- Description: A passive network adversary analyzes traffic patterns (packet sizes, timing, frequency, etc.) even when encrypted, to identify that
v2ray-core
is being used. They might use machine learning or other statistical techniques to distinguishv2ray-core
traffic from other encrypted traffic. The adversary may not be able to decrypt the content, but they can identify the use ofv2ray-core
.- Impact:
- Loss of anonymity: Users can be identified as using a circumvention tool.
- Service blocking: The adversary can selectively block or throttle connections.
- Metadata collection: The adversary can gather information about user activity.
- Affected v2ray-core Component:
- All transport protocols (VMess, VLESS, Shadowsocks, Trojan, etc.).
- The
transport
layer and its configuration (streamSettings
). - Obfuscation mechanisms (TLS, WebSocket) within the
transport
layer.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Use protocols designed for strong obfuscation (VLESS + XTLS, Trojan).
- Configure TLS with realistic certificates and ciphers.
- Use WebSocket transport with appropriate path and host settings.
- Avoid default ports or easily guessable configurations.
- Regularly update
v2ray-core
. - Consider traffic padding (if supported).
- Use bridges or relays.
- Impact:
Threat: Active Probing and Blocking
- Description: An active network adversary sends probe packets to the suspected
v2ray-core
server or client to elicit responses that reveal the presence ofv2ray-core
or specific protocols. Based on the responses, the adversary can block the connection.- Impact:
- Denial of service: Users are unable to connect.
- Circumvention failure.
- Affected v2ray-core Component:
- All inbound and outbound connection handlers.
- The specific protocol implementation (VMess, VLESS, Shadowsocks, etc.).
- The
transport
layer and its configuration.
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Use protocols and configurations resistant to known probing techniques (VLESS + XTLS, Trojan).
- Configure
streamSettings
to use TLS with strong ciphers and certificate verification. - Implement fallback mechanisms (switch protocols/servers).
- Use domain fronting (with caution).
- Regularly update
v2ray-core
.
- Impact:
Threat: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack
- Description: An adversary intercepts the connection between the client and server, presenting a fake certificate, decrypting traffic, potentially modifying it, and re-encrypting it.
- Impact:
- Complete loss of confidentiality.
- Data modification.
- Loss of integrity.
- Potential for further attacks.
- Affected v2ray-core Component:
- TLS implementation within the
transport
layer (streamSettings
). - Certificate verification logic.
- Protocols that rely on TLS for security.
- TLS implementation within the
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Always use TLS with strong ciphers and certificate verification.
- Ensure the client verifies the server's certificate against a trusted CA. Do not disable certificate verification.
- Use protocols with strong authentication (VLESS + XTLS, Trojan).
- Consider mutual TLS (mTLS).
- Regularly update
v2ray-core
. - Use a secure channel to initially exchange configuration information.
- Impact:
- Description: A misconfigured
v2ray-core
instance allows traffic to bypass the tunnel or leak identifying information due to incorrect routing rules, DNS settings, or security parameters.- Impact:
- Loss of anonymity: User's real IP address or DNS requests may be exposed.
- Circumvention failure.
- Potential for data leakage.
- Affected v2ray-core Component:
routing
configuration.inbounds
andoutbounds
configurations.- DNS settings within
v2ray-core
or the OS. policy
configuration (if used).
- Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Thoroughly review and test the configuration.
- Use a configuration validation tool (if available).
- Provide clear and secure configuration instructions.
- Use a secure method for distributing configurations.
- Configure DNS to use a trusted resolver over TLS/HTTPS through the tunnel.
- Use "full tunnel" configurations.
- Regularly audit the configuration.
- Impact:
- Description: A security vulnerability (e.g., buffer overflow, RCE) is discovered in the
v2ray-core
code. An attacker crafts a malicious payload to exploit it, gaining control of the process or system.- Impact:
- Complete system compromise.
- Data theft.
- Denial of service.
- Use as a botnet.
- Affected v2ray-core Component:
- Potentially any part of the
v2ray-core
codebase.
- Potentially any part of the
- Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Keep
v2ray-core
updated to the latest stable version. This is crucial. - Monitor security advisories.
- Temporarily disable
v2ray-core
or use an alternative if a patch isn't available. - Run
v2ray-core
with least privileges. - Consider sandboxing.
- Keep
- Impact:
- Description: A vulnerability is discovered in a library that
v2ray-core
depends on. An attacker exploits this vulnerability to compromisev2ray-core
.- Impact: Similar to a direct
v2ray-core
vulnerability, this could lead to system compromise, data theft, or denial of service. - Affected v2ray-core Component: The component that uses the vulnerable dependency. This is difficult to predict without knowing the specific vulnerability.
- Risk Severity: Critical (depending on the vulnerability in the dependency)
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Keep
v2ray-core
updated.v2ray-core
updates often include updates to its dependencies. - Monitor security advisories for
v2ray-core
and its major dependencies. - Consider using a software composition analysis (SCA) tool to identify and track vulnerabilities in dependencies.
- Keep
- Impact: Similar to a direct