attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for vitessio/vitess

Objective: Gain Unauthorized Data Access/Control (Read/Write/DoS) [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     Attacker's Goal:
                                Gain Unauthorized Data Access/Control
                                        (Read/Write/DoS) [CRITICAL]
                                              |
        ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        |                                               |                               |
  1. Compromise VTGate [CRITICAL]              2. Compromise VTTablet [CRITICAL]      3. Exploit Vitess Configuration/Management [CRITICAL]
        |                                               |                               |
        |------                                         |------                     ------|------
        |                                                                                 |             |
        1.2 Bypass [HIGH RISK]                                                        3.1 Weak      3.2 Misconfigured
        Authentication                                                                Credentials   Topology Service
                                                                                      [HIGH RISK]   [HIGH RISK]
          |                                                                           ------|------   ------|------
          |                                                                           |             |   |             |
        1.2.1 [HIGH RISK]                                                            3.1.1 [HIGH RISK]3.1.2 [HIGH RISK] 3.2.1 [HIGH RISK] 3.2.2 [HIGH RISK]
        Use Default                                                                   Hardcoded     Leaked    Insecure      Lack of
        or Weak                                                                       Credentials   Credentials  gRPC/HTTP     Proper
        Credentials                                                                   in Code/      on Public    Security      Access
                                                                                      Repos/        Forums        (No TLS)      Controls
                                                                                      Forums                                           (e.g., RBAC)
                                                                                                                                on Topology
                                                                                                                                Service

        |
  5.  Denial of Service (DoS)
        |
  ------|------
        |
      5.1 Overload
      VTGate/VTTablet
      with Requests
        |
        |
      5.1.1 [HIGH RISK]
      Send High
      Volume of
      Queries
      (e.g., Slow
      Queries)

Attack Tree Path: 1. Compromise VTGate [CRITICAL]

• Description: VTGate acts as the proxy and router for client requests to the Vitess cluster. Compromising it provides a significant level of control.
  • High-Risk Path:
    • 1.2 Bypass Authentication [HIGH RISK]
      • Description: Circumventing the authentication mechanisms of VTGate allows an attacker to impersonate a legitimate user or gain unauthorized access.
      • Specific Attack Vector:
        • 1.2.1 Use Default or Weak Credentials [HIGH RISK]
          • Description: Exploiting default or easily guessable credentials for VTGate access. This is a very common and easily preventable vulnerability.
          • Likelihood: High
          • Impact: Very High
          • Effort: Very Low
          • Skill Level: Novice
          • Detection Difficulty: Easy

Attack Tree Path: 2. Compromise VTTablet [CRITICAL]

• Description: VTTablet manages a single MySQL shard. Compromising a VTTablet gives direct access to the data within that shard.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Exploit Vitess Configuration/Management [CRITICAL]

• Description: This involves exploiting weaknesses in how Vitess is configured or managed, often through its control plane and topology service.
  • High-Risk Paths:
    • 3.1 Weak Credentials [HIGH RISK]
      • Description: Using weak or compromised credentials to gain access to Vitess management interfaces (e.g., VTAdmin, vtctl) or the topology service.
      • Specific Attack Vectors:
        • 3.1.1 Hardcoded Credentials in Code/Configuration [HIGH RISK]
          • Description: Credentials stored directly within source code or configuration files, making them easily discoverable.
          • Likelihood: Medium
          • Impact: Very High
          • Effort: Very Low
          • Skill Level: Novice
          • Detection Difficulty: Easy (with tools)
        • 3.1.2 Leaked Credentials on Public Repos/Forums [HIGH RISK]
          • Description: Credentials accidentally published to public repositories (e.g., GitHub) or online forums.
          • Likelihood: Low
          • Impact: Very High
          • Effort: Very Low
          • Skill Level: Novice
          • Detection Difficulty: Easy
    • 3.2 Misconfigured Topology Service [HIGH RISK]
      • Description: Exploiting misconfigurations in the topology service (e.g., etcd, ZooKeeper, Consul) that Vitess relies on for service discovery and configuration management.
      • Specific Attack Vectors:
        • 3.2.1 Insecure gRPC/HTTP Security (No TLS) [HIGH RISK]
          • Description: Communication with the topology service without TLS encryption, allowing for eavesdropping and potential manipulation of data.
          • Likelihood: Medium
          • Impact: High
          • Effort: Low
          • Skill Level: Intermediate
          • Detection Difficulty: Medium
        • 3.2.2 Lack of Proper Access Controls (e.g., RBAC) on Topology Service [HIGH RISK]
          • Description: Insufficient access controls on the topology service, allowing unauthorized modification of the Vitess configuration.
          • Likelihood: Medium
          • Impact: Very High
          • Effort: Medium
          • Skill Level: Intermediate
          • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 5. Denial of Service (DoS)

• Description: Attacks aimed at making the Vitess cluster unavailable to legitimate users.
  • High-Risk Path:
    • 5.1 Overload VTGate/VTTablet with Requests
      • Description: Flooding VTGate or VTTablet with a large volume of requests, overwhelming their capacity to process them.
      • Specific Attack Vector:
        • 5.1.1 Send High Volume of Queries (e.g., Slow Queries) [HIGH RISK]
          • Description: Sending a large number of queries, potentially complex or slow ones, to exhaust resources and cause service disruption.
          • Likelihood: High
          • Impact: Medium
          • Effort: Low
          • Skill Level: Novice
          • Detection Difficulty: Easy