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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for tsenart/vegeta

Threat: Threat: Accidental Production DoS via Misconfiguration

  • Description: An internal user (developer, tester, etc.) unintentionally configures vegeta to target a production system with a high request rate or long duration. This could be due to a typo in the target URL, incorrect environment variables, or a copy-paste error. The user does not intend to cause harm.
    • Impact: Production service outage, data loss (if writes are interrupted), financial loss, reputational damage.
    • Vegeta Component Affected:
      • vegeta attack command (or the equivalent programmatic API calls).
      • Target configuration: -targets flag (or Targets field in the Attacker struct).
      • Rate configuration: -rate flag (or Rate field in the Attacker struct).
      • Duration configuration: -duration flag (or Duration field in the Attacker struct).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Input Validation: Implement strict input validation on all vegeta parameters, especially the target URL. Use a whitelist of allowed targets (e.g., a regex that only matches test environment URLs). Reject any input that doesn't match the whitelist.
      • Environment Segregation: Enforce strict separation between development, testing, and production environments. Use different credentials, network access controls, and distinct infrastructure for each environment.
      • Configuration Management: Use a configuration management system (e.g., Ansible, Chef, Puppet, Terraform) to manage vegeta configurations and prevent manual errors. Implement infrastructure-as-code and require code reviews for any changes.
      • Least Privilege: Run vegeta with the least privileged user account possible. This account should not have write access to production databases or other critical resources. Consider a dedicated service account with highly restricted permissions.
      • "Dry Run" Mode: Implement a "dry run" mode that simulates the attack without actually sending requests. This allows users to verify their configuration before running a real attack. (Note: vegeta doesn't have a built-in dry run; this would be a custom implementation within the application using vegeta).
      • Kill Switch: Provide a mechanism to quickly stop a running vegeta attack (e.g., a separate command, API endpoint, or a process monitoring system that can kill the vegeta process).
      • Monitoring and Alerting: Monitor vegeta usage and set up real-time alerts for unusual activity (e.g., high request rates, unexpected targets, long durations). Integrate with existing monitoring systems (e.g., Prometheus, Grafana, Datadog).

Threat: Threat: Malicious Insider DoS Attack

  • Description: A malicious insider (e.g., a disgruntled employee) with access to the system running vegeta intentionally configures it to attack a production system or a critical third-party service. Their goal is to cause disruption or damage.
    • Impact: Production service outage, data loss, financial loss, reputational damage, legal consequences.
    • Vegeta Component Affected: Same as Threat 1.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • All mitigations from Threat 1, with increased emphasis on access control and auditing.
      • Access Control: Implement very strict access controls and the principle of least privilege. Minimize the number of users who have access to vegeta and its configuration. Use role-based access control (RBAC).
      • Auditing: Log all vegeta commands and configurations, including the user who executed them, timestamps, and all parameters. Store audit logs securely and monitor them for suspicious activity. Implement log integrity checks.
      • Intrusion Detection: Implement intrusion detection systems (IDS) and security information and event management (SIEM) systems to detect and respond to malicious activity, including unusual vegeta usage patterns.
      • Background Checks: Conduct thorough background checks on employees with access to sensitive systems, and implement regular security awareness training.
      • Two-factor authentication: Enforce two-factor authentication for accessing systems that can run vegeta.

Threat: Threat: Third-Party Service Disruption

  • Description: An attacker (maliciously or accidentally) configures vegeta to target a third-party service (e.g., an API provider, a CDN, a partner's website). This could violate terms of service, cause legal issues, or damage relationships.
    • Impact: Legal repercussions, account suspension, reputational damage, strained business relationships.
    • Vegeta Component Affected:
      • vegeta attack command (or programmatic API).
      • Target configuration: -targets flag (or Targets field).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict Target Whitelisting: Implement a very strict and enforced whitelist of allowed targets. This whitelist should only include internal testing endpoints and be centrally managed and enforced.
      • Input Validation: Rigorously validate the target URL to ensure it exactly matches the whitelist. Reject any input that doesn't match. Use a robust URL parsing library to prevent bypasses.
      • Education and Training: Train developers and testers on the responsible use of vegeta and the severe potential consequences of targeting external services. Include this training as part of onboarding and regular security awareness programs.
      • Legal Review: Have legal counsel review any testing plans that might involve third-party services, even indirectly. Obtain explicit written consent from third parties before conducting any load testing against their systems.