and integrity, reputational damage.
  • Risk Severity: Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Certificate Storage: Store private keys in secure locations with restricted access (e.g., using file system permissions, dedicated secret stores, hardware security modules).
    • Automated Certificate Management: Use automated certificate management solutions like ACME (Let's Encrypt) to reduce manual handling of certificates and keys.

Attack Surface: Vulnerabilities in Traefik Dependencies

  • Description: Traefik or its dependencies contain known vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
  • Traefik Contribution: Traefik, like any software, relies on dependencies. Vulnerabilities in these dependencies indirectly affect Traefik's security.
  • Example: A vulnerability is discovered in a Go library used by Traefik. An attacker exploits this vulnerability to cause a denial of service or gain remote code execution on the Traefik instance.
  • Impact: Denial of service, remote code execution, information disclosure, potential for complete compromise of the reverse proxy.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regularly Update Traefik: Keep Traefik updated to the latest stable version to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Dependency Scanning: Implement dependency scanning tools to identify vulnerabilities in Traefik's dependencies.

Attack Surface: Untrusted or Malicious Plugins

  • Description: Using untrusted or malicious plugins in Traefik introduces vulnerabilities or malicious functionality.
  • Traefik Contribution: Traefik's plugin system allows extending its functionality, but untrusted plugins can introduce security risks.
  • Example: A user installs a seemingly benign plugin from an untrusted source. The plugin contains malicious code that exfiltrates sensitive data or compromises Traefik's configuration.
  • Impact: Data exfiltration, unauthorized access, service disruption, potential for complete compromise of the reverse proxy and backend services.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Plugins from Trusted Sources Only: Only install plugins from official Traefik repositories or highly reputable and trusted sources.
    • Code Review Plugins: If using custom or third-party plugins, conduct thorough code reviews to identify potential vulnerabilities or malicious code.

Attack Surface: Exploiting Vulnerabilities in HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 Implementations

  • Description: Vulnerabilities in Traefik's HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 implementations are exploited for denial of service or other attacks.
  • Traefik Contribution: Traefik supports HTTP/2 and HTTP/3. Vulnerabilities in these protocol implementations can be exploited through Traefik.
  • Example: An attacker sends specially crafted HTTP/2 requests that exploit a known vulnerability in Traefik's HTTP/2 implementation, causing a denial of service.
  • Impact: Denial of service, service instability, potential for other vulnerabilities depending on the nature of the HTTP/2/3 vulnerability.
  • Risk Severity: High.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Regularly Update Traefik: Keep Traefik updated to the latest stable version to patch known vulnerabilities in HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 implementations.
    • Disable HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 if not needed: If HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 are not required, consider disabling them to reduce the attack surface.