Mitigation Strategy: Strict Rate Limiting and Control within Vegeta
Description:
- Conservative
-rate
: Always startvegeta attack
commands with a very low-rate
value (e.g.,1/s
or lower). Never assume a high rate is safe. - Gradual
-rate
Increase: Incrementally increase the-rate
in small, controlled steps. Monitor the target system after each increase before proceeding. Avoid large jumps. - Controlled
-duration
: Use the-duration
flag to limit the length of attacks. Start with short durations (seconds) and gradually increase them only as needed. Never run attacks indefinitely. -max-workers
and-connections
Management: Begin with low values for-max-workers
and-connections
. Increase these cautiously, observing the impact on both the target and the machine runningvegeta
. These control concurrency.- Dynamic Adjustment: Be prepared to immediately reduce the
-rate
,-duration
,-max-workers
, or-connections
if the target system shows signs of stress (high latency, errors, resource exhaustion). Have a plan for quickly stopping or modifying the attack. - Target file usage: Use target files instead of command line arguments to define targets. This allows for easier management and review of the targets.
- Stdin usage: Use stdin to pipe targets to vegeta. This allows for dynamic generation of targets and avoids storing targets in files.
Threats Mitigated:
- DoS/DDoS (caused by
vegeta
): Severity: High. Uncontrolledvegeta
attacks can overwhelm the target. - Resource Exhaustion (on target system): Severity: Medium to High. Excessive load can exhaust server resources.
- Inaccurate Test Results: Severity: Medium. Overloading the system produces misleading data.
Impact:
- DoS/DDoS: Risk significantly reduced. Controlled parameters prevent overwhelming traffic.
- Resource Exhaustion: Risk significantly reduced. Gradual increases and monitoring allow for early detection.
- Inaccurate Test Results: Risk reduced. Controlled testing provides more reliable data.
Currently Implemented:
- Basic
-rate
and-duration
usage in scripts.
Missing Implementation:
- Systematic, gradual increase in
-rate
,-max-workers
, and-connections
is not consistently followed. - A documented plan for dynamically adjusting
vegeta
parameters during attacks is missing. - Target files and stdin usage are not implemented.
Mitigation Strategy: Data Sanitization and Parameterization within Vegeta Scripts
Description:
- No Hardcoded Sensitive Data: Never hardcode sensitive data (API keys, tokens, passwords, PII) directly within
vegeta
attack scripts or in files referenced by-body
or-header
. - Environment Variables: Use environment variables to store sensitive values. Reference these variables within
vegeta
scripts using shell variable substitution (e.g.,echo "GET https://api.example.com/resource" | vegeta attack -header "Authorization: Bearer $API_TOKEN" ...
). - External Files (for non-sensitive data): Use external files (referenced by
-body
and-header
) for request bodies and headers, but ensure these files contain only synthetic or anonymized test data. - Stdin for Dynamic Data: Use stdin (
-
) as the target source to pipe dynamically generated, sanitized data tovegeta
. This avoids storing potentially sensitive data in files. Example:generate_test_data.sh | vegeta attack -targets=- ...
- Careful File Handling: If using
-body
or-header
with files, meticulously review the file contents before each run to confirm they contain only test data.
Threats Mitigated:
- Exposure of Sensitive Data: Severity: High. Accidental leakage of production data during testing.
- Data Breach (through testing): Severity: High. Compromised testing environment could expose sensitive data.
Impact:
- Exposure of Sensitive Data: Risk significantly reduced. Parameterization and avoiding hardcoding prevent accidental exposure.
- Data Breach: Risk reduced. Using environment variables and stdin minimizes the impact of a compromise.
Currently Implemented:
- Some parameterization of API keys using environment variables.
Missing Implementation:
- Consistent use of environment variables for all sensitive data.
- Widespread use of stdin for dynamically generated, sanitized data.
- A formalized process for reviewing the contents of files used with
-body
and-header
.
Mitigation Strategy: Vegeta Resource Management
Description:
- Start Small: Begin with low values for
-max-workers
and-connections
to minimize the initial resource consumption ofvegeta
itself. - Monitor Vegeta's Host: While
vegeta
is running, actively monitor the resource usage (CPU, memory, network I/O) of the machine executingvegeta
. Use tools liketop
,htop
, or system-specific monitoring utilities. - Adjust Concurrency: If the
vegeta
host machine shows signs of resource strain (high CPU, memory exhaustion, network saturation), immediately reduce-max-workers
and-connections
. - Rate and Duration Limits: Indirectly manage
vegeta
's resource usage by also controlling the-rate
and-duration
. Lower rates and shorter durations reduce the overall load generated.
Threats Mitigated:
- Resource Exhaustion (on testing machine): Severity: Medium. The testing machine becoming overloaded leads to inaccurate results.
- Inaccurate Test Results: Severity: Medium. Bottlenecks on the testing machine skew performance metrics.
Impact:
- Resource Exhaustion: Risk significantly reduced. Monitoring and adjusting concurrency prevent overload.
- Inaccurate Test Results: Risk reduced. Ensuring the testing machine is not a bottleneck improves data reliability.
Currently Implemented:
- Occasional manual checks of resource usage.
Missing Implementation:
- Systematic monitoring of the
vegeta
host during every test run. - A defined process for adjusting
-max-workers
,-connections
,-rate
, and-duration
based on observed resource usage.