attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for tsenart/vegeta

Attack Surface: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

• Description: An attacker can induce the application using Vegeta to make requests to unintended locations, often internal resources, by manipulating the target URL.
• Vegeta Contribution: Vegeta is designed to send HTTP requests to user-defined target URLs. If the application using Vegeta allows untrusted input to control these URLs, Vegeta becomes the tool that performs the SSRF attack.
• Example: An application allows users to specify a target hostname for load testing. An attacker inputs http://internal.database.server:5432 as the target. Vegeta, as instructed by the application, sends requests to this internal database server, potentially exposing sensitive information or allowing unauthorized actions.
• Impact: Access to internal resources, data exfiltration, potential for further attacks on internal systems, bypassing firewalls.
• Risk Severity: High to Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Input Validation and Sanitization: Strictly validate and sanitize user-provided target URLs. Use allowlists of permitted hostnames or URL patterns.
  • URL Parsing and Validation: Parse URLs to ensure they conform to expected formats and do not point to internal networks or restricted resources.
  • Network Segmentation: Isolate the system running Vegeta from sensitive internal networks if possible.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Run Vegeta with minimal network permissions, restricting its ability to connect to internal networks.

Attack Surface: Unintentional Denial of Service (DoS)

• Description: Misconfiguration or excessive use of Vegeta can overwhelm the target system, leading to a denial of service.
• Vegeta Contribution: Vegeta's core functionality is to generate high load. Incorrectly configured attack parameters (e.g., high rate, long duration) directly cause the DoS against the target.
• Example: A developer accidentally sets the Vegeta request rate to 10,000 requests per second against a staging environment with a capacity of 1,000 requests per second. Vegeta overwhelms the staging environment, making it unavailable for testing and potentially impacting other services sharing the same infrastructure.
• Impact: Target system unavailability, performance degradation, disruption of services, potential financial losses if production systems are affected.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Rate Limiting and Throttling: Carefully configure Vegeta's rate limits and duration based on the target system's capacity and known limitations.
  • Gradual Load Increase: Start with low load and gradually increase it while monitoring the target system's performance.
  • Environment Isolation: Run load tests against dedicated testing or staging environments, isolated from production systems.
  • Resource Monitoring: Monitor resource usage (CPU, memory, network) on both the Vegeta client and the target system during load tests.
  • Alerting and Thresholds: Set up alerts to detect when load tests are approaching or exceeding system capacity.

Attack Surface: Command Injection via Configuration

• Description: If the application dynamically constructs Vegeta commands or configuration files based on untrusted input, attackers might inject malicious commands that Vegeta's execution context will run.
• Vegeta Contribution: Vegeta is a command-line tool. If the application using it constructs command strings or configuration files using external input without proper sanitization, Vegeta becomes the vehicle for executing injected commands on the system.
• Example: An application allows users to specify custom headers for Vegeta attacks via a text field. The application directly concatenates this input into the Vegeta command string: vegeta attack -rate=100 -duration=10s -header="User-Agent: MyAgent" -header="${USER_INPUT}" .... An attacker inputs X-Custom: MaliciousHeader"; rm -rf / # into the text field. Vegeta's execution context will then attempt to execute the injected rm -rf / command.
• Impact: Arbitrary command execution on the system running Vegeta, potentially leading to system compromise, data breaches, or denial of service.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Avoid Dynamic Command Construction: Prefer using Vegeta's API or configuration files instead of dynamically constructing command strings from user input.
  • Input Sanitization and Validation: If dynamic command construction is unavoidable, rigorously sanitize and validate all user inputs to prevent command injection. Use escaping or parameterization techniques appropriate for the shell environment.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Run Vegeta with minimal privileges to limit the impact of successful command injection.
  • Secure Configuration Management: Store Vegeta configurations securely and avoid exposing configuration parameters to untrusted users.

Attack Surface: File Path Traversal in Target Files

• Description: If the application allows users to specify file paths for Vegeta to read target lists, and these paths are not validated, attackers could use Vegeta to access arbitrary files on the system.
• Vegeta Contribution: Vegeta's functionality to read target definitions from files, when combined with application's lack of path validation, allows attackers to leverage Vegeta to perform file path traversal.
• Example: An application allows users to upload a file containing target URLs for Vegeta to use. The application uses the uploaded file path directly in the Vegeta command: vegeta attack -targets="${UPLOADED_FILE_PATH}" .... An attacker uploads a file with a malicious path like ../../../../etc/passwd. Vegeta, as instructed, attempts to read /etc/passwd as a target file, potentially exposing sensitive system information.
• Impact: Unauthorized file access, information disclosure, potential for further system compromise.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate and sanitize user-provided file paths. Use allowlists of permitted directories or file extensions.
  • Path Normalization: Normalize file paths to remove relative path components (e.g., ..) before using them with Vegeta.
  • Restrict File Access: Run Vegeta with restricted file system permissions, limiting its ability to read files outside of designated directories.
  • Secure File Upload Handling: Implement secure file upload mechanisms, including input validation and storage in secure locations.

Attack Surface: Information Disclosure in Vegeta Output

• Description: Vegeta's output and reports can contain sensitive information (request/response details, headers, potentially response bodies). Insecure handling of this output, generated by Vegeta, can lead to information disclosure.
• Vegeta Contribution: Vegeta is the source of the output and reports that may contain sensitive data. The risk arises from how this Vegeta-generated output is handled and stored by the application.
• Example: Vegeta reports, containing request headers with API keys and response bodies with sensitive data, are stored in a publicly accessible web directory. An attacker discovers this directory and gains access to the sensitive information contained within Vegeta's reports.
• Impact: Exposure of sensitive data (API keys, authentication tokens, personal information, internal application details), potential for account compromise or further attacks.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Secure Output Storage: Store Vegeta outputs and reports in secure locations with appropriate access controls. Avoid storing them in publicly accessible directories.
  • Data Sanitization in Output: Sanitize or redact sensitive information from Vegeta outputs and reports before storing or sharing them.
  • Access Control for Reports: Implement access controls to restrict who can view or download Vegeta reports.
  • Minimize Verbosity: Configure Vegeta to output only necessary information, reducing the risk of accidentally logging sensitive data.