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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for vitessio/vitess

Attack Surface: VTGate Compromise/DoS

  • Description: Attackers target the VTGate proxy to disrupt service or gain unauthorized access.
  • How Vitess Contributes: VTGate is the central point of entry for all client connections, making it a prime target. Its query routing and rewriting logic, while beneficial, adds complexity that could be exploited. Vitess directly introduces this component and its associated attack surface.
  • Example: An attacker floods VTGate with thousands of simultaneous connections, exceeding configured limits and preventing legitimate users from accessing the database. Alternatively, an attacker exploits a vulnerability in VTGate's parsing logic (a Vitess-specific vulnerability) to bypass authentication.
  • Impact: Denial of service for all database clients; potential unauthorized data access or modification.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Rate Limiting: Implement strict rate limiting per client IP address or user (configured within Vitess).
    • Connection Limits: Configure maximum concurrent connections per client and globally (within Vitess).
    • Query Timeouts: Set reasonable timeouts for all queries (within Vitess).
    • Resource Quotas: Enforce resource limits (CPU, memory) on VTGate processes (Vitess-specific configuration).
    • Authentication & Authorization: Use strong authentication and fine-grained authorization within Vitess to control access to VTGate.
    • Network Segmentation: Isolate VTGate using firewalls or security groups.
    • Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular penetration testing and code reviews of VTGate configurations.
    • WAF (Web Application Firewall): Deploy a WAF in front of VTGate.
    • Input Validation: Although Vitess handles much of the SQL injection risk, ensure the application uses parameterized queries.

Attack Surface: Topology Service Poisoning

  • Description: Attackers compromise the topology service (etcd, ZooKeeper, Consul) to manipulate Vitess cluster configuration.
  • How Vitess Contributes: Vitess fundamentally relies on the topology service for cluster discovery and configuration. The interaction between Vitess and the topology service is the core of this attack surface. A compromised topology service can control the entire Vitess cluster.
  • Example: An attacker gains write access to etcd and modifies the shard routing rules (stored within the topology service for Vitess) to redirect traffic to a malicious MySQL instance they control.
  • Impact: Complete cluster compromise; data theft, modification, or destruction; denial of service.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure the Topology Service: Follow security best practices for the chosen topology service.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant Vitess components (VTGate, VTTablet) only the minimum necessary permissions within the topology service. This is a direct interaction between Vitess and the topology service.
    • Network Isolation: Isolate the topology service.
    • Regular Audits: Regularly audit the topology service.
    • Redundancy and Monitoring: Deploy the topology service in a highly available configuration.

Attack Surface: Direct VTTablet Access

  • Description: Attackers bypass VTGate and directly access VTTablet instances, circumventing Vitess's security controls.
  • How Vitess Contributes: VTTablets are core Vitess components that manage individual MySQL instances. Vitess introduces VTTablet and the expectation that access should be mediated through VTGate. The vulnerability arises from bypassing this intended architecture.
  • Example: An attacker scans the network and discovers an exposed VTTablet port (a Vitess component). They connect directly to the VTTablet and issue SQL commands.
  • Impact: Unauthorized data access, modification, or deletion; potential for privilege escalation within the MySQL instance.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Network Segmentation: Use firewalls to completely isolate VTTablets. Only VTGate instances (and potentially VTOrc) should communicate with VTTablets. This directly addresses the Vitess-introduced risk.
    • Strong Authentication: Configure VTTablets (a Vitess component) to require strong authentication for all connections.
    • MySQL Security Hardening: Harden the underlying MySQL instances.
    • Intrusion Detection: Monitor network traffic to and from VTTablets.

Attack Surface: VTOrc Manipulation

  • Description: Attackers compromise VTOrc to disrupt replication, promote malicious replicas, or perform other unauthorized actions.
  • How Vitess Contributes: VTOrc is a Vitess-provided component for automating failover and other administrative tasks. It is entirely within the Vitess ecosystem.
  • Example: An attacker gains access to VTOrc's API (a Vitess API) and issues a command to promote a compromised replica.
  • Impact: Data corruption, data loss, denial of service, potential for complete cluster compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure API Access: Protect VTOrc's API (a Vitess API) with strong authentication and authorization.
    • Network Isolation: Restrict network access to VTOrc.
    • Audit Logging: Enable detailed audit logging for all VTOrc operations (Vitess-specific logging).
    • Regular Security Reviews: Regularly review VTOrc's configuration.
    • Two-Factor Authentication (2FA): Implement 2FA for access to VTOrc.