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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for wailsapp/wails

Attack Surface: Exposed Go Backend Functions via Bindings - Unintended Function Exposure

  • Description: Developers might unintentionally expose sensitive Go functions to the frontend JavaScript code through Wails bindings.
  • Wails Contribution: Wails' core feature of binding Go functions to the frontend directly creates this attack surface. The ease of binding can lead to over-exposure if not carefully managed.
  • Example: A developer accidentally binds a GetUserAdminDetails(userID string) function, intended only for internal server-side use, to the frontend. A malicious frontend script could then call this function to retrieve sensitive admin details for any user ID.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive data, privilege escalation, backend logic bypass.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Only bind Go functions that are absolutely necessary for frontend functionality.
    • Code Review: Thoroughly review all function bindings to ensure no sensitive or internal functions are inadvertently exposed.
    • Access Control in Backend: Implement robust authorization checks within bound Go functions to verify if the caller (even if from the frontend) is authorized to perform the action.

Attack Surface: Exposed Go Backend Functions via Bindings - Insecure Function Implementation (Input Validation)

  • Description: Bound Go functions might lack proper input validation, making them vulnerable to injection attacks or other input-related exploits when called from the frontend.
  • Wails Contribution: Wails facilitates direct frontend-to-backend function calls, increasing the attack surface if backend functions are not designed with frontend input in mind and lack input sanitization.
  • Example: A bound Go function ProcessUserInput(input string) directly executes the input string as a system command without sanitization. A malicious frontend could call this function with "; rm -rf /" to execute a dangerous command on the server.
  • Impact: Command injection, path traversal, SQL injection (if database interaction), denial of service, data corruption.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Sanitization and Validation: Thoroughly sanitize and validate all input received from the frontend within bound Go functions. Use allow-lists and escape/encode user-provided data appropriately.
    • Principle of Least Privilege (Backend Execution): Avoid executing system commands or directly interacting with databases based on raw frontend input. If necessary, use parameterized queries or secure libraries to interact with external systems.
    • Security Testing: Conduct thorough input fuzzing and penetration testing on bound Go functions to identify input validation vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Inter-Process Communication (IPC) Bridge Vulnerabilities - Message Injection/Manipulation

  • Description: The IPC channel between the frontend and Go backend might be vulnerable to message injection or manipulation, allowing attackers to bypass frontend security or tamper with data in transit.
  • Wails Contribution: Wails relies on IPC for communication between the frontend and backend. The security of this IPC mechanism is crucial and any weakness here is directly related to Wails' architecture.
  • Example: An attacker intercepts IPC messages and injects a crafted message to the backend that triggers an administrative function call, bypassing frontend authentication checks. Or, an attacker modifies a message containing user data in transit to alter the data processed by the backend.
  • Impact: Privilege escalation, data tampering, bypassing frontend security controls, unauthorized actions.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure IPC Mechanism: Ensure Wails uses a secure and robust IPC mechanism. (While Wails handles this internally, developers should be aware of potential underlying vulnerabilities in the chosen IPC method and keep Wails updated).
    • Message Integrity Checks: Implement integrity checks (e.g., digital signatures or HMAC) on IPC messages to detect and prevent tampering. (This might require custom implementation on top of Wails' default IPC).
    • Minimize Sensitive Data in IPC: Reduce the amount of sensitive data transmitted over IPC. If possible, process sensitive data primarily in the backend and only send necessary identifiers or non-sensitive data over IPC.

Attack Surface: Frontend (WebView/Chromium) Specific Issues within Wails Context - Context Isolation Weaknesses

  • Description: While WebView/Chromium provides context isolation, vulnerabilities or misconfigurations within Wails could potentially weaken this isolation, allowing malicious frontend JavaScript to access backend resources or escape the sandbox.
  • Wails Contribution: Wails' integration of the frontend and backend within a single application context introduces potential complexities that could, in theory, lead to context isolation issues if not handled correctly by Wails or if underlying WebView vulnerabilities are present.
  • Example: A vulnerability in Wails' internal JavaScript bridge or a misconfiguration allows malicious JavaScript code in the frontend to access Go backend memory or execute arbitrary code on the host system.
  • Impact: Backend compromise, system-level compromise, data breach, complete application takeover.
  • Risk Severity: Critical (though less likely to be directly caused by Wails itself, more by underlying WebView/Chromium issues or Wails integration flaws)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Keep Wails and Dependencies Updated: Regularly update Wails and its dependencies, including the underlying WebView/Chromium components, to patch known vulnerabilities.
    • Follow Wails Security Best Practices: Adhere to any security guidelines provided by the Wails team regarding frontend and backend interaction.
    • Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits of the Wails application, including both frontend and backend components, to identify potential context isolation weaknesses or misconfigurations.