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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for vitessio/vitess

Attack Surface: 1. MySQL Protocol Exploits on VTGate (Critical)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the MySQL protocol implementation within VTGate.
  • Vitess Contribution: VTGate acts as a MySQL protocol proxy, parsing and handling MySQL client requests. Any vulnerability in VTGate's MySQL protocol handling becomes an attack surface.
  • Example: A crafted MySQL query sent to VTGate triggers a buffer overflow in VTGate's protocol parsing logic, leading to remote code execution on the VTGate server.
  • Impact: Full compromise of the VTGate server, potentially leading to data breaches, service disruption, and lateral movement within the infrastructure.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep Vitess updated to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing focusing on VTGate's MySQL protocol handling.
    • Consider using a Web Application Firewall (WAF) in front of VTGate to filter malicious MySQL traffic (though less common than HTTP WAFs).

Attack Surface: 2. SQL Injection through VTGate (High)

  • Description: Exploiting SQL injection vulnerabilities by injecting malicious SQL code through VTGate.
  • Vitess Contribution: VTGate processes and rewrites SQL queries before sending them to the underlying MySQL instances. If applications do not properly parameterize queries, VTGate can become a conduit for SQL injection.
  • Example: An application constructs a SQL query by concatenating user input without proper sanitization. An attacker injects malicious SQL code into the user input, which is then passed through VTGate and executed against the database, potentially allowing data exfiltration or modification.
  • Impact: Data breaches, data modification, denial of service, and potential compromise of backend MySQL instances.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Crucially, always use parameterized queries or prepared statements in applications interacting with Vitess.
    • Implement robust input validation and sanitization on the application side.
    • Grant database users connecting through VTGate only the necessary privileges (least privilege).
    • Conduct regular security code reviews to identify potential SQL injection vulnerabilities in applications.

Attack Surface: 3. VTAdmin Authentication Bypass (Critical)

  • Description: Bypassing authentication mechanisms protecting the VTAdmin interface.
  • Vitess Contribution: VTAdmin provides administrative access to the Vitess cluster. Weaknesses in VTAdmin's authentication directly expose the entire Vitess infrastructure.
  • Example: A vulnerability in VTAdmin's authentication logic allows an attacker to gain administrative access without valid credentials, potentially by exploiting a session management flaw or a bug in the authentication process.
  • Impact: Full compromise of the Vitess cluster, including data manipulation, service disruption, and potential access to underlying data.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Enforce strong passwords for VTAdmin users and implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).
    • Regularly audit and pen-test VTAdmin's authentication and authorization mechanisms.
    • Grant VTAdmin users only the necessary administrative privileges (least privilege).
    • Restrict network access to VTAdmin to authorized administrators only, ideally through a secure network like a VPN.
    • Keep Vitess updated to patch any identified authentication vulnerabilities in VTAdmin.

Attack Surface: 4. Topology Service Compromise (Critical)

  • Description: Gaining unauthorized access to or disrupting the topology service (etcd, Consul, ZooKeeper) used by Vitess.
  • Vitess Contribution: Vitess relies heavily on the topology service for cluster coordination and metadata. Compromising the topology service can severely impact the entire Vitess cluster.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in etcd or gains unauthorized network access to the etcd cluster. They then manipulate topology data, causing VTGate to route queries incorrectly, leading to data corruption or service disruption.
  • Impact: Cluster-wide service disruption, data corruption, data breaches, and potential loss of cluster configuration.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Harden the topology service deployment (etcd, Consul, ZooKeeper) itself by following its security best practices (strong auth, ACLs, encryption).
    • Implement strict Access Control Lists (ACLs) on the topology service to limit access only to authorized Vitess components.
    • Use Mutual TLS (mTLS) for topology service communication.
    • Regularly audit the security of the topology service.
    • Implement monitoring and alerting for the topology service.

Attack Surface: 5. Internal gRPC Authentication Bypass in VTTablet (High)

  • Description: Bypassing internal gRPC authentication mechanisms used by VTGate and VTAdmin to communicate with VTTablet.
  • Vitess Contribution: VTTablet relies on gRPC for internal communication. Weaknesses in the internal authentication can allow unauthorized control over VTTablet, even if external endpoints are secured.
  • Example: An attacker compromises a VTGate instance and then exploits a vulnerability in VTTablet's internal gRPC authentication to gain unauthorized access to VTTablet, allowing them to manipulate data directly or disrupt tablet operations.
  • Impact: Data breaches, data modification, denial of service, and potential compromise of backend MySQL instances.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Ensure strong and properly configured authentication mechanisms for internal gRPC communication.
    • Use Mutual TLS (mTLS) for internal gRPC communication.
    • Isolate VTTablet instances on a secure internal network.
    • Regularly audit internal gRPC authentication mechanisms.
    • Keep Vitess updated to patch any identified vulnerabilities in internal communication protocols.

Attack Surface: 6. Dependency Vulnerabilities in Core Vitess Libraries (High to Critical)

  • Description: Exploiting known vulnerabilities in critical third-party libraries used by Vitess components, such as gRPC or core database client libraries.
  • Vitess Contribution: Vitess depends on these libraries. Vulnerabilities within them directly impact Vitess security and stability.
  • Example: A critical vulnerability is discovered in the gRPC library used by VTGate, allowing for remote code execution. Exploiting this vulnerability compromises VTGate servers.
  • Impact: Can range from denial of service to remote code execution and data breaches, depending on the specific vulnerability.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement robust dependency scanning and management.
    • Use automated vulnerability scanning tools.
    • Promptly update Vitess and its dependencies to the latest versions.
    • Utilize Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tools to monitor dependencies.

Attack Surface: 7. Insecure Default Configurations in Vitess Components (High)

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities arising from insecure default configurations in Vitess components.
  • Vitess Contribution: Vitess components might have insecure default settings that, if left unchanged, can create vulnerabilities.
  • Example: VTAdmin is deployed with default administrative credentials, or with overly permissive access control configurations. An attacker exploits these defaults to gain unauthorized access and control.
  • Impact: Can lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, service disruption, or full system compromise depending on the specific insecure default.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Always change default passwords and configurations for all Vitess components.
    • Follow Vitess security hardening guides and best practices.
    • Implement the principle of least privilege in all configurations.
    • Regularly review Vitess configurations for security weaknesses.