Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
140 lines (122 loc) · 10.3 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

140 lines (122 loc) · 10.3 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for valyala/fasthttp

Objective: The attacker's goal is to achieve one or more of the following, by exploiting fasthttp-specific vulnerabilities:

  1. Denial of Service (DoS): Render the application unresponsive to legitimate users.
  2. Information Disclosure: Gain access to sensitive data.
  3. Remote Code Execution (RCE): Execute arbitrary code on the server (indirectly via fasthttp).
  4. Request Smuggling/Hijacking: Manipulate request parsing.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application using fasthttp
├── 1. Denial of Service (DoS) [HIGH RISK]
│   ├── 1.1 Slowloris-style Attacks (Exploiting Connection Handling)
│   │   ├── 1.1.1  Slow Header Reads (Incomplete Headers)
│   │   │   └──  *Mitigation:*  Set reasonable `ReadTimeout` and `WriteHeaderTimeout` values.  Monitor for slow connections. [CRITICAL]
│   │   ├── 1.1.2  Slow Body Reads (Incomplete Body)
│   │   │   └──  *Mitigation:*  Set reasonable `ReadTimeout` and `MaxRequestBodySize`.  Monitor for slow connections. [CRITICAL]
│   │   └── 1.1.3  Many Concurrent Connections (Exhaustion) [HIGH RISK]
│   │       └──  *Mitigation:*  Limit the maximum number of concurrent connections using `Concurrency` and potentially external tools. [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 1.2  Resource Exhaustion via Request Flooding [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.2.1  High Request Rate (Legitimate-Looking Requests) [HIGH RISK]
│   │   │   └──  *Mitigation:*  Implement rate limiting.  Monitor request rates. [CRITICAL]
│   │   ├── 1.2.2  Large Request Bodies (Even if Rejected)
│   │   │   └──  *Mitigation:*  Strictly enforce `MaxRequestBodySize`. [CRITICAL]
│   └── 1.3  Exploiting `fasthttp` Bugs (e.g., Panics)
│       ├── 1.3.1  Triggering Panics via Crafted Input
│       │   └──  *Mitigation:*  Regularly update `fasthttp`. Implement robust error handling and recovery mechanisms. Use fuzz testing. [CRITICAL]
├── 2. Information Disclosure
│   ├── 2.2  Error Handling Leaks [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 2.2.1  Detailed Error Messages Revealing Internal Paths or Configuration [HIGH RISK]
│   │   │   └──  *Mitigation:*  Implement custom error handlers that return generic error messages.  Log detailed errors separately. [CRITICAL]
│   │   └── 2.2.2  Stack Traces in Responses (on Panic, if not Handled) [HIGH RISK]
│   │       └──  *Mitigation:*  Use `recover()` to handle panics gracefully and prevent stack traces. [CRITICAL]
│   └── 2.3 Exploiting `fasthttp` Bugs (e.g., Buffer Over-Reads)
│       └── *Mitigation:* Regularly update `fasthttp`. Use memory safety tools. [CRITICAL]
├── 3. Remote Code Execution (RCE) - *Indirectly* via fasthttp
│   ├── 3.2  Chaining with Other Vulnerabilities (e.g., Deserialization, Template Injection) [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 3.2.1  `fasthttp` Used to Deliver Malicious Payload to Vulnerable Component [HIGH RISK]
│   │   │   └──  *Mitigation:*  Address vulnerabilities in *all* components of the application.  Follow secure coding practices. [CRITICAL]
│   │   └── 3.2.2  `fasthttp` Misconfiguration Leading to Exposure of Vulnerable Endpoints
│   │       └── *Mitigation:* Carefully configure routing and access controls. Follow the principle of least privilege. [CRITICAL]
│   └── 3.3 Exploiting unsafe features of fasthttp
│       └── *Mitigation:* Avoid using unsafe features of fasthttp, like `hijack`. [CRITICAL]
├── 4. Request Smuggling/Hijacking
    ├── 4.2  Connection Hijacking (If `hijack` Feature is Misused) [HIGH RISK]
    │   └──  *Mitigation:*  Avoid using the `hijack` feature unless absolutely necessary and with extreme caution. [CRITICAL]
    └── 4.3 Exploiting fasthttp bugs
        └── *Mitigation:* Regularly update `fasthttp`. [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: Denial of Service (DoS)

Description: The attacker establishes numerous connections but sends data very slowly (incomplete headers or body). This ties up server resources, preventing legitimate users from connecting. Vectors: * Slow Header Reads (1.1.1): Sending HTTP headers very slowly, one byte at a time. * Slow Body Reads (1.1.2): Establishing a connection and sending the initial headers, but then sending the request body extremely slowly. * Many Concurrent Connections (1.1.3): Simply opening a large number of connections to the server, exhausting the available connection pool. Critical Mitigations: * Set ReadTimeout and WriteHeaderTimeout to reasonable values (e.g., a few seconds). * Set MaxRequestBodySize to limit the maximum size of a request body. * Limit the maximum number of concurrent connections using the Concurrency setting in fasthttp.Server.

Attack Tree Path: Resource Exhaustion via Request Flooding

Description: The attacker overwhelms the server with a large volume of requests, consuming CPU, memory, or other resources. Vectors: * High Request Rate (1.2.1): Sending a flood of valid (or seemingly valid) requests to the server. * Large Request Bodies (1.2.2): Sending requests with very large bodies, even if the server ultimately rejects them, the initial processing can consume resources. Critical Mitigations: * Implement rate limiting (per IP address, per user, or globally). * Strictly enforce MaxRequestBodySize.

Attack Tree Path: Exploiting fasthttp Bugs

Description: The attacker sends crafted input designed to trigger a bug in fasthttp (like a panic) that causes the server to crash or become unresponsive. Vectors: * Triggering Panics via Crafted Input (1.3.1): Sending specially formed requests that exploit a vulnerability in fasthttp's parsing or handling logic, leading to a panic. Critical Mitigations: * Regularly update fasthttp to the latest version. * Implement robust error handling and use recover() to catch panics. * Use fuzz testing to identify potential vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: Information Disclosure

Error Handling Leaks (2.2): * Description: The server reveals sensitive information through error messages or stack traces. * Vectors: * Detailed Error Messages (2.2.1): Error messages that include internal file paths, database queries, or configuration details. * Stack Traces (2.2.2): Unhandled panics that result in stack traces being sent in the HTTP response. * Critical Mitigations: * Implement custom error handlers that return generic error messages to clients. * Use recover() to handle panics and prevent stack traces from being exposed. * Log detailed error information securely (not in responses to clients). * Exploiting fasthttp Bugs (2.3): * Description: The attacker sends crafted input designed to trigger a bug in fasthttp that causes the server to leak information. * Vectors: * Exploiting buffer over-reads or other memory-related vulnerabilities. * Critical Mitigations: * Regularly update fasthttp to the latest version. * Use memory safety tools (e.g., AddressSanitizer) during development.

Attack Tree Path: Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Indirectly via fasthttp

  • Chaining with Other Vulnerabilities (3.2): * Description: fasthttp is used as the entry point to deliver a malicious payload that exploits a vulnerability in another part of the application (e.g., a vulnerable library used for deserialization or template rendering). * Vectors: * fasthttp Used to Deliver Malicious Payload (3.2.1): The attacker sends a request containing a malicious payload (e.g., a serialized object or a crafted template) that triggers a vulnerability in a different component. * fasthttp Misconfiguration (3.2.2): Incorrect routing or access control configuration in fasthttp exposes a vulnerable endpoint that should not be accessible. * Critical Mitigations: * Address vulnerabilities in all components of the application, not just fasthttp. * Follow secure coding practices for all parts of the application. * Carefully configure routing and access controls in fasthttp. * Follow the principle of least privilege.

    • Exploiting unsafe features of fasthttp (3.3):
      • Description: Using unsafe features of fasthttp can lead to vulnerabilities.
      • Vectors:
        • Misusing hijack feature.
      • Critical Mitigations:
        • Avoid using unsafe features.

Attack Tree Path: Request Smuggling/Hijacking

  • Connection Hijacking (4.2): * Description: If the hijack feature of fasthttp is used, the attacker might be able to gain control of the underlying TCP connection and manipulate requests or responses. * Vectors: * Improper handling of the connection after hijacking, leading to vulnerabilities. * Critical Mitigations: * Avoid using the hijack feature unless absolutely necessary. * If hijack is used, ensure proper connection closure and resource cleanup. * Thoroughly validate any data received on a hijacked connection.
    • Exploiting fasthttp bugs (4.3):
      • Description: The attacker sends crafted input designed to trigger a bug in fasthttp that causes the server to misinterpret requests.
      • Vectors:
        • Exploiting vulnerabilities in request parsing.
      • Critical Mitigations:
        • Regularly update fasthttp to the latest version.