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attack-tree.md

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Attack Tree Analysis for vitessio/vitess

Objective: Compromise Application Data and Availability by Exploiting Vitess Weaknesses

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Vitess [CRITICAL NODE]
├───(OR)─ Exploit Vitess Component Vulnerabilities
│   ├───(OR)─ Exploit Vtgate Vulnerabilities
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Authentication Bypass in Vtgate
│   │   │   ├─── Weak/Default Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH START] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Authorization Bypass in Vtgate
│   │   │   ├─── Misconfigured RBAC/ACLs [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ SQL Injection through Vtgate
│   │   │   ├─── Insufficient Input Sanitization in Application Queries [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Denial of Service (DoS) against Vtgate
│   │   │   ├─── Resource Exhaustion (CPU, Memory, Network)
│   │   │   │   ├─── Maliciously Crafted Queries [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   └───(AND)─ Remote Code Execution (RCE) in Vtgate (Less Likely, but consider) [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───(OR)─ Exploit Vtctld Vulnerabilities
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Authentication Bypass in Vtctld [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   ├─── Weak/Default Credentials [HIGH-RISK PATH START] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Authorization Bypass in Vtctld
│   │   │   ├─── Misconfigured RBAC/ACLs [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Denial of Service (DoS) against Vtctld
│   │   │   ├─── Resource Exhaustion (CPU, Memory, Network)
│   │   │   │   ├─── Maliciously Crafted API Requests [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   └───(AND)─ Remote Code Execution (RCE) in Vtctld [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───(OR)─ Exploit Vttablet Vulnerabilities
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Authentication Bypass in Vttablet (Less likely if behind Vtgate, but consider direct access)
│   │   │   ├─── Weak/Default Credentials (if directly accessible) [HIGH-RISK PATH START - if directly accessible]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Authorization Bypass in Vttablet (Less likely if behind Vtgate, but consider direct access)
│   │   │   ├─── Misconfigured ACLs (if directly accessible) [HIGH-RISK PATH START - if directly accessible]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ SQL Injection through Vttablet (If direct access or Vtgate bypass)
│   │   │   ├─── Insufficient Input Sanitization (if direct access) [HIGH-RISK PATH START - if directly accessible]
│   │   ├───(AND)─ Denial of Service (DoS) against Vttablet
│   │   │   ├─── Resource Exhaustion (CPU, Memory, Network)
│   │   │   │   ├─── Maliciously Crafted Queries [HIGH-RISK PATH START - if directly accessible or Vtgate bypass]
│   │   └───(AND)─ Remote Code Execution (RCE) in Vttablet [CRITICAL NODE]
│   └───(OR)─ Exploit Vitess Operator/Control Plane Vulnerabilities (Kubernetes, etc.)
│       ├───(AND)─ Compromise Kubernetes Cluster [CRITICAL NODE]
│       │   ├─── RBAC Misconfigurations in Kubernetes [HIGH-RISK PATH START] [CRITICAL NODE]
│       │   ├─── Exploiting Kubernetes API Server Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
│       │   └─── Container Escape from Vitess Pods [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └───(AND)─ Compromise Vitess Operator Logic [CRITICAL NODE]
│           ├─── Misconfigurations in Operator Deployment [HIGH-RISK PATH START] [CRITICAL NODE]
├───(OR)─ Exploit Vitess Configuration & Deployment Weaknesses [HIGH-RISK PATH START - Category]
│   ├───(AND)─ Weak Authentication & Authorization Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   ├─── Default or Weak Passwords for Vitess Components [HIGH-RISK PATH START] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├─── Missing Authentication on Internal Vitess APIs [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   └─── Overly Permissive Authorization Policies [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   ├───(AND)─ Insecure Network Configuration [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   ├─── Exposed Vitess Ports to Public Network (Vtgate, Vtctld, Prometheus) [HIGH-RISK PATH START] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├─── Lack of Network Segmentation for Vitess Components [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   └─── Unencrypted Communication between Vitess Components (gRPC without TLS) [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   └───(AND)─ Outdated Vitess Version with Known Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH START] [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └─── Failure to Apply Security Patches and Updates [HIGH-RISK PATH START] [CRITICAL NODE]
├───(OR)─ Exploit Vitess Dependencies Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH START - Category]
│   ├───(AND)─ Exploit Underlying MySQL Server Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   │   ├─── Outdated MySQL Version with Known Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH START] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   └─── Misconfigured MySQL Security Settings [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
│   ├───(AND)─ Exploit etcd/Consul (or other coordination service) Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
│   └───(AND)─ Exploit Go Runtime or Library Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE]
└───(OR)─ Exploit Vitess Inter-Component Communication Channels [HIGH-RISK PATH START - Category]
    ├───(AND)─ Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack on gRPC Channels [HIGH-RISK PATH START]
    │   ├─── Lack of TLS Encryption for gRPC Communication [HIGH-RISK PATH START]

Attack Tree Path: Weak/Default Credentials (Vtgate, Vtctld, Vttablet - if directly accessible)

  • Attack Vector: Attackers attempt to log in to Vitess components using default or commonly used credentials.
  • Impact: If successful, attackers gain unauthorized access, potentially with administrative privileges (especially for Vtctld).
  • Mitigation: Enforce strong password policies, change default passwords immediately, consider multi-factor authentication.

Attack Tree Path: Misconfigured RBAC/ACLs (Vtgate, Vtctld, Vttablet - if directly accessible, Kubernetes)

  • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit overly permissive or incorrectly configured RBAC/ACLs to gain unauthorized access to Vitess resources or Kubernetes resources.
  • Impact: Authorization bypass, allowing attackers to perform actions they should not be permitted to, potentially leading to data breaches or cluster compromise.
  • Mitigation: Implement least privilege principle, regularly audit and review RBAC/ACL configurations, use automated tools to detect misconfigurations.

Attack Tree Path: Insufficient Input Sanitization in Application Queries (SQL Injection via Vtgate, Vttablet - if directly accessible)

  • Attack Vector: Attackers inject malicious SQL code into application queries that are passed through Vtgate or directly to Vttablet (if accessible).
  • Impact: SQL injection vulnerabilities can lead to data breaches, data manipulation, and potentially denial of service.
  • Mitigation: Use parameterized queries or prepared statements, implement robust input sanitization and validation in the application, use a Web Application Firewall (WAF).

Attack Tree Path: Maliciously Crafted Queries (DoS against Vtgate, Vttablet - if directly accessible or Vtgate bypass, Vtctld API)

  • Attack Vector: Attackers send a large volume of resource-intensive or malformed queries to Vitess components, overwhelming their resources (CPU, memory, network).
  • Impact: Denial of Service, leading to application downtime and disruption of Vitess management functions.
  • Mitigation: Implement rate limiting, request filtering, resource monitoring, and set up alerts for anomalies.

Attack Tree Path: Misconfigurations in Operator Deployment (Kubernetes)

  • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit misconfigurations in the Vitess Operator deployment, such as overly permissive service accounts, exposed operator API endpoints, or insecure container configurations.
  • Impact: Operator compromise, leading to Vitess cluster compromise and potentially Kubernetes cluster compromise.
  • Mitigation: Follow security best practices for Kubernetes operator deployments, implement least privilege for operator service accounts, secure operator API endpoints, regularly audit operator configurations.

Attack Tree Path: Weak Authentication & Authorization Configuration (Category)

  • Attack Vector: This is a broad category encompassing various weaknesses in authentication and authorization setup, including default credentials, missing authentication, and overly permissive policies.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to Vitess components and data, leading to data breaches, data manipulation, and cluster compromise.
  • Mitigation: Implement strong authentication mechanisms (e.g., mutual TLS), enforce strong password policies, implement least privilege authorization, regularly audit and review authentication and authorization configurations.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Network Configuration (Category)

  • Attack Vector: This category includes insecure network setups like exposed ports, lack of network segmentation, and unencrypted communication.
  • Impact: Increased attack surface, easier lateral movement, Man-in-the-Middle attacks, data interception.
  • Mitigation: Implement network segmentation, restrict access to Vitess components to internal networks, use firewalls, enforce TLS encryption for all gRPC communication.

Attack Tree Path: Outdated Vitess Version

  • Attack Vector: Attackers exploit known vulnerabilities present in outdated versions of Vitess.
  • Impact: Exploitation of vulnerabilities can lead to various consequences, including RCE, data breaches, and DoS.
  • Mitigation: Establish a regular patching and update schedule for Vitess, subscribe to security advisories, and promptly apply security patches.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Underlying MySQL Server Vulnerabilities (Outdated MySQL Version, Misconfigured MySQL)

  • Attack Vector: Attackers target vulnerabilities in the underlying MySQL servers used by Vitess, or exploit misconfigurations in MySQL security settings.
  • Impact: MySQL compromise, leading to data breaches, data manipulation, and potential disruption of Vitess operations.
  • Mitigation: Keep MySQL servers updated with security patches, harden MySQL security configurations according to best practices, restrict access to MySQL servers.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Vitess Inter-Component Communication Channels (Category)

  • Attack Vector: Attackers intercept or manipulate communication between Vitess components, often by exploiting unencrypted gRPC channels.
  • Impact: Man-in-the-Middle attacks, data interception, potential data manipulation, and disruption of Vitess operations.
  • Mitigation: Enforce TLS encryption for all gRPC communication between Vitess components, use strong TLS configurations and valid certificates.

Attack Tree Path: Lack of TLS Encryption for gRPC Communication

  • Attack Vector: Attackers perform Man-in-the-Middle attacks on unencrypted gRPC channels between Vitess components to intercept or manipulate traffic.
  • Impact: Data interception, potential data manipulation, and disruption of Vitess operations.
  • Mitigation: Enforce TLS encryption for all gRPC communication, configure TLS properly with strong ciphers and valid certificates.