attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for usememos/memos

Objective: Compromise Application Using Memos by Exploiting Memos-Specific Weaknesses (High-Risk Paths Only)

Attack Tree Visualization

[CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application Using Memos ├───[OR]─ [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Input Validation Vulnerabilities in Memos │ ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) │ │ ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Stored XSS in Memo Content │ │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Inject malicious JavaScript in memo content │ │ └───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Reflected XSS in Search/Filter Parameters │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Craft malicious URL with JavaScript payload in search query │ └───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Markdown Injection/Abuse │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Inject malicious Markdown to bypass sanitization ├───[OR]─ [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Authentication/Authorization Weaknesses in Memos │ ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Authentication Bypass │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit default credentials │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Brute-force weak passwords │ ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Authorization Bypass/Privilege Escalation within Memos │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Manipulate API requests to access/modify memos of other users ├───[OR]─ [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit API Vulnerabilities in Memos │ ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] API Abuse/Rate Limiting Issues │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Denial of Service (DoS) by overwhelming API endpoints │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Brute-force attacks on API endpoints │ ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Insecure API Endpoints/Parameter Tampering │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Access sensitive data via API endpoints without proper authorization │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Modify/delete memos via API endpoints without proper authorization │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Parameter manipulation to bypass filters or access controls in API requests ├───[OR]─ [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit File Upload Vulnerabilities (If Memos implements file uploads) │ ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Unrestricted File Upload │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Upload malicious file types │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Server-side execution or client-side XSS via uploaded files ├───[OR]─ [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Dependency Vulnerabilities in Memos │ ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Outdated Dependencies with Known Vulnerabilities │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Identify vulnerable dependencies used by Memos │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit known vulnerabilities in dependencies ├───[OR]─ [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Configuration and Deployment Issues in Memos │ ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Insecure Default Configuration │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Default credentials for admin accounts │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Weak default settings │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Unnecessary features enabled by default │ └───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Misconfiguration during Deployment │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exposed configuration files │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Insecure server configuration │ │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Running Memos with overly permissive permissions └───[OR]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Social Engineering Attacks Targeting Memos Users ├───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Phishing Attacks │ ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Send phishing emails to Memos users to steal credentials └───[AND]─ [HIGH-RISK PATH] Credential Stuffing/Password Reuse ├───[LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Attempt to login with leaked credentials from other breaches

Attack Tree Path: 1. [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Input Validation Vulnerabilities in Memos:

• [HIGH-RISK PATH] Cross-Site Scripting (XSS):
  • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Stored XSS in Memo Content:
    • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Inject malicious JavaScript in memo content:
      • Attack Vector: Attacker injects malicious JavaScript code within the content of a memo. This could be done through the memo creation or editing interface.
      • Exploitation: When another user views the memo, the stored JavaScript code executes in their browser.
      • Impact: Session hijacking, cookie theft, redirection to malicious sites, defacement of the application for the victim user, or further attacks against the victim's system.
  • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Reflected XSS in Search/Filter Parameters:
    • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Craft malicious URL with JavaScript payload in search query:
      • Attack Vector: Attacker crafts a malicious URL that includes JavaScript code within a search or filter parameter.
      • Exploitation: The attacker tricks a victim user into clicking the malicious URL. When the application processes the URL, the JavaScript code is reflected back to the user's browser and executed.
      • Impact: Similar to Stored XSS, but requires victim interaction to click the malicious link. Session hijacking, cookie theft, redirection, etc.
  • [HIGH-RISK PATH] Markdown Injection/Abuse:
    • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Inject malicious Markdown to bypass sanitization:
      • Attack Vector: Attacker injects specially crafted Markdown syntax into memo content that exploits vulnerabilities in the Markdown parser or bypasses sanitization mechanisms.
      • Exploitation: When the memo is rendered, the malicious Markdown can lead to unexpected behavior, such as loading external resources from attacker-controlled sites, or in some cases, HTML injection if the parser is misconfigured.
      • Impact: Information disclosure (loading images from attacker's server can reveal IP addresses), client-side vulnerabilities, redirection to malicious sites. While often less severe than full XSS, it can still be exploited for malicious purposes.

Attack Tree Path: 2. [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Authentication/Authorization Weaknesses in Memos:

• [HIGH-RISK PATH] Authentication Bypass:

  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit default credentials:
    • Attack Vector: If Memos or the application using it ships with default credentials (username/password) for administrative or user accounts, and these are not changed by the administrator.
    • Exploitation: Attacker attempts to log in using the known default credentials.
    • Impact: Full unauthorized access to the application, potentially with administrative privileges, leading to complete compromise.
  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Brute-force weak passwords:
    • Attack Vector: If the application uses basic authentication and does not implement strong password policies or rate limiting on login attempts.
    • Exploitation: Attacker uses automated tools to try a large number of password combinations to guess a user's password.
    • Impact: Account compromise, allowing access to the user's memos and potentially other application data.

• [HIGH-RISK PATH] Authorization Bypass/Privilege Escalation within Memos:

  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Manipulate API requests to access/modify memos of other users:
    • Attack Vector: If the Memos API has vulnerabilities in its authorization logic, allowing users to access or modify resources they should not have access to.
    • Exploitation: Attacker manipulates API requests (e.g., by changing user IDs or memo IDs in the request parameters) to attempt to access or modify memos belonging to other users.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data (other users' memos), data manipulation (modifying or deleting other users' memos), potentially privilege escalation if authorization flaws extend to administrative functions.

Attack Tree Path: 3. [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit API Vulnerabilities in Memos:

• [HIGH-RISK PATH] API Abuse/Rate Limiting Issues:

  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Denial of Service (DoS) by overwhelming API endpoints:
    • Attack Vector: If the Memos API endpoints are publicly accessible and lack proper rate limiting.
    • Exploitation: Attacker sends a large volume of requests to the API endpoints, overwhelming the server and making the application unavailable to legitimate users.
    • Impact: Service disruption, application unavailability, impacting users' ability to access or use Memos.
  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Brute-force attacks on API endpoints:
    • Attack Vector: If API endpoints related to authentication or sensitive actions are not rate-limited and use weak authentication mechanisms.
    • Exploitation: Attacker uses automated tools to brute-force API endpoints, attempting to guess API keys, tokens, or user credentials.
    • Impact: Account compromise, unauthorized access to API functionality, data breaches depending on the API endpoints targeted.

• [HIGH-RISK PATH] Insecure API Endpoints/Parameter Tampering:

  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Access sensitive data via API endpoints without proper authorization:
    • Attack Vector: If API endpoints that expose sensitive data (e.g., user details, internal system information) are not properly secured with authorization checks.
    • Exploitation: Attacker directly accesses these API endpoints without proper authentication or authorization, potentially bypassing intended access controls.
    • Impact: Data breach, information disclosure, exposing sensitive user data or internal application details.
  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Modify/delete memos via API endpoints without proper authorization:
    • Attack Vector: If API endpoints for modifying or deleting memos lack proper authorization checks.
    • Exploitation: Attacker manipulates API requests to modify or delete memos, potentially affecting data integrity and availability.
    • Impact: Data manipulation, data integrity issues, potential data loss or disruption of application functionality.
  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Parameter manipulation to bypass filters or access controls in API requests:
    • Attack Vector: If API endpoints rely on client-side or easily bypassed input validation or access controls based on request parameters.
    • Exploitation: Attacker manipulates API request parameters to bypass intended filters or access controls, gaining unauthorized access or performing unauthorized actions.
    • Impact: Authorization bypass, data access, data manipulation, depending on the specific API endpoint and vulnerability.

Attack Tree Path: 4. [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit File Upload Vulnerabilities (If Memos implements file uploads):

• [HIGH-RISK PATH] Unrestricted File Upload:
  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Upload malicious file types:
    • Attack Vector: If Memos allows file uploads without proper restrictions on file types.
    • Exploitation: Attacker uploads malicious files, such as executable files, HTML files with JavaScript, or other dangerous file types.
    • Impact: Server-side execution if executable files are uploaded and accessed, client-side XSS if HTML/JavaScript files are uploaded and served, potentially leading to full system compromise or widespread user impact.
  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Server-side execution or client-side XSS via uploaded files:
    • Attack Vector: Once malicious files are uploaded, they can be accessed and executed by the server or served to users' browsers.
    • Exploitation: Attacker accesses the uploaded malicious files directly or tricks users into accessing them.
    • Impact: Server-side execution, allowing the attacker to run arbitrary code on the server. Client-side XSS, as described in input validation vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 5. [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Dependency Vulnerabilities in Memos:

• [HIGH-RISK PATH] Outdated Dependencies with Known Vulnerabilities:
  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Identify vulnerable dependencies used by Memos:
    • Attack Vector: Memos relies on third-party libraries and frameworks (dependencies). If these dependencies are outdated and contain known security vulnerabilities.
    • Exploitation: Attacker uses vulnerability scanning tools to identify outdated dependencies with publicly known vulnerabilities in Memos.
    • Impact: Identification of vulnerable components allows attackers to target known weaknesses.
  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit known vulnerabilities in dependencies:
    • Attack Vector: Once vulnerable dependencies are identified, attackers can exploit the known vulnerabilities.
    • Exploitation: Attacker uses publicly available exploits or develops custom exploits to target the identified vulnerabilities in the outdated dependencies.
    • Impact: Depending on the vulnerability, impact can range from Denial of Service (DoS) to Remote Code Execution (RCE), potentially leading to full system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 6. [CRITICAL NODE, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exploit Configuration and Deployment Issues in Memos:

• [HIGH-RISK PATH] Insecure Default Configuration:

  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Default credentials for admin accounts: (Already covered in Authentication Bypass)
  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Weak default settings:
    • Attack Vector: Memos default configuration includes weak security settings, such as permissive access controls, verbose error logging, or insecure default ports.
    • Exploitation: Attacker exploits these weak default settings to gain unauthorized access, gather information, or increase the attack surface.
    • Impact: Information disclosure (verbose error logs), increased attack surface, potential for easier exploitation of other vulnerabilities.
  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Unnecessary features enabled by default:
    • Attack Vector: Memos has unnecessary features enabled by default that increase the attack surface and may contain vulnerabilities.
    • Exploitation: Attacker targets these unnecessary features to find and exploit vulnerabilities.
    • Impact: Increased attack surface, potential for exploitation of vulnerabilities in unnecessary features.

• [HIGH-RISK PATH] Misconfiguration during Deployment:

  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Exposed configuration files:
    • Attack Vector: Configuration files containing sensitive information (e.g., database credentials, API keys) are accidentally exposed to the web or are not properly secured during deployment.
    • Exploitation: Attacker gains access to these exposed configuration files, revealing sensitive secrets.
    • Impact: Exposure of secrets can lead to full compromise of the application and its infrastructure.
  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Insecure server configuration:
    • Attack Vector: The server hosting Memos is misconfigured, with weak TLS settings, exposed management ports, or other insecure configurations.
    • Exploitation: Attacker exploits these server misconfigurations to perform Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks, gain access to management interfaces, or further compromise the server.
    • Impact: Man-in-the-middle attacks, unauthorized access to server management, potential server compromise.
  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Running Memos with overly permissive permissions:
    • Attack Vector: Memos application processes are run with overly permissive file system or operating system permissions.
    • Exploitation: If an attacker gains limited access (e.g., through XSS or other vulnerabilities), overly permissive permissions can allow them to escalate privileges and gain further control.
    • Impact: Privilege escalation, potential for further exploitation and system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 7. [HIGH-RISK PATH] Social Engineering Attacks Targeting Memos Users:

• [HIGH-RISK PATH] Phishing Attacks:

  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Send phishing emails to Memos users to steal credentials:
    • Attack Vector: Attacker sends deceptive emails (phishing emails) to Memos users, impersonating legitimate entities (e.g., the application administrator, a trusted service).
    • Exploitation: Users are tricked into clicking malicious links in the emails or providing their login credentials on fake login pages controlled by the attacker.
    • Impact: Account compromise, allowing the attacker to access the user's memos and potentially other application data.

• [HIGH-RISK PATH] Credential Stuffing/Password Reuse:

  • [LEAF, HIGH-RISK PATH] Attempt to login with leaked credentials from other breaches:
    • Attack Vector: Attackers obtain lists of usernames and passwords leaked from data breaches at other websites or services.
    • Exploitation: Attackers use automated tools to try these leaked credentials to log in to Memos, assuming users reuse passwords across different platforms.
    • Impact: Account compromise if users reuse passwords, allowing access to their memos and potentially other application data.