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Threat Model Analysis for wailsapp/wails

Threat: Unsafe Exposure of Go Functions to Frontend

  • Threat: Unsafe Exposure of Go Functions to Frontend
  • Description: An attacker could exploit vulnerabilities in poorly designed Go functions exposed through the Wails bridge to the frontend. By crafting malicious JavaScript calls, they might:
    • Execute arbitrary commands on the server (Command Injection).
    • Access or modify files outside of intended paths (Path Traversal).
    • Execute arbitrary code within the Go backend process (Arbitrary Code Execution).
    • Gain access to sensitive data in the backend (Information Disclosure).
  • Impact:
    • Critical: Full compromise of the application and potentially the underlying system. Data breach, data loss, system instability, denial of service.
  • Wails Component Affected: Go Backend, Wails Bridge, Exposed Go Functions
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Expose only necessary Go functions via wails.Bind.
    • Strict Input Validation: Validate all input from the frontend within exposed Go functions.
    • Secure Function Design: Design exposed functions to be secure by default, avoid risky operations.
    • Use DTOs: Define clear Data Transfer Objects for communication between frontend and backend to enforce type safety and validation.
    • Regular Code Reviews: Conduct security-focused code reviews of all exposed Go functions.

Threat: Vulnerabilities in Go Dependencies

  • Threat: Vulnerabilities in Go Dependencies
  • Description: An attacker could exploit known vulnerabilities in Go libraries used by the Wails backend. This is relevant because Wails applications inherently rely on a Go backend and its dependencies. Exploitation could occur by triggering vulnerable code paths through frontend interactions via the Wails bridge.
  • Impact:
    • High to Critical: Depending on the vulnerability, impact can range from denial of service to arbitrary code execution on the backend, potentially leading to data breach or system compromise.
  • Wails Component Affected: Go Backend, Go Dependencies
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Dependency Management: Utilize Go modules (go.mod) for explicit dependency management.
    • Regular Dependency Audits: Regularly audit and update Go dependencies using tools like govulncheck or go list -m all.
    • Vulnerability Scanning: Integrate vulnerability scanning into the CI/CD pipeline to automatically detect vulnerable dependencies.
    • Keep Dependencies Updated: Stay up-to-date with security patches for Go dependencies by regularly updating them.

Threat: Bridge Exploitation and Manipulation

  • Threat: Bridge Exploitation and Manipulation
  • Description: An attacker might attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the Wails communication bridge itself. While the official Wails bridge is generally secure, potential vulnerabilities could be discovered or introduced in custom or modified bridge implementations (though discouraged). Exploitation could lead to code injection or manipulation of communication to bypass security or gain unauthorized access to backend functionalities.
  • Impact:
    • High to Critical: Potentially arbitrary code execution in the backend or frontend, depending on the nature of the vulnerability. Full application compromise is possible.
  • Wails Component Affected: Wails Bridge, Communication Layer between Frontend and Backend
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Official Wails Bridge: Strictly rely on the official and actively maintained Wails bridge implementation.
    • Keep Wails Updated: Regularly update the Wails framework to benefit from security patches and improvements in the bridge implementation.
    • Minimize Bridge Complexity: Keep the interaction between the frontend and backend as simple and well-defined as possible to reduce the attack surface of the bridge.
    • Avoid Custom Bridges: Avoid creating or using custom or modified bridge implementations unless absolutely necessary and after rigorous security vetting.

Threat: Dependency Confusion/Compromised Build Dependencies (Wails CLI)

  • Threat: Dependency Confusion/Compromised Build Dependencies (Wails CLI)
  • Description: An attacker could compromise build dependencies used by the Wails CLI or introduce malicious dependencies through dependency confusion attacks targeting the Wails build process. This could result in a compromised build process and the injection of malicious code into the application during the build phase, before distribution.
  • Impact:
    • High: Distribution of a compromised application to users, potentially leading to widespread malware distribution, data theft, or system compromise on user machines.
  • Wails Component Affected: Wails CLI, Build Process, Build Dependencies (e.g., npm packages, Go modules used by the CLI)
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure Build Environment: Utilize a controlled and hardened build environment to minimize the risk of compromise.
    • Dependency Pinning: Pin specific versions of build dependencies in package managers (e.g., package-lock.json for npm, Go modules' go.sum).
    • Verify Build Artifacts: If possible, verify the integrity of build artifacts and dependencies used by the Wails CLI through checksums or signatures.
    • Use Private Dependency Repositories (where applicable): If feasible, use private repositories for build dependencies to reduce exposure to public repositories susceptible to attacks.

Threat: Compromised Wails CLI Toolchain

  • Threat: Compromised Wails CLI Toolchain
  • Description: An attacker could compromise the Wails CLI toolchain itself (e.g., through a supply chain attack targeting the Wails repository, distribution channels, or maintainer accounts). If successful, any application built using the compromised CLI would be potentially malicious from the outset.
  • Impact:
    • Critical: Widespread compromise of applications built with the compromised CLI. Massive malware distribution potential, impacting all users of applications built with the infected toolchain.
  • Wails Component Affected: Wails CLI Toolchain, Distribution Channels (e.g., GitHub releases, npm registry if applicable)
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Use Official Wails Distribution: Download the Wails CLI and related tools exclusively from official and trusted sources (e.g., Wails GitHub releases, official wails.io website).
    • Verify Signatures (if available): If digital signatures are provided for Wails binaries or packages, verify these signatures before using them.
    • Monitor Wails Security Advisories: Stay actively informed about security advisories and announcements related to Wails from official Wails channels.
    • Regularly Update Wails: Keep the Wails CLI and framework updated to benefit from security updates and patches released by the Wails team.

Threat: Unrestricted Local File System Access via Go Backend (Exposed via Wails)

  • Threat: Unrestricted Local File System Access via Go Backend (Exposed via Wails)
  • Description: Through the Wails bridge, if exposed Go functions permit unrestricted file system operations based on frontend input, an attacker could perform path traversal attacks, read sensitive files, exfiltrate data, or tamper with files on the user's local system. This is a direct consequence of exposing Go backend capabilities to the frontend via Wails.
  • Impact:
    • High: Data breach, data loss, data tampering, system instability, privacy violations on the user's local machine.
  • Wails Component Affected: Go Backend, Exposed Go Functions (via Wails Bind), File System Access
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Restrict File System Access: Limit file system access within Go backend functions to only the necessary paths and operations.
    • Input Validation for File Paths: Thoroughly validate and sanitize all file paths received from the frontend before performing any file system operations in Go.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for File Operations: Grant the application and its Go backend only the minimum necessary file system permissions required for its intended functionality.

Threat: Native API Abuse via Go Backend (Exposed via Wails)

  • Threat: Native API Abuse via Go Backend (Exposed via Wails)
  • Description: If Wails applications expose Go functions that interact with native desktop APIs and these are not secured properly, an attacker could abuse these APIs. This could lead to executing arbitrary system commands, abusing system resources, or potentially escalating privileges on the user's machine. The Wails bridge facilitates this exposure from the frontend.
  • Impact:
    • High to Critical: System compromise, arbitrary code execution on the user's machine, denial of service, privilege escalation.
  • Wails Component Affected: Go Backend, Exposed Go Functions (via Wails Bind), Native API Integration
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Restrict Native API Access: Limit access to native APIs in Go backend functions to only what is strictly necessary for the application's core functionality.
    • Secure API Usage: Use native APIs securely, adhering to best practices and security guidelines specific to each API.
    • Input Validation for API Parameters: Validate and sanitize any input parameters used when interacting with native APIs from Go functions.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for API Access: Grant the application and its Go backend only the minimum necessary native API access required for its intended functionality.